

# Aide-de-Camp's Library



सत्यमेव जयते

Rashtrapati Bhavan  
New Delhi

Accn. No. 365

Call No. IA(4) - V





# BONES OF CONTENTION



LORD VANSITTART

*has also written:*

BLACK RECORD

ROOTS OF THE TROUBLE

LESSONS OF MY LIFE

THE LEOPARD AND THE SPOTS

GREEN AND GREY

*etc.*

# BONES OF CONTENTION

BY

THE RT. HON. LORD VANSITTART

P.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., D.LITT., LL.D.

HUTCHINSON & CO. (Publishers) LTD.  
LONDON : NEW YORK : MELBOURNE : SYDNEY



THIS BOOK IS PRODUCED IN  
COMPLETE CONFORMITY WITH THE  
AUTHORIZED ECONOMY STANDARDS.

MADE AND PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN AT  
THE FLEET STREET PRESS  
EAST HARDING STREET, E.C.4

# CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
FOREWORD . . . . .	7
I CONQUEST AND RELIGION IN THE GERMAN CHURCHES .	11
II ANOTHER BLACK RECORD . . . . .	21
III WHAT OTHER GERMANY? . . . . .	30
IV THE POLICY . . . . .	36
V THE REAL REACTIONARIES . . . . .	41
VI PEACE TERMS FOR GERMANY . . . . .	48
VII REFORM AND PRECAUTION . . . . .	62
VIII THE QUESTION-MARK . . . . .	68
IX TEST CASE . . . . .	73
X THE NEW MORALITY . . . . .	79
XI THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA . . . . .	85
XII REVELATIONS . . . . .	91
XIII THE ATLANTIC CHARTER . . . . .	97
XIV THE DESTINY OF FRANCE . . . . .	102
XV THE CITY OF ILL FAME . . . . .	110
XVI THE CHURCH IN POLITICS . . . . .	115
XVII TRAILING MY COAT . . . . .	123
XVIII FOLLOW MY LEADER . . . . .	127
XIX WHY IT HAPPENED . . . . .	132
EPILOGUE . . . . .	139
INDEX . . . . .	143



## FOREWORD

I HAVE BROUGHT THESE BONES OF CONTENTION INTO A COLLECTION NOT because I "hoped it would vex somebody," but because I hope they are food for thought. As in *Lessons of My Life*—though in simpler form—I have written them in unconnected chapters into which readers may dip at random. Personally I do not regard these chapters as controversial. They are merely a contribution to Security.

As controversial, however, they will certainly be taken, and neither I nor, I imagine, my publisher will mind. The experience of trying to tell the English-speaking publics the truth about the Germans has been an interesting one. My chief impression has been the strong hold of German propaganda, and the reinforcement that it has received from the German refugees—with a few outstanding exceptions. These Germans are all brothers under their skin, and they are marvellously well-organised everywhere. To have gained added insight into their racket has been well worth their abuse.

These years of effort, however, have been worth while in many another way. For the first time I have myself taken part in the rough and tumble of politics, instead of trying to advise politicians. The game is not clean, but in the mud and scrums of the pitch I have learned much that I never knew before as a mere expert. I am glad of the knowledge but also glad that I did not possess it sooner. It is an absorbing game, but I should not have wished to play it professionally or to have begun it earlier. It will be a relief to be eventually free to write of something else, free also perhaps to speak of something else or, if I wish, to keep silent. Nearly every speech I have made in the House of Lords these recent years has been on one aspect or another of the problem of Germany, the problem of preventing her from gaining again in peace the victory she could not gain at war. And nearly all of my speeches outside the House have been on the platforms of the "Win the Peace" Movement, of which I am president—a Movement that from its near-cloistered headquarters at 4, Dean's Yard, Westminster, has recruited and enlightened many scores of thousands of the men and women of this country in support of the aims, ideals and practical policies I have

advanced. For the encouragement and support of these people, for the friendships I have found in this cause, I am grateful.

I am grateful, too, for new friends in many countries. They are the recompense of uphill causes—though *why* this one should be uphill is still a mystery. The English-speaking world has so long been lapped in caution, so long unused to heightened voice and unhedged opinion, that I am hardened to the charge of extremism, and to the instinctive repudiation of my doctrines by those who have never read them. At first even bolder acquaintances, with a reputation to lose, nearly always worked in somewhere their insurance policy: "Of course, I wouldn't go so far as you," before I had gone anywhere. That was their way of feeling safe, uncommitted, respectable. In exchange I have struck rich veins of spontaneity inaccessible to diplomacy. Unity with the sufferers from these two German wars is my most valuable possession. I hope that I shall be able to leave it to someone in my will, since this struggle for a safe world will far outlast my day. At present, even at the end of five years of war, we are perhaps more likely to lose the peace than to win it; and we shall be still more likely to do so five, ten, fifteen, years after the signature of another treaty, which every defeated German will strain every nerve to violate. We may well lose the peace because we shall shrink from occupying Germany long enough. We may well lose the peace because once again we shall eventually cover our own sloth by making excuses for the inexcusable.

In that word lies the key. The Germans are inexcusable—utterly. There comes back to me a testimony quoted by that outspoken scholar and politician, J. M. Robertson, in 1915: "We must not delude ourselves by thinking that the German millions have been dragooned to their colours, or driven into action. They have gone willingly and gladly. The very soul and life of the nation is in the struggle." Robertson and his friend were tough realists; so listen also to a mild visionary. Maeterlinck wrote *The Treasure of the Humble*, *The Life of the Bees*, *Life and Flowers*, *The Blue Bird*, and other pity and gentleness. Yet of the Germans he said: "Let there be no suggestion of error, of having been led astray, or an intelligent people having been tricked or misled. No nation can be deceived that does not wish to be deceived: and it is not intelligence that the Germans lack." If you think the gentle artist too harsh, hear the great surgeon, Wilfred Trotter, in his *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*. "Germany has modelled herself after the wolf pack, and has found it fatally easy to teach her citizens the ferocity and greed, the

## FOREWORD

insensitiveness and blood lust of the wolf." Maeterlinck gives you the German case at its worst, Trotter at its best—and what a best! If you will take the dilemma firmly by these two horns you will understand the reason for this book, and we may win the peace after all.





## CHAPTER I

### CONQUEST AND RELIGION IN THE GERMAN CHURCHES

EVERYTHING IN GERMANY HAS BEEN MILITARISED, INCLUDING THE GERMAN Churches, and the sheep of their folds. The German State has always been as sure of the support of the German Churches as of that of Social Democracy. "German Socialists are not like other Socialists," said a former German Chancellor proudly. The same may be said of German Christianity, for its charity stops short at home. In other words, the German Churches have never made any stand, or even protest, against German militarism. All that they have done has been to protest, on the whole mildly, against religious persecution at home, and sometimes, at best, against the denial of religious facilities in occupied countries. They have not protested against conquest, nor against the *material* maltreatment of the victims. To represent the German Churches as opponents of militarism or exported Nazism would be to fall into dangerous errors; they have not resisted the Nazis, or their imperial predecessors, on anything but their *own* ground, and not too well at that. They have thus been the accomplices of annexation and cruelty.

Illustration is always more cogent than affirmation, particularly when it is both brief and recent. I have before me the text of the Pastoral Letter of the German Catholic Bishops of 18th December, 1942. It is an illuminating document. The Bishops assert their love and admiration of the heroism of the German soldiers. True, they denounce religious persecution, but in a manner suggesting their former argument that it impairs unity at a critical time. They also lament the growing acerbity of war, but at a moment when the war was beginning to turn against Germany. They do not dissociate themselves from the Nazi *external* policy and territorial acquisition. In substance they emphasise their obedience to the Reich Government, and conformity with the war-effort. It is a pronouncement of pure nationalism, which accepts Hitler's annexations while rejecting Rosenberg's paganism. The Bishops pay a tribute to the Pope and his peace efforts. The Vatican most wisely gave no publicity to this Pastoral Letter; and we shall see why.

Here are some significant quotations. "Our demand extends with the same insistence to the vital interests of the Catholic Church and the free exercise of Catholicism in the new territories that have come to Germany." Note the calm acquisitiveness of those last eight words, particularly the verb "come." The text goes on to speak of "German Nationhood" in "these new territories." Not a word of protest, not even of shame or apology; the land-grabbing is simply accepted.

In the next paragraph the Bishops complain of religious persecution because it lends colour to propaganda against Germany, and because it embitters the Germans in occupied territories—mostly Fifth Columnists—"who have come to the Reich with great confidence and high hope." An odd way of describing brutal and unscrupulous expansion with the help of traitors! Here is no qualm, no spark of the sense of wrongdoing.

There is worse to come. The next paragraph describes Alsace-Lorraine as having "returned to the Reich after twenty years of alien rule." This is the ordinary formula of pan-German propaganda. The Bishops continue: "The population in May, 1940, hailed the incoming German troops with great enthusiasm, because they thought German, felt German, and expected from the German administration more justice than from the French." That is a falsehood unworthy even of German "technical" Christianity. The poor people felt so German that the Germans have persecuted and deported them with crushing cruelty! The Bishops are thinking again of the Quislings. "The people of Luxemburg also gave a friendly reception to the German troops." (They did nothing of the kind, knowing the type too well.) Persecution, however, has "alienated from us the love of the Luxemburgers." Love indeed! Ask the Luxemburgers what they think of this smug annexationism. They will not mince their words.

The Pastoral Letter proceeds with no apparent embarrassment: "Similar is the religious situation in the territories which, after twenty years of incorporation with Yugoslavia, have returned to the Reich." What impudent mendacity! These territories never belonged to Germany. "This treatment of the deeply believing and zealously religious Slovenes has turned to hate the enthusiasm for Germany"—more of the same nationally conceited fable—"which according to expert opinion prevailed among ninety per cent of the population." (The "experts" were, of course, Fifth Columnists.) This is the old *Herrenvolk* affirmation that everyone forced into the New Order "loves," is "enthusiastic" for, the unwanted and unwelcome conqueror, and that only religious

mishandling of the conquered, not the conquest itself, is culpable. Indeed the idea of conquest never once reproaches these German Churchmen. The vassals have always "returned" to their precious Reich. It never occurs to any German to ask himself why anyone should love him. He is dimly aware that no one does—except the Germanophiles whom he despises—and he hates everyone for not entertaining the affection which he has done everything in his power to dispel. The German Christians are not immune from this kind of spirit.

Instances such as this could be multiplied; but this one, typical of the whole mentality, will suffice. In all such utterances there is no cause for surprise. The German Churches have just run true to form, that is all; and true to form they are likely to run to the end. In the eyes of Europe, through which we must learn to see them, German protests against religious persecution are of no avail or account compared with the acceptance of every other form of outrage. Why should we expect the German Churches suddenly to turn over a new leaf, when no one would expect a sudden change of heart in any other German walk of life?

Europeans look for no miracles in the utterances of the German hierarchy of any denomination; so we are not disappointed when we do not find them. We were, therefore, puzzled by the late Archbishop of Canterbury when he said in 1943: "Let me acknowledge that I was misled when some nine months ago I said that the German Church had resisted only the curtailment of its own liberty, and not the oppression of other peoples. . . . Church leaders in Germany have shown a noble courage in upholding principles by which the German conduct in Poland or Czechoslovakia or elsewhere is evidently condemned, and we honour them for their fearless witness." We wondered what the Archbishop had in mind. Evidently not the Pastoral Letter. Something perhaps of which poor Europe has seen neither the text nor the effect.

The only "fearless witness" worth while would be sweeping condemnation of the German Army by the German Church—which might conceivably mitigate the atrocities of the former. That has never happened in history, for the Church in Germany has had not "one foundation" but two, and the second is the Army; that is what makes it German. I do not believe that there has been any such condemnation even now. In any case it would now be too late—the Germans having again lost their war—to affect the real record of the German Churches. Here also a change—or softening, or enlargement—of a steely heart is very long overdue. It will not come quickly; the Pastoral Letter

shows that it is still afar. Our own need is to realise that "Allies inside Germany" must be bred, not discovered; else we shall only collect again a host of insincerities. Do let us sometimes profit by experience, or at least ask what it was. What did the German Church do to impede either of these wars, and what to prevent the spread of hatred and revenge throughout Germany on the very morrow of the first frustration of its ferocious flock? I can produce a great mass of evidence, but it all points the wrong way in the case of the leaders both of the German Catholic Church and of the Catholic Centre Party.

On this subject I have talked to members of the Polish underground movement—a marvellous organisation with which the Polish Government in London maintained close connection despite the contrary assertions of the Russian press. These men have described to me at first hand how the German Catholic priests in the overrun districts would not even administer the last rites to dying Catholic Poles, unless the moribund spoke German. This is only an extreme modern form of the old German cultural war upon the Polish language, which was forbidden as a medium for prayer.

On the political side the German Catholic Party were the consistent supporters of over-armament, and of the policy for which it was designed. In the last war the party was unmitigatedly annexationist, and strongly advocated unrestricted submarine warfare. The rôles of the Catholics Brüning and Papen in preparing the way for Hitler are notorious. In the March elections of 1933 it has been calculated that the German Catholics registered three times as many votes for National Socialism as for the Catholic Centre Party. Later in that same month the Catholic Centre voted in favour of unrestricted plenary powers for Hitler and the suspension of the Weimar Constitution. "The support of all the moderate parties, conspicuously that of the Centrists, was decisive," wrote Professor Jessop. "It was inspired by . . . a recovered faith in Germany's ability to re-establish her pre-1918 position in Europe."

This faith was stronger than the political objection to the incompatibility of National Socialist ideology with Catholic doctrine. This was a vote for the *Herrenvolk*, since Hitler's purpose was manifest in his book and speeches. In that summer the Catholic Centre Party dissolved itself, and the episcopate pledged "full and generous support" to the new and forbidding form of national unity. Despite the anti-Christian attitude of the National Socialists a Concordat was signed, and cordially welcomed by Cardinal Bertram, who in the name of his colleagues expressed "willing

readiness to collaborate," and appreciation of "the statesmanlike farsightedness and energy of the Government of the Reich." In the late autumn the German Bishops enjoined their flocks—though with expressed misgivings—to take part in the referendum designed as a manifestation of national support for Hitler, who had just left the League of Nations. The Archbishop of Freiburg and the Bishop of Osnabrück went even further in support. (The subsequent subservience of Cardinal Innitzer needs no recalling.)

There were still Catholic elements in Germany capable of resistance, but they were disheartened by a misguidance which after 1933 gave the impression of approving Hitler's *political* projects and achievements, though, of course, not his *religious* programme. The consent of silence at the least was given to the Third Reich's foreign and military policy. That attitude, in strict consonance with the imperialist past, has been continued to this day. It has contributed both to cause and to support these wars. That is the brief charge.

The Bishop of Chichester says that we cannot blame the German churches for praying for German soldiers. They have gone far beyond that. The late Cardinal Archbishop of Cologne, for example, belauded the conquest of the Netherlands, Belgium and France "for which the German people in accord with the exhortation of their Führer thanked God in humble prayers." On 30th May, 1941, the *Deutsche Rio-Zeitung* published the text of a Pastoral Letter from the Bishop of Ermeland. "We behold with admiration our armies who have attained and are still attaining incomparable successes in glorious battles under outstanding leadership. . . . It is just as faithful Christians, fully convinced of God's love, that we resolutely take up our stand behind our Führer." It would be hard to approve more plainly the German policy of brute force. This clearly transcends the ordinary and habitual prayers for the victory of that sinful course. So far I have seen no single authoritative ecclesiastical condemnation of it or of its even more brutal methods. Of this spirit the *Gazette de Lausanne* wrote: "The new German idea has penetrated into the widest circles of the Catholic people and also extensively among the lower grades of the clergy." Events have proved this only too well. The nation was mesmerised by conquest, and the Churches have never been an exception.

The first wartime letter of the German Episcopate looked forward to peace after the victory of the German arms, the second urged unstinted war-effort. The third was solely concerned with religious principles. The criticism of the *New York Herald Tribune* was appropriate. It "proved

disappointing to Catholic leaders here. Although the hierarchy served notice that the church 'clings undauntedly' to the Ten Commandments, the rest of the available excerpts commented on the 'heroism and endurance' of German soldiers and otherwise seemed to give approbation to the German war effort." Exactly. The fourth not only again praised the Army but asserted that the German nation has risen to the highest standard politically, economically and culturally that has ever been attained by any nation of the West. This is the Gospel of the *Herrenvolk*.

Let me conclude by quoting an eye-witness personally known to me. "In Polish Pomerania only 70 priests, out of a total of 700 in 1919, are still to be found. Of these many have been forbidden to minister to their flock. Preaching and the singing of hymns must be in German. An order of 25th May, 1940, forbade confession except in German. The deported and murdered Polish priests have been replaced by German priests from the Reich, whose political loyalty from a Nazi point of view could not be doubted. They mostly belong to the Nazi party and even parade in their party uniforms. On Nazi holidays these priests hoist the swastika on their churches. When they are requested to administer the last rites, they first inquire whether the dying man knows German. The numerous attempts made by Polish Catholics to obtain some sort of assistance from German Catholics, or at least some passive resistance on their part, have all ended in complete failure."

Let us now turn to the Protestant Churches. In 1933 the official German census gave the following figures for the population of the Reich according to creeds: Protestants, 62.2 per cent; Roman Catholics, 33 per cent. In May, 1939, a further census was made after the incorporation of Austria and the annexation of Czecho-Slovakia. The new figures were: Protestants, 54.2 per cent; Roman Catholics, 40.3 per cent. Let us now see how the bulk of this Protestant majority has acted and reacted to German annexationism. The net result is that the great majority of Protestant leaders in Germany have influenced their co-religionists to support the foreign policy of National-Socialism (which is, of course, exactly the same as that of Stresemann under the Republic or of the Kaiser), although these National-Socialist doctrines are in every way incompatible with the principles of Christianity. Everyone in Germany, including most members of the German Churches, is a German first and a Christian afterwards, and the German Christians of all denominations have so far lost sight of the very reason of their

being that they follow the policy of conquest, even when it must eventually mean the destruction not only of their own particular creeds but of all others founded on the teachings of Christ.

I have only space to quote a few excerpts from the evidence which shows clearly that the moral rot in the German Protestant Church set in just so soon as the German nation again got a leader armed with sufficient strength to "do evil in the sight of the Lord." Thus, for example, right early you will find in the collected sermons of Gerhard Bauer, Vicar of St. Margaret's in Gotha, and of many other preachers and teachers, passages like the following: "The German people has found itself again. The Führer is right when he speaks of a miracle which has taken place in the past months. Would it not be possible that an inspired man should rise, point to the miracle and exclaim: 'Blessed be the eyes that see what you see.' " . . . "We have enough to be grateful for that this huge internal revolution has taken place." He and his like were fawningly grateful because the miracle meant strength and aggression. That it also meant de-Christianisation was relatively immaterial.

Pastor Joachim Hossenfelder, a more important person, goes further still. He said: "Christian faith is a heroic, manly thing. God speaks in blood and Volk a more powerful language than he does in the idea of humanity." Here is a German Protestant leader going the whole hog in Nazi racialism, and doing so for a mess of pottage. He goes on: "God has again chosen his man"—what chuckle-headed blasphemy—"and has given to him the greatest mission in German history. A man compact of purity, piety, energy and strength of character, our Adolf Hitler." Religious servility can go no further.

I have already said that the Lutheran Church is little better than a branch of the Prussian War Office. Mr. James Gerard, United States Ambassador in Berlin in the last war until the United States entered it, wrote exactly the same thing in 1918. He said: "The people feel that in attending Church they are only attending an extra drill, where they will be told of the glories of the autocracy and the necessity of obedience. In fact, many State-paid preachers launch sermons of hate from their State-owned pulpits."

The Protestant Church in Germany has been fairly consistent. In the days of the Third Reich it has been roughly divided into two groups. The first, the so-called German Christians, has been wholly devoted to Nazi aims. One of its most prominent members has been the Pastor Hossenfelder whom I have already quoted. This group, moreover,



comprised theologians and pastors of all denominations, Lutherans and members of the Reformed Church, Conservatives and Liberals and strict Pietists. All these supported Hitler's Reichs-Bishop Müller. They announced their programme in April, 1933, in Berlin. The declaration ran as follows, and it is undiluted bloodthirsty nationalism: "God has created me a German; Germanism is a gift of God. God wills that I fight for Germany, and for a German the Church is a community of believers which is under the obligation to fight for a Christian Germany. Adolf Hitler's State calls to the Church, the Church has heard the call." The German Christians, in fact, again went the whole Nazi hog. The second group was the Confessional Church, whose best known figure was Niemöller, a vehement and bellicose nationalist. On the purely religious—as distinct from the political—side Niemöller and a few others are really in a class by themselves. Of the rest of the group it can, however, be broadly said that they did not compromise with the regime *until war broke out*. Between these two groups there lay an amorphous middle, into which we need not enter for the moment. It should, however, be added that in October, 1936, Hitler's Reichs Church Minister Kerl invited the Lutheran Bishops to call on him and sign a declaration condemning the Confessional Church. They did so. The signatories comprised Bishops Marahrens, of Hanover, Wurm of Württemberg and Meiser of Munich. Of the third little has been reported in this country, but Marahrens and Wurm have obtained more credit than they deserve, as is apparent not only from the foregoing but from what follows.

From the 2nd to the 5th July, 1935, a "German Lutheran Day" was held in Hanover. The Protestant Bishops of the Reich who took part in it sent the following telegram to Hitler: "The German Lutheran Day, convoked for the first time after the founding of the Third Reich and assembled in Hanover, send to the Führer and Reichs Chancellor reverent greetings." (Note the servile reverence, though Hitler's attitude towards Christianity was already known.) The telegram continues: "We pray for our Führer and Reichs Chancellor that God may day by day grant him new strength to rule the nation according to divine pleasure." Hitler certainly obtained new strength, and the German churches were largely responsible for the contribution, yet the Church might have taken warning from the profuse blasphemy of all National-Socialists fundamentally bent on destroying the whole basis of the Church. Thus, the aforesaid Reichs Church Minister Kerl said on 13th February, 1937: "The question of the divinity of Christ is ridiculous"

and unessential. A new authority has arisen as to what Christ and Christianity really are—Adolf Hitler.”

The relatively small opposition ever shown to Hitler in ecclesiastical circles diminished with the foreign successes of the Third Reich. German Churchmen, like all other Germans, worship force, and the Third Reich gave them even more than the Second; therefore, most of the German Protestants put even the Third Reich first and their faith second. There were many individuals who in their hearts defended true Christianity. The majority, however, consented unto its death.

And then the war came and most of the German Confessionals decided to refrain from conflict with the regime. At two conferences it was decided “not to obstruct the Government in its war effort.” Indeed, the whole of German ecclesiasticism has supported the war. No part of it has put forward any moral objection to aggression or protested against the appalling terror and unimaginable atrocities committed in the occupied countries. The same Bishop Marahrens, among others, was again one of the signatories of the letter sent to Hitler’s headquarters on 30th June, 1941. “The Ecclesiastical Council of the German Evangelical Church, convoked for the first time since the opening of the decisive struggle in the East, assures you once again, my Führer, in these convulsive days, of the unchanged fidelity and willingness to serve which animates the entire Evangelical Christendom of the Reich. . . . The German nation and all its Christian sections thank you for your deed,” (i.e., in attacking Russia.) “All the prayers of the Evangelical Church remember you and our incomparable soldiers.” Well might the *Christian Science Monitor* of 13th June, 1942, reflect: “Reports from Germany agree that the tenor of the overwhelming majority of Protestant and Roman Catholic sermons has been patriotic and loyal to the Reich’s aims.” Bishop Wurm is again named as one of the most out-and-out patriots, and yet this same Wurm still gets many a write-up from dupes or accomplices in this country and in the United States.

Broadly speaking, the German Protestant Press has always helped in the *Wehrerziehung* (armed education) of the German nation and has been the unremitting backer of that nation’s policy of aggression.

There is one more crime on the charge-sheet of the German Churches. They have played a considerable part in fostering Fifth Column activities in the countries that Germany was to devour. The German Churches have lent themselves to the same dirty work in Czechoslovakia and Poland. Not a word has been said by *any* Germans against the persecution of Polish protestants. The general attitude of the German Churches

towards conquest may be summed up in an episcopal proclamation to the unhappy inhabitants of Lorraine after the German conquest. Here it is: "The unimaginably great victories of the German Army under the leadership of our Führer have made your longing a reality. You may return home to the Reich—the Great German Reich of Adolf Hitler." Cynical hypocrisy can go no further.

The story is the same everywhere. For example, one of the German ecclesiastical organs, *Das Deutsche Pfarrerblatt*, contains the following passage on German ecclesiastical activities in Yugoslavia: "Our brother clergymen took up responsible positions, as they did everywhere in Germanism (*Volksdeutschtum*) beyond the frontiers. The deeds of our colleague Johann Baron from Marburg (Maribor), who was senior of the German evangelical community in Slovenia, are especially commended. Already on 7th March he had taken over the civic administration of Marburg. At the given moment" (note the confessed Fifth Columnist) "he disarmed the Slovene police, drove away the Serb militia and brought German soldiers into the city." Pretty fellows these German Churchmen! Again in Roumania the head of the Evangelical Church, Bishop Viktor Glondys, himself confessed that he had long been aiming at making of the German minority in Roumania "a German nation in the midst of a foreign State." Here, again, is the brazen Fifth Columnist in a cassock. It is, therefore, not surprising that at the beginning of 1942 all the Church schools of the German minority in Roumania were placed by the German evangelical community under the care of a National-Socialist organisation. The German evangelical churches in foreign countries did, in fact, everything within their power to turn Germans abroad into fanatical followers of Hitler and National-Socialism, whose doctrines they were more than ready to condone if they led to the desired and anticipated aggression. Lord D'Abernon wrote of all Germans long before the advent of Hitler: "No one I have met here would think a successful war morally reprehensible." The German Churches are no exception to that utter condemnation of the German people. Nietzsche saw the truth over half a century ago. "To achieve obedience to a person is the cult of the German, all the more so when little is left in him of the cult of religion."

## CHAPTER II

### ANOTHER BLACK RECORD

I HAVE SET FORTH IN OTHER WRITINGS THE REASONS FOR WHICH THE German nation is responsible for its own misdeeds. I have demonstrated why no German party, sect or organisation is guiltless, and why we can trust nothing but an *entirely* renovated Germany, male and female.

I am now going to show that the same invincible causes of guilt and unreliability are also at work among most of the "good" Germans, for as such we must presumably take the bulk of the politically-minded German refugees here and in the United States. I have studied them for years, and they fill me with despair. Is this the utmost that the "good" Germany can produce? Yes. There is nothing better. And what do they amount to? Another war if they have their way. They don't want us to lose the war, but they do want us to lose the peace. Why? Because they are good Germans, working to preserve not only Germany but greater Germany. In other words, these people are, consciously—or worse still subconsciously—pan-Germans, whatever religious or democratic labels they may affect. No peace that suits them can eventually suit the rest of the world. And these are the best Germans existing or available! We shall have to solve the German problem not with them but in spite of them. Lest readers should think my judgment harsh, let them judge by samples.

Throughout this war Britain and the United States have been honeycombed by Germans or pan-German Austrians, who have worked their way into our councils. They happen to be mostly men of the Left, because the German Right has mostly stayed at home, with the exception of those who have bestowed themselves on the United States—men like Brüning, Rauschning, Treviranus. The United States seem moreover to have acquired practically the whole Berlin *Hochschule für Politik*, and German professors infest American universities even more than ours. Germans in profusion have muscled into Government departments—particularly those of political warfare—into business,

into journalism. And none of all these categories wants the peace that we need. I will select my examples not from what I know by private or secret information, but by the admissions of their own ceaseless publications. Let me begin the demonstration in Britain and continue it in the United States.

Here is the Communist leader, Wilhelm Koenen, declaring that the new Germany must be "a strong State"—Europe won't have that at any price—with a sort of people's army—Europe won't have that at any price either, for it would become a professional one at the first opportunity. There is the usual unscrupulous boosting of fictitious underground centres and alleged "mass executions" of alleged rebels "from all strata." This feature is common, and its purpose obvious—to gull the English-speaking publics into believing fairy-tales, until beaten bad Germans revolt against defeat and palm themselves off as good ones. So it's always "Jam to-morrow" (in English) and "pie in the sky" (in American); and the results are still zero.

Here we have Herr Viktor Schiff, former foreign editor of the Berlin Socialist newspaper *Vorwärts*, now of the *Daily Herald*. He is on the familiar tack that the western democracies are to blame for German imperialism. Europe won't have that nonsense either. He opposes a "dictated" peace—as if all peaces were not dictated—prolonged occupation or any cessions by Germany to Poland, threatening us with the death of a "peaceful democratic German Republic," if we don't obey. He asserts that we must be satisfied with the destruction of the Germans actually responsible for this war, and says nothing of the Germanity that produced the last. He argues that we must take Germanity to our bosom even more quickly than after the last war. "The new Germany will perhaps have become a much better democratic State than some of its sternest judges." There's typical German insensitiveness for you. So no period of probation. We are to have what he calls a "Blitz reconciliation." Herr Schiff is an Austrian naturalised German, born in Paris. You would, therefore, think that he had more perception of other people's feelings than the average Teuto-Prussian, and would realise the callous effrontery of his own proposal. But no! The German national conscience has a thick skin, and the best individual mind can rarely shed it, or even dimly realise the spiritual consequences of what Germans have done unto others. I have rarely felt more discouraged than when I read this one sentence of Herr Schiff. It is a revelation in itself. He, too, of course, opposes effective occupation and the Atlantic Charter in so far as it provides for unilateral disarmament;

for millions of Germans, he avers, may be counted upon to "become quite rapidly decent and useful citizens of the new Germany and of the new Europe."

Herr August Weber, former Chairman of the Deutsche Staatspartei, is equally convinced of this convenient theory, and that there are plenty of "suitable and capable individuals prepared to take over on the military breakdown of the Hitler regime." He is indignant at the idea that any but Germans should have a voice in re-educating Germany. Frau Litten, mother of the unfortunate Hans Litten killed by Hitler, is equally sure of the easy conversion of German women and German youth "to a new way of life." Most German women, she says, "have come to see how miserable they have made themselves." No evidence is offered of all these wishful attempts to paint female Germans fair. I can offer masses of evidence to the contrary; so can the Russians! Nor, again, is it shown that they have come to see how miserable they have made their neighbours. Again I—and all occupied countries—can show plentiful testimony to the contrary. Frau Litten, and Herr Koenen, Herr Schiff and Herr Weber all were members of the Executive of the Free German Movement in London.

The next book that I pick at random from the ever-growing pile is even more impertinent. It is by Herr Heinrich Fraenkel, another London Free German, and the Editor of the Movement's paper, who begins by admitting that he is meddling in our politics, and brazenly does so; for he urges that changes in the composition of our Government would greatly hearten our "Allies inside Germany." Not content with this lack of taste and manners, Herr Fraenkel lectures us, informs us that our propaganda to Germany has been futile, and that we should hand it over to Germans. These German skins are impenetrable. The book abounds with all the old stock-in-trade about the "unbending," innumerable Opposition, the "two millions" in the concentration camps, international civil war, and suggestions of soft peace. He tops up with a tentative defence of Prussianism, and the affirmation that we and the Americans also suffer from it.

Next we come to the most impudent book of all: *Need Germany Survive*, by Herr Julius Braunthal, Editor of the *International Supplement of the Left News*. Beginning with the affirmation that the German people are "not guilty," not even of docility, he proceeds to argue that other peoples are equally guilty, including our own. He arranges history accordingly, omitting or modifying the inconvenient facts, to arrive at the stupefying conclusion that "the majority of the German people

have stood for pacifism!" His methods may be judged by the suggestion that if the Germans have had Hitler, we have had Hobbes, Carlyle, Kipling! Anti-Semitism is traced to Chaucer and Shakespeare. The Germans, he suggests, are no worse, indeed, often better, than anyone else. He indicts all Germany's victims down to the very Danes. The German Socialists were not to blame for supporting the war of 1914: they were just "caught unprepared"—that's all. He repeats the lie that the German Army was not beaten in 1918, and affirms that there was a German revolution "fantastic in its suddenness, and equally fantastic in its depth." Its equally fantastic fizzle is, of course, explained away by the usual cliché about "the hostility of the victorious powers." The "Democratic" Germans, no more to blame than "the British and French people" for trusting Hitler, will "swiftly"—i.e., after years of war—awake from their fleeting error. He imputes class motives to the policy of occupying Germany, which is gratuitous since "nationalism is actually waning among the German peoples" (he forgets that he has denied its existence), and he intimates that German collaboration might be withheld from a Europe that could not be reconstructed without it. Appeasement must, therefore, begin again!

What sort of appeasement? Why, Germany is to keep the loot. She "is the only country able to offer Austria great economic advantages." Austrian "independence would mean permanent and, indeed, hopeless mass unemployment and misery." Confederation with Austria's neighbours is wrong and useless; a democratic Germany will act as magnet to the Austrian workers. Nor must Germany be humiliated by unilateral disarmament. Her "military defeat will necessarily let loose revolutions in all parts of the continent," including this country, so we shall all be in the same boat, Herr Braunthal chuckles, because this war is just "a phase in the processes of a world revolution." Only "vested interests" are at issue, not German guilt or ambition. Only "class" and "counter-revolution" can see evil in Herr Braunthal's compatriots. There can be no discrimination between the workers of the Allies and the workers of the Axis. What we need is a peace treaty favourable to the latter, and its victims must not be restored as "national sovereign-states."

This revelation of German insolence should be pondered. It is in strict line with most of the output of the pan-German refugees. It is the best that they can do. Let us remember that, and beware. One other point. Most of these writers are not acknowledged in the Germany of to-day as being of pure German race. One would, therefore, again have expected

to find them less impenetrably Germanic, more perceptive of the feelings of others. But no! Even they are Germans first and last.

In Britain, to sum up, the German emigrants of all shades take the Nationalist line: they demand the maintenance of an undiminished Germany, of a highly centralised Germany that would again prove incompatible with European security. Having learned nothing and forgotten nothing they vapour again in the tone of all former arrogance, and declare that they will sign no enforced peace—as if we needed or wanted their worthless signatures.

I pass on to the United States, and take down a book called *The Silent War*. It is by two German refugees who make no real attempt to explain why "Allies inside Germany" have never accomplished anything despite all these alleged and highly-coloured activities. Of two collaborators they write: "They wanted constant and living proof that there was an underground movement." So do we; and it isn't there. The most significant part of the book is a disingenuous preface by Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, referring as usual to "the tremendous handicaps which were placed in the way of German opposition to Hitler because of the tardiness of the so-called democratic world in opposing him from without." No German has ever tried to explain why the German opposition did nothing, when "the so-called democratic world" did fight, or admitted that, if none but Germans can re-educate Germans then none but Germans could have stopped Hitler. Even Germans can't have it both ways. Herr Niebuhr is a theologian, a fact which lends added significance to his sneer at the countries whose hospitality he has enjoyed.

Here is Prince Hubertus zu Löwenstein, a former German Catholic Republican Youth Leader, a peculiarly unabashed pan-German propagandist, asserting that "Germany should consist of those regions which are genuinely German, Austria included." The Germans are democratic, and must not be guided or occupied. He makes, says Professor John Brown, "at once a bid for power and a plea for an unpunished Germany." The rearmament of Germany was the fault of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission, suggests Herr Seger with singular impudence. We are all to blame for Hitler—not the good Germans. All these trends appear in all German writings in the United States, in those of Herren Friedrich Stampfer, and Wilhelm Sollmann, two former Social Democrat leaders, among hosts of others. Here, for example, is Herr Stampfer asserting that, in his experience, there is no difference between Czechs, French, British and Germans. That, however, is for us, not you, to say, Herr Stampfer; and you will soon be made aware



that we all see a very considerable difference. Or here he is again brazenly asserting that the Underground Movement in Germany was foiled by the protests of the British Foreign Office at Prague! In the eyes of these hardened German propagandists any lie, however extravagant, will do for the gullible British or American publics. A scandalous trade.

Needless to say this deceptive propaganda receives all possible assistance from the German press and the German professors in the United States. The same themes persist in calculated unison: "the two Germanys," the creation of a Pan-European Federation with Germany in the lead (and Britain and Russia excluded), the preservation of the German economic organisation of Europe, agitation and intrigue against unconditional surrender, or even bombing, and so on for ever. We are witnessing a concerted German effort to dodge responsibility, organise sympathy, and—in Miss Dorothy Thompson's phrase—"salvage Germany" by a soft peace that would permit a third German bid for domination.

I will take one other specimen, the most typical of the lot, Herr Paul Hagen. I have said, and repeat, that he is a pan-German concealed as an anti-Nazi democrat. (They are all anti-Nazis, of course; but how little the pan-German refugees have brought that expression to mean!) Hagen, like Braunthal, is gambling on the ignorance of the English-speaking publics. He appears, indeed, to be curiously ignorant himself. He records alleged threats used to a German Council of Workers and Soldiers by a fabulous French General commanding the occupation troops in Aachen after the last war. But it was the 3rd *Belgian* Cavalry Brigade that occupied Aachen! He invents the visit to the Paris Hotel in Aachen of "the famous steel and munitions baron Kardorf," affirms that he lived under the roof of the French General Staff, and "is still one of the leaders of Hitler's economic staff to-day." There was no French General Staff in the hotel, and there was no such person as Kardorf. There was an exceedingly anti-French *coal*-magnate and supporter of Hitler named Kirdorf, who died years ago.

In view of these errors it is not surprising to find Herr Hagen ignorant of other German conditions. He actually asserts that "the industrialists were practically without influence in the foreign policy of the Kaiserreich and not of too great influence in domestic affairs." He has apparently never even heard of Mannesmann's share in the Morocco crisis, or of the fact that the great German industrialists exercised a decisive and calamitous influence both in domestic and foreign affairs by financing

all pan-German and expansionist propaganda. He blunders into blaming the Junkers rather than the industrialists. That view is miles behind the times. The Junkers have done all the harm they could, but they have long been bankrupt, politically and financially; and money talks—*Grossdeutsch.*

He proceeds to the now threadbare falsehood that it was really the Allies who prevented the success of the German revolution, although in the same breath he complains that German democracy "was imposed from the outside rather than developed from within," and adds the staggering balderdash that "the German Republic of Weimar was the freest of all the democratic States." There was no real democracy under Weimar, and it ended in tyranny *before* Hitler. As to the pseudo-revolution, the Germans prevented it themselves, and the German Socialists played an important part in the prevention. Of all German vices the most contemptible is to blame others for their own sins.

Next we come to another familiar fable. "A decree of the Supreme Command stated that the blockade of Germany should be continued." There was no such decree, and I have often shown up the German lie about the continuance of the blockade; but Herr Hagen assumes that it will still do for the American public.

This book abounds either with error or effort to mislead. There were "millions of democratic Germans, the majority of the nation," during the Kaiserreich. This is wide of the mark. The Social Democrats were the strongest party, about 30 per cent of the electorate, and they went to war with the utmost solidarity and enthusiasm.

Why should we take them on trust again? We want prolonged proof. Yet over and over again Herr Hagen asserts without any proof that "there cannot be the slightest doubt that after Hitler's defeat the democratic forces will become the dominant force in Germany, if they are permitted by the victors this time to complete the interrupted revolution," if it is not "again Verboten" by the Allies. Already Allied leadership is "increasingly reactionary." (The dog returns to its vomit.) German unity behind Hitler is only a "semblance." So much for five years of bloody reality under Hitler, and four more of the same under the Kaiser! Note one astounding thing about all argumentative pan-German refugees: they never even mention Germany's First World War, except to insinuate that "war guilt was equally divided." It suits their books to forget it.

Herr Hagen repeatedly argues that the anti-Fascist movement in Italy has been so gloriously triumphant that the Germans will follow

suit. Premise and conclusion are alike false: our "men on the spot" have been forced to conclude that there is little hope of re-educating *this* generation, even of Italians. Herr Hagen knows the fragility of his case, and hedges. "The familiar processes (of revolution) will be delayed (in Germany), and then compressed into a brief final phase." That's the old story: the Germans will fight till they know they are beaten. Till then this Germany bursting with democracy won't burst: though "every town and every district" is bulging with "proven," "reliable," intransigent" anti-Nazis. Till then we must not expect anything "comparable to the guerilla fronts of the oppressed nations." (Why not?) Herr Hagen insults our intelligence by suggesting that, in this final phase, even the German Churches will start the revolt! Nothing will be started till the game is up.

There follows a flood of fiction. Industrial Germany is "pretty well undermined by an elaborate network of local underground groups. Here, again, Germany is going the Italian way." Not a sign of it till the bitter end. There is going to be a "general craving for personal and political liberty"—the very thing that Germans have instinctively dreaded. "Strong democratic movements have emerged in Germany's past." When?

The new and sudden German democracy is going to talk pretty big. If it doesn't like our peace-terms, "a conflict will develop between the German democratic forces and the Allies." It will "defend freedom against restrictions imposed by the occupation," and it will organise sympathy among "analogous groups in the Allied camp," by pretending that "there will have been more destruction during this war in German industries than in all the other areas of destruction together." What cynicism! It will resist decentralisation by any diminution of Prussia, which "fought most consistently against rearmament!" What brazen untruth! In a Germany which "will already have been largely cured of National Socialism . . . a large part of the youth will be eager and useful promoters of the new society," so "there will be no need for strict controls." A new chance for Hunnery. Herr Hagen's overnight "democracy" opposes occupation, it won't have unilateral disarmament, and it *will* have pan-Germanism. Germans outside the Reich must be allowed to vote themselves back again, notably Austria, "Sudeten Germany" and Poland. "The German labour party will demand that plebiscites take place." What German labour party? The only German labour that we know has fought like tigers against us for five years. And yet Herr Hagen complains that I call him a pan-German, though this

is exactly what he and his cronies revealed in 1939 in *The Coming World War*, a plea and plan for a German hegemony in a revolutionary mask. And now he disputes the Moscow decision on Austrian independence!

"The danger of pan-Germanism resides not in a man but in the mentality of the German people," says M. Chéradame. These temporary emigrants simply can't shake it off, and to maintain it they throw morals to the winds. "To subscribe to this doctrine of the 'innocent German people' after the political crimes committed by them and their leaders, is to subscribe to a kind of moral anarchy, which completely abandons any belief in free will and moral responsibility, which is the basis of any organised society." That is America's Professor John Brown of the Catholic University, Washington, D.C. Now let us hear Britain's Professor William Brown, the famous psychologist. "Germany appears to be a definitely paranoid nation, on account of her native aggressiveness . . . It is not surprising that she has accepted a paranoid individual as her leader. . . . The paranoid person . . . never gives in in argument." (The pan-German refugees are no exception: they will argue the hind legs off any donkeys they can meet in Britain and the United States—and there are plenty.) "The nation must be put into moral quarantine for a considerable period of years, policed by a powerful international force, and re-educated, ethically, politically and religiously. . . . When this long period of quarantine is over, and even during its later stages, an attempt must be made to alleviate, and ultimately to remove, the tendency towards a paranoid national outlook."

How many Germans will admit these truths? Literally one in a million. I am often asked why I will not trust Germans. Here is one of many reasons. If ever the Germans could bring themselves to go down on their knees and ask pardon of God and man for the unutterable crimes that they have all, all committed against both, then I might have hope even of this generation. But they won't because they can't—even the best of them. Scratch a German and you find a pan-German. All that the professing élite can do is to dodge, and cog and quibble and lie and hope to deceive; to shirk and shift the blame, and cry: "The culprit is a man, a clique, a class, but not we, nor we, nor we"—until they have progressively exonerated almost everyone for everything. For that duplicity I despise them, and where I despise I cannot trust. That is why I despair of this generation, and why the world on guard must await a better one.

The Greeks had a word for it 2,500 years ago. "Their act was no unintentional injury but a deliberate plot," wrote Thucydides. "Clemency

would be better reserved for those who will afterwards be faithful allies than be shown to those who remain just what they were before."

The responsibility of the German people for these two appalling calamities to mankind is dishonestly disputed by most German anti-Nazi propagandists. They are prepared not to die but to lie for the Fatherland. The best way of serving humanity is to nail the lie; that is, to unmask the Germans intriguing in our midst even when men were dying in millions to save the world from their country. If the typical Germans are allowed to "get away" with their mean pretences, another world war will ensue. "*Völker hört die Signale*," runs the International. Here is a danger-signal.

## CHAPTER III

### WHAT OTHER GERMANY?

LATE IN THE FIFTH YEAR OF THE WAR MR. CHURCHILL REAFFIRMED THAT Hitler was still in control; and everyone should ask how and why the idol of a fanatical nation remained so long on its feet of clay.

There is an old Latin saying that Nothing can be made out of Nothing. It is impossible to conjure an Other Germany out of "next door to nothing." There are, of course, good Germans; but, when you want them, they always come to Nothing. I shall show why they could have come to nothing else.

The shortest method will be by exposing the alleged German Underground Movement. I know something of underground movements. During the years when I was head of the Foreign Office I looked eagerly for some sign of such a German movement, and could naturally find none worthy of the name, because Hitler had the easiest of all rides to power. The German nation had logically thrown in its lot with him: he was the culmination of a process begun under the Kaiser and continued under Weimar. His foreign policy was nationally accepted at the outset.

The rearmament of the German nation for war was carried out with not only national connivance but national enthusiasm. A strike would have stopped it. As early as 1925 as much was being undisguisedly spent on staff, artillery and fortifications as in 1913. Indeed, more was actually spent on illegal staff. Under Stresemann the Army leadership of the

German Republic had a budget of 9.15 million marks compared with the 4.85 million marks of the Imperial German Staff. 90 per cent of the Kiel dockhands declared for the construction of the pocket battleships. So did the Socialist leaders, and brazenly pretended that the ships were needed for defence against Poland! The nation had long been taught to hate and despise the Poles; a war against them could have been whipped up almost as easily in 1929 as in 1939. A hundred years of mis-education in the glories of battle and the mission of the *Herrenvolk* had told their tale, the only possible one.

Thus at the end of the fifth year of Germany's Second World War the German people worked harder, fought harder, held together more tenaciously than after a shorter war-period under the Kaiser. German production of coal, for example, was throughout better than ours. There was still no sign of a collapse of morale, which could only come under the pressure of defeat, of force applied from outside Germany, not from the effect of any movement within. In judging the joint phenomena of German production and morale we must moreover remember that they were maintained not only *longer* than in the First German World War, but despite tests to which imperial Germany was not exposed—concentrated bombing, and the huge drain of the three winter campaigns in Russia.

German apologists and soft-peace merchants pretended that the Gestapo rendered impossible any resistance in Germany. Yet in Poland, Russia, Yugoslavia, Greece, France, brave men and women defied alike Gestapo and German Army, in the teeth of seemingly hopeless odds took to the hills and forests and fought out a guerilla war. Were there no hills and forests in Germany? Yes, but there were no German men and women to fill them. Suppose, however, that Germans should be exonerated from even attempting what others have achieved. There remains an even more unanswerable fact. In flat, woodless Denmark, which lends no cover to such operations, every day saw fresh acts of large-scale sabotage, sometimes even of street-fighting. Why could not the alleged German underground movement do at least as much as little Denmark? Because it did not exist in any force. Not even one leading Nazi was murdered.

To explain away the almost total absence of results in Germany, German refugees are driven to the most disingenuous shifts of reinsurance propaganda. Take, for example, the Social-Democrat Herr Stampfer, now in the United States, the man who, with many of his colleagues, whooped his way into the First World War. There was no pretence

of underground movements in 1914-1918. In the July-August, 1943, number of an American publication, *New Europe*, he has the effrontery to state: "Those men and women (of the opposition) did not want to foster a new 'stab in the back' legend." (After the last war the Germans of *all* parties pretended that they had never been beaten in the field, but only stabbed in the back at home.) Herr Stampfer continues: "The men and women of the German underground movement were by no means willing to give to their foes the opportunity to repeat so sordid a manoeuvre!" Analyse that, and you will see what it means: the German underground movement would be unwilling to act even if it *were* there. Now comes the crowning distortion. Herr Stampfer wriggles on: "They were convinced that the Nazi forces were outnumbered by the united forces of England, France and Poland, and that a sweeping victory of the Allies was in sight."

These German propagandists stick at nothing. All Germans knew perfectly well that they would have an easy task in crushing Poland long before the British or French could muster the forces of succour. It was for the very purpose of covering eastward expansion that the Siegfried Line had been built. The plain truth is that of Joseph Harsch in the *Christian Science Monitor*: "I never met a German, even among those who talked loudest against Hitler, whose eyes did not gleam over the speed and success of the attack on Poland." And why no action during all the years since Poland fell?

Another device for maintaining this fraud upon the British and American publics is to exaggerate most grossly the numbers of Germans in concentration camps. The numbers at the outset were remarkably small in relation to the magnitude of the upheaval, precisely because Hitler was giving the nation what it wanted. At one moment the figures were down to 8,000, though, of course, the average number was much higher. Even so it must always be remembered that only a minority were political prisoners. The majority consisted of two other categories: the victims of racialism—the Jews—of vendetta or "old scores," and those interned and tortured to force them to buy their way out.

The refugee-propagandists show their contempt for our intelligence when they concoct figures of two million Germans in concentration camps. Herr Seger, in the same number of *New Europe*, oversteps all bounds in affirming: "Hitler's terrorism against the German people by far exceeds anything he has ever done to the conquered European nations." For what sort of fools do these Germans take us? The Germans, of course, have had two million human beings, and many more, in

camps; but the millions were not Germans. Yet another dodge is to swell the list of martyrs by including Czechs, Poles, Austrians or even black-market men and ordinary criminals.

There was never a real or organised underground movement, as events have proved. Nor will there ever be one against an aggressive German foreign policy. There is an effective German underground abroad, and it does much harm to the Allies. There has been nothing to hamper militarism in Germany so long as aggression paid. The small element of truth is swollen out of all recognition by fiction. Nothing can be made out of Nothing, not though Germans should slaughter all mankind. Too many of them *like* the occupation.

Let there be no affirmation without proof. What follows is either literal quotation or close summary of Polish underground sources personally known to me. Here is a real underground movement, which should shame the German sham.

"The Polish Underground Movement has always tried to find some trace of German opposition with a view to co-operation. There should have been exceptional opportunities for such contacts, owing to the great number of Poles living in Germany, now swollen by the importation of slaves. No such German organisation could be found. Thousands of reports received from all parts of the Reich confirmed the non-existence of any organised German opposition, with the exception of German Communists; but even they do not pursue any subversive activities or sabotage; they even refrain from using the weapon of the illegal press."

Accordingly the Polish Underground Movement conceived the ingenious plan of editing illegal publications in German by fictitious German organisations. These papers passed from hand to hand, and the German people were convinced of their German origin. "Even so no real German opposition could be built up. The reason is that the nation as a whole is not only *not* in opposition to the Hitler regime but lends its active support. Most Germans help the regime and the Gestapo of their own free will." This was written toward the middle of 1944.

Literally millions of Germans indeed participated willingly in the wholesale crimes committed in the occupied territories. For example, there were 3½ millions of Jews in Poland in 1939. They were reduced by the spring of 1944 to 70,000, though another 100,000 might conceivably be in hiding. Scores of thousands of ordinary Germans took part in this massacre. "I have seen with my own eyes German railwaymen and



civilians volunteering for the slaughter, climbing the Ghetto walls, shooting Jews in the streets and at the windows. I have seen ordinary German civilians pumping lead into Jewish children." How does anyone expect a real underground movement when the man in the street behaves like a beast in the jungle?

These Polish underground sources rightly point out that "even passive resistance on the part of the German people, signifying their moral disapproval or at least their lack of enthusiasm, would have stultified the programme of atrocities. These, however, are committed by German civilians, as well as by the army and police. . . . The opinion prevalent in Allied countries that the people responsible for the horrors are exclusively members of the Gestapo and the Nazi Party is entirely false." That is what I have long endeavoured to bring home to the world. The atrocities are German, plain German.

Here is an illustration, again in the words of an eye-witness. "The front platform of Warsaw tramcars is reserved for Germans. One day—the rest of the car being packed—a Pole mounted the front platform. He was thrown out while the car was going at full speed. His brains bespattered the car. The passengers, average Germans, applauded vociferously." They will humble themselves in defeat, but this is how they behave in victory.

I have heard eye-witnesses testify that they have seen ordinary Germans set out to kill Poles for fun, to relieve boredom. It has been their idea of sport. The Germans must have mighty little sporting ammunition in future.

Here is another illustration. "At the cross-roads Nowy-Swiat Warecka Street I saw two ordinary German civilians stop an elderly woman walking with a boy of about twelve. The Germans accused the pair of being Jews, took them to No. 9, Warecka Street, and threw them out of a window on the seventh floor."

Such examples could be multiplied without end. "They happen every day and several times a day. They illustrate the fact that the German nation takes an active part in the *policy of murder*, without being compelled to do so."

Here is another eye-witness. "There is no German resistance or even protest against the policy of murder. There is no disquiet based on moral or political premises. Such as exists is motivated by privation, by guilty conscience and fear of defeat. During over four years of German occupation I heard once, and once only, a German protest against the maltreatment of a Pole. Two German youths were kicking an old

Polish workman into pulp. A passing German civilian exclaimed: "What are you doing? *The war is not over yet.*"

This incident throws a floodlight on German mentality. The isolated intervention says: Be as cruel as you like after you have won, but till then observe some ostensible restraints. Humanity and underground movements do not grow out of such a spirit.

My next excerpt has an even more direct bearing on the German policy of annihilation. "According to voices reaching us from Britain and the United States, the number of German criminals liable to punishment will be a few hundred or a few thousand. Such utterances are very harmful in their effects in occupied countries, and defeat their own ends, as in practice they constitute an amnesty for several millions of other war criminals." "Millions," please note; and again the word is incompatible with effective underground movements.

I mentioned just now the murder of nearly 3½ millions of Polish Jews. It took place in two stages: in the summer and autumn of 1942 and the spring of 1943. After the first stage a halt was called to see the effect on Anglo-American opinion. There was a reaction, but it was not threatening enough. It never is. The slaughterers decided that they could go ahead with relative impunity, and not only with Jews. The tale is the same from every occupied country.

I continue the quotation of the sufferers. "Artificial limitation of the number of war criminals liable to punishment spells deadly menace to the occupied countries. It is worthless as a deterrent. The prospect of a few meagre "token" reprisals will simply cause the Germans, when defeated, to put the policy of destruction into execution. They can win the war by exterminating the population of the occupied countries. They would not need to kill them all; it would be sufficient to 'liquidate' certain age-groups."

Again. "There is no doubt as to the danger of mass-slaughter of the populations of evacuated territory. This danger could be removed by a firm declaration of the Allied Governments of the penalties entailed by such a policy, because the German nation is responsible for German crimes and knows it." And because the German nation has been responsible, there has been no underground movement.

Again. "The occupied countries cannot understand why the Allies leave to the mercy of the Germans defenceless civilian populations. An explicit threat of the consequences is the only means of calling forth opposition in Germany based not on moral consideration but on fear of the responsibility which the nation shares with its leaders. Fear is

the only means by which a wedge can be driven between Hitler and the German nation." I also said that many times—in vain.

Briefly, then, here is the demonstration that there is no German underground movement worth mentioning, and that it could only be conjured up by the only means of stopping "the policy:" Fear. We left the attempt all too late in our pursuit of conciliatory phantoms. We did not, would not, understand the Germans in the only effective way of understanding them. And now we don't want the phantom German underground movement or its fictitious leaders safely employed abroad. There is a certain resemblance between them and the Gilbertian hero.

He led his regiment from behind—

He found it less exciting.

But there is this difference that Herren Stampfer and Seger have no regiment, and, even were they now to roll up with one, they would be too late. Five years ago we might have said thanks. Now we say: we are thrashing your Germans without you, thanks; and we no more need you than the clown at the circus, who pretends to help everyone, and gets rolled up in the carpet.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE POLICY

#### *A Speech in the House of Lords*

WHEN THE CONQUEST OF BELGIUM AND NORTHERN FRANCE WAS ACHIEVED in the First World War there appeared on the scene some bodies known as the *Niederlegungskommissionen*. It is a fixed German principle that the German eagle is always closely followed by the German vultures. These bodies settled down on the occupied territories and ransacked them. The factories were gutted; all industrial machinery that could not be carried off to Germany was destroyed. This was done with the transparent and avowed object of so paralysing the victims economically that Germany, win or lose, would have no difficulty in capturing their markets. Therefore, this policy was relentlessly pursued during the

retreat. Everything that could not be looted—and the Germans are born looters—was destroyed. The mines were flooded, houses and villages blown up, even the humbler forms of private property—beds, furniture, utensils—were ruined or spitefully defiled. (The Germans have a mental kink for defilement; they indulged it plentifully in 1870-71.) Not only the woods but the very fruit trees were cut down. That policy was pursued even *after* the Germans had appealed to President Wilson for what they were pleased to call a “just peace.” That policy is being pursued to-day, and in the crescendo that has characterised all German barbarism. We are on the way to witness the devastation and depopulation of all Europe, except Germany; and that policy, too, has a purpose and we had better face it. The *Herrenvolk* have not changed; they are still minded to win this war, even in losing it, and they intend to do so on a basis of population. They count on achieving that deadly purpose by the wholesale stripping of all occupied territory, by processes of enfeeblement and starvation, which prevent the victims from breeding, and by the massacre of the inhabitants, particularly those capable of intellectual leadership. Herod’s policy toward children was child’s play to Hitler’s.

The policy has already gone far. German defeat will be accompanied by an orgy of destruction, vicious, mean, calculated; and all these epithets are German characteristics twice revealed in action. There is only one way, the tamer’s whip, to check in time the nature of the beast; for against all this horror not a voice is raised in Germany. The German mind confounds it with cleverness. The reason lies in a single sentence. It was written by the greatest of all living German writers, Herr Thomas Mann, in the middle of the last war, and it was written not in condemnation but in eulogy. He said: “German militarism is the manifestation of German morality.” That is the whole trouble. That is why the Germans do not protest against anything, however bloody, and that is why our whole problem resides in making the Germans protest against their own instincts. When you have done that the problem is half solved.

In 1942 an order was intercepted in Belgium, and widely publicized in this country. It showed us clearly what to expect: in the event of defeat the Germans had long planned to increase the devastations of the last war and accompany them with calculated slaughter. The policy has its roots deep back in the last century, and we must strain every nerve to defeat and eradicate it, because, if we fail, we may find that the German policy of extermination has won the peace even though

we have won the war. So far, no effective deterrent has been applied. There have been praiseworthy meetings and resolutions in St. James's Palace, learned and eloquent debates in the House of Lords, weighty warnings by His Majesty's Government; and all have left an impression of the menace of King Lear: "I will do such things—what they are yet I know not." And so the policy of atrocity went on unchecked. It was carried out by all sorts and conditions of Germans, sometimes to order, sometimes without orders, by millions of average Teutons never loth to carry out bestiality with gusto.

All our Ministers have spoken to all our Allies about the dawn of liberation. It is a well-worn phrase but it is still potent with evocation. (*Clichés* are modern magic.) It can only ring true on conditions, and if those conditions are not faced, the world will face instead the blank vision of Omar Khayyam:

"The stars are setting, and the Caravan  
Starts for the dawn of Nothing—  
Oh, make haste."

Precisely because the German star was setting we should have made haste lest we become the prophets of a false dawn. What could we have done? The shortest way to assent is simplicity. There was one measure which could have been decided to-day and taken to-morrow, not only without cost but with great economy and profit, not only without offending any principle but in consonance with the highest principle—humanity. It was the minimum due to the oppressed. We should long since have been driving at the German people the truth that the price of atrocity rises and that it was very vital in their interests to prevent it from rising further. Our propaganda, on the contrary, has always tended to reassure the Germans by telling them that only identified individuals will be brought to book. One cannot reassuringly run after the guilty without losing sight of the innocent, because one cannot run two ways at once; and that, in the phrase so often and so wrongly attributed to Talleyrand, is worse than a crime, it is a mistake.

In the first speech that I ever made in the House of Lords I said:

"We have tried our present line of conciliation for two-and-a-half years of failure—of foredoomed failure. . . ."

I added that if we really wished to achieve results in Germany we must take a very much stiffer and more upstanding line: "The right way to get into Germany is not to crawl." Other counsels prevailed, and

ingratiation continued. What has happened during the intervening years? Millions more people have been slaughtered. Jews, Poles, Russians, Greeks, Yugoslavs—all our Allies—"are slain all the day long." The situation worsened through five years of "foredoomed failure." In looking back over them as a whole there was always a pervading and recurrent weakness in our attitude towards Germany. It is the old, old story reinforced by the German ring that has got such a hold on our political warfarers. Before the war appeasement was so much in the air that during the war it has been on the air.

Time and again, in our broadcasting in German, we exonerated the German people—even the German Army, God forgive us!—and put down all crime to a coterie. We held out the promise of good things if only Germans will be good boys, instead of dwelling more on the bad things that are coming to bad boys. Indeed, throughout the whole of this latest and greatest outbreak of German homicidal mania we tended to address the German nation as a reasonable being, and that is a deep-seated misjudgment of German character. The last excuse for that posture, or imposture, vanished when Germany began to lose the war, and by that very loss to imperil the very existence of multitudes yet in her power.

For years I asked in vain that we should stand up and not suck up to Germany; but although it is impossible to have it both ways in dealing with the German, we went on trying. Then the Americans stepped in, set up their own broadcasting station here, and a department of their own political warfare attached to General Eisenhower. From that moment the situation became hopeless. The Americans outdid us in softness. The Germans got a double daily dose of appeasement instead of one. This did the Germans no good, and nauseated our allies, to whom we seemed dwellers in another world, though here also the Americans achieved a most unenviable advantage. If only we had not been so frightened in our broadcasts of appearing anti-German, we should certainly have appeared more human. The plain fact is that much of our broadcasting, particularly our broadcasting in German—and still more American broadcasting—was out of touch and sympathy with the occupied countries. The reason for that was that the voices were those of men with no feeling against Germany. How could we ever expect the Germans to take seriously threats of retribution if we continually undid with one hand what we did with the other? Whenever anyone in this country, including myself, took the strong line, our political warriors got on the air and explained him away in German.

Time was when our national emblem was the rose. In the inter-war period it seemed to have been changed to a bunch of pinks, pansies and wallflowers. So the Germans took every liberty with us, from rearmament and the occupation of the Rhineland to the rape of Austria and Czechoslovakia. They knew that we wouldn't really hurt them. Exactly the same process was at work in operating "the policy." Our tenderness was terribly unfair to our Allies. For the Germans never took seriously our threats of retribution and went on their way murdering, sure of ultimate impunity and fortified by the remembrance of our weakness towards the war criminals at the end of the last war. To save our fellow-beings it was absolutely vital to see ourselves as others see us; but it is the iron law of dreams that the dreamers never see themselves at all. Yet the counter-policy of conciliation was bankrupt from the start. It never paid a shilling in the pound. It was wrong, and because it was wrong it failed, as wrong always deserves. We should never have touched conciliation so long as "the policy" of the Hun was in operation. We have paid for it by the loss of most cultural values in Europe, and Europe has done the paying.

Instead we should daily have told the Huns that the remedy was in their own hands, that it was not a difficult one; that retribution—the lady with the limp—is not class-conscious, and would not recoil before numbers, however great. We should have told them every night that if they lay awake they could hear her footfall in the darkened streets, have told them the very addresses at which she would call. We should have told them till they were sick what their fellows and friends and relatives had been doing in every country great and small, from Russia to Luxemburg. Results were obtainable in that way. In the last war some of our prisoners, when particularly maltreated, found the means to say, perhaps to a guard or sometimes even to the Commandant, "I suppose you know that you are on our list?" That rarely failed to produce an effect.

We should have named not only fresh culprits but fresh categories, for instance, all those engaged in the German policy of starving whole peoples to death, as in the case of Greece. We might have saved hundreds of thousands of lives in that way, when things began to go worse for the Germans. "Depend upon it, Sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight it concentrates his mind wonderfully," said Dr. Johnson, and what is true of two weeks is true of two months or two years, provided a man knows that it is a dead certainty that he will be hanged. You can concentrate the German mind, but only by a policy

of concentration; we followed rather a policy of diffusion, and that means confusion. You *can* make the Germans protest against their own instincts; but only by new methods. Perseverance in the old ways could lead only to the brief picture painted by an early saint of an earlier invasion of the German barbarians: "Nothing was left," he wrote, "but the sky and the earth."

This is not only a warning but a character-study. The Germans have always been untrue to their word but never to their past. "According to plan" they would go on murdering and laying waste until they reached the confines of their own country, and then, according to plan, they would surrender, and thus, according to plan, win the peace, with German territory intact and all around in ruin. Nothing would be left but the sky and the earth, and the dawn to which we are all pledged would be the dawn of nothing for millions whom we might have saved.

## CHAPTER V

### THE REAL REACTIONARIES

#### *A Speech at the National Trade Union Club*

I TAKE IT KINDLY THAT YOU HAVE INVITED ME HERE THIS EVENING BECAUSE many of you must dislike what you think I stand for. The short answer is that I don't.

It is my great desire to keep this important question above personalities. None of these great issues should be obscured by any personal bias, still less by petty mendacity. I shall therefore merely cite one example of distortion; thereafter I shall be content to refer to this type of adversary as XYZ. The example that I select, out of thousands and at random, is that of three Labour members of Parliament, Messrs. Stokes, Cove and Messer. The selection is impartial for we are unknown to each other. These three recently protested against "Lord Vansittart's vindictive and reactionary policy towards the German working class." Now either these three have read me, and in that case they know perfectly well that I have never suggested any policy *at all*—let alone a vindictive



and reactionary one—against the German working class, for only fools try to conduct foreign policy by “class” jargon; or, alternatively, they have not read me, and in that case also it is equally dishonest to write this sort of muck. I consider their views on the German question utterly mistaken, and it is a subject in which I am far more versed than they are; but I would never descend to such methods in any controversy with any of my opponents. “Settling the issues of life and death for millions without either knowing or feeling the need to know the relevant facts is the most dreadful weakness of present-day democracy,” says one of our most eminent scholars. In other words, playing the cat and banjo on these vast issues to the tune of any sectarian prejudice is the gravest crime of which a man can be guilty. It amounts to connivance in wholesale murder. I prefer the ordinary criminal, who at least has the courage to risk a penalty. For the sake of a good understanding at home and a good peace abroad, I am, therefore, going to take seriously the ignorant nonsense of XYZ.

Why should I be vindictive? It is true that most of my young friends and relatives were killed in Germany’s First World War; but I have suffered no more than millions of others. Indeed, I have suffered less than hundreds of millions of unhappy Europeans. If I felt their sufferings less keenly and personally, I could shrug my shoulders and say: “Well, I have foreseen and foretold both these wars. I have done all I could to save mankind from these Teutonic furies, and, anyhow, I am 63. Whatever mess XYZ make of the peace—and ignorance has always been ruinous in these matters—the Germans won’t be able to make their Third World War in *my* time.” But the reason why I neither can nor will ever adopt such an attitude is that I have spent my entire life in trying to look into the future. Is that “reactionary?” I have always done my best to save the next generation. Is *that* reactionary? And I am still doing my best according to my lights to ensure that other people may be happier than I have been. Is that reactionary? Foreign affairs appear to be foreign, indeed, to XYZ.

Even if I *were* reactionary, the charge would be wholly irrelevant unless I held some brief for the German Right. But I have said repeatedly and publicly that the German Right are undoubtedly the bloodiest men that have ever defiled the earth, and that I insist upon their being totally liquidated as a political party or force. I have, therefore, said with equal clarity that, like any sensible man in the world, I prefer the German Left. I am not, however, fool enough to take the German Left on trust again. I know too much about it. Its tricky and ignominious

record is too disheartening. All my Left friends among the oppressed nations unhesitatingly endorse my views. Our own Left is naturally less well informed; indeed, XYZ are so fuddled that my declared policy towards Germany—"full larders, empty arsenals"—appears to them "a vindictive and reactionary policy towards the German working class." I have not come here to-night to apologise but to carry the war into the enemy's country, that is, into XYZ-land.

Like almost everyone of my generation I was brought up on the myth of automatic progress. My education lay entirely within the closing period of Victorian optimism. Now it may be very silly to believe in automatic progress, that is, in man's destiny to go forward whatever he does or does not do; but that attitude is certainly the exact reverse of reaction. Then I discovered quite early in life that man is, on the contrary, a crab-like animal, that is, he can more easily go back than go forward; and long before 1914 it became apparent to me that he was in fact going to go back rather than forward, because that was bound to be the result of the great war for which Germany was visibly preparing. This discovery of the crab-like tendency in human history came as an immense shock to me. It was the last thing that I had expected to see, particularly in the hopeful days of youth. Time has shown that my instinct was right, and that man *has* gone back rather than forward not only in temper and temperament but in regard to the vast amount of material and spiritual damage inflicted upon the world. Germany in particular has gone uninterruptedly backward throughout my whole life; and it was, of course, to the Germans that I owed the discovery of this crab-like tendency.

From the early part of this century I have never had any doubt of Germany's intentions; nor, indeed, had any working diplomatist who really knew his job. Let me give you one example; it is worth remembering because it is a keynote. In 1907 took place the Second Hague Conference, which Germany brought to naught because no nation bent on world domination could possibly agree to the peaceful settlement of international disputes. A friend of mine was one of the secretaries at that Conference, and this is what he wrote to me at the time: "One would think that anyone by now could see what Germany means to do. The trouble is that no one wants to see." That, in two sentences, was the whole trouble before Germany's first bid for world domination, and it was equally the whole trouble before the second. And, if XYZ had their way, it would be the whole trouble before a third. "No one wants to see." That was the tragedy.

And here I must do something that I always detest doing, that is, I must reject an olive-branch. Some XYZ's, after considerable abuse of me, have added: "Well, we mustn't be *too* hard on him because after all he did give due warning against the Nazis." That is not strictly correct. It is quite true that as early as 1930 I described the Nazis as "ridiculously dangerous," but I was only able to be accurate in my warning because I knew not only the Nazis but the German nation, and was sure that the Nazis were going to propound a policy of aggression which would sweep *the whole German nation* along with it just as the militarism of the Kaiser's period had done. Therefore, in 1933 I maintained that the advent of Hitler had only made more certain a second German World War already certain, and that Germany would precipitate this war at any time after the beginning of 1938, and by 1939 at latest. There was good reason why this must of necessity be so. Let us remember the origin of the word "assassin." It is the European form of the Arabic word "Hashisheen." The word meant those who killed when they had taken hashish. The German nation had become in the main a nation of killers because they had become spiritual dope-fiends. The fatal drug has been administered to them for 150 years, and more particularly, of course, during the last 80. There can be no argument whatever in regard to what has happened or in regard to the true cause of the catastrophe.

Man has gone back a lot in these last years. He is certainly more violent than when I began life. Apart from the dead, the maimed, the ruined, the heartbroken, it will take Europe generations to recover from what Germany has done to us. I say "to us" because I have always refused to think as an Englishman only. I try to think and feel as a European. I am shocked to find how many of my compatriots think first as Englishmen, then of Germany and then hardly at all. There is among us an incontestable streak of indifference to the fate of the victims, and I confess that it revolts me.

Precisely because I thought and felt as a European I disliked our pre-war policy of no commitments and no armaments. One is naturally the outcome of the other. If one has no armaments one can take no effective commitments. I preferred the opposite policy: full armaments and commitments to the hilt, because I felt that the only way of keeping the peace in Europe was to undertake, and undertake effectively, engagements towards our weaker brethren in Europe. That policy involved expense but no risk. Had we followed it, we should not have been spending 15 millions a day on a war, and Europe would not be

littered with ruins and corpses. My doctrine, however, was not popular in this country, or, indeed, in any other. In fact, not a soul would hear of it—least of all XYZ—and so the League of Nations became a deceptive and dangerous façade, and collective security without armaments was a booby-trap. If it was “reactionary” to endeavour to avoid these calamities, and progressive to court them—and progressives did, in fact, pride themselves on this idiocy—than you should give thanks for reaction. Had sheer pertinacity not obtained a grudging and miserable instalment of rearmament in the teeth of the opposition of all the three great political parties, you would not be here now. If XYZ had had their way we should have been invaded; the Germans would have massacred 20 millions of us, and enslaved the rest. So little have XYZ ever grasped the essential condition of progress—the destruction of the German national will to war. Even now they persist in reaction. I have just been reading a manifesto of their war aims, which do not even include the defeat of the Axis!

Who then are the real reactionaries? Those, Right and Left—and both are equally culpable—who enabled the German nation to put the clock back again by refusing to mistrust her and therefore by refusing the only thing that could have prevented the Second German World War: arms, and arms in time.

And who are worse reactionaries? Those who, by trusting the German nation again before it has been fundamentally reformed, would give it yet another chance to put the clock back again for the third time. If German hands—or XYZ—interfere with that clock any more, it will not prove possible to mend it.

A last word on this silly subject of reaction. I belong to no party. I desire no office. Indeed, I resigned office because I believe that happiness does not consist in being something but in living up to one's convictions; and mine, founded on forty years of working experience and not one of arm-chair theorising in a cushy house in a cushy street of a cushy town in a cushy island, is that there can be no use in planning any brave new world so long as there is a Germany strong enough to sweep it away. With that single proviso I am ready to welcome any England, Europe or Universe that will make for the greater happiness of man. I am not going to allow XYZ to wreck it in advance.

In pre-war days I was frequently attacked by the Right, and it was even said in some quarters there that I was off my head, because the line that I advocated meant facing the facts and higher taxation. That went on from 1931 to 1939, throughout the days of the so-called National

Government (which was, of course, really a Tory Government) and throughout the epoch which I will call "The Montagu Norman Conquest." Now the wheel comes full circle, and I am abused by all the XYZ's of the Left, and for exactly the same reason—that I have told the truth about Germany. When men of the Right and men of the Left both damn the same man for the same reason, and when events have already proved that he is right and they are wrong, there is clear evidence of much confused political thinking.

My diagnosis of the German nation is an extremely harsh one, but history will bear me out. When men's heads are clearer and their eyes free from the dust of German propaganda, history will pass a judgment never exceeded in harshness on modern Germany and on her accomplices, witting and unwitting, in this country and elsewhere. My cure, therefore, is drastic. It consists in destroying all reactionary tendencies in Germany. This can only be done by applying drastic measures of supervision to the German nation. The vocal pro-German wing of the British Left will not look at them, and is, therefore, itself reactionary. No backwoodsmen could be more dangerous to progress. No sane man can trust Germans. These Left backwoodsmen do—in the name of a party delusion. They, therefore, oppose any adequate control of the criminal.

Let us see the consequences of failing to apply such supervision, for example, of trusting Germany to re-educate herself. Exactly the same things will happen as happened after the last war. There was no reformation in Germany. In a short while the text-books under the Republic became worse than those under the Kaiser, and in yet a little while we had a Second German World War more ferocious than the first. Moreover in the unholy alliance between the German socialists and the German militarists all opponents of the latter were murdered with the connivance of the former. Hardly a bull point for the XYZ conception of a "good" Germany. People in this country heard of some of the more outstanding murders, but they were never told of the thousands of small men bumped off under suspicion of being anything from a moderate Liberal leftwards. Under Weimar, of course, XYZ would have had a very early bullet in the back. Perhaps there is something to be said for Britain after all.

We must not minimise the task ahead. Germany's achievements in the arts and sciences have no connection with politics. In the political sphere Germany has *never* been civilised in the full Western sense, despite a veneer that has twice worn very thin before disappearing altogether. Some of us never found the least difficulty in seeing through it.

This war began in 1914 and will end in 1945. The first Thirty Years' War raged from 1618 to 1648. There were many participants in that war, and all concerned committed terrible atrocities. With one exception in the last three hundred years they have progressed continually; the atrocities committed by the Germans between 1939 and 1945 are far worse than those committed by the Germans between 1639 and 1645. In a word, Germany has gone back instead of forward both politically and ethically. Germany is, therefore, the world's greatest and most crab-like reactionary: and her friends and advocates are tarred with the same brush. Once more it follows that the real reactionaries are the Germanofools. XYZ are positively Victorian in their insistence that the truth must always suit them. Such an attitude in any section of the Left is indeed a paradox. Old-fashioned minds will have to cast aside hurriedly the last relics of over-comfortable insularity, for this is civilisation's last chance. The last war cost, directly and indirectly, 25 million lives. Before this one is ended it will have cost, directly or indirectly, 100 million lives. And of the first war Germany was 80 per cent and of the second 100 per cent guilty. The world can afford no third era of destruction on this rising scale.

All sorts of attempts are made by Germans and pro-Germans to divert and distribute the blame for this last war. The three pet red-herrings—and red herrings are odd and expensive pets—are capitalism, the Treaty of Versailles, economic causes. None of these three, of course, is the cause of this war. The true cause is much simpler: it lies in the inordinate ambitions so long instilled into the German nation. I will take these three red herrings in order and dismiss them as briefly as they deserve. As to capitalism, if every country in Europe had had a Socialist Government (and two or three of them had) this German war would have come upon Europe just as surely, because the Germans were not seeking customers or comrades but slaves. As to economic causes, these can contribute to, but cannot make, great wars. The theory is an example of old-fashioned cleverness and owes much of its currency to Karl Marx. Because it looks clever it also attracted me; but so soon as I began to have the practical handling of international affairs, it became evident that the facts did not fit. For example, Germany had the ball at her feet in 1914. She had only to go on just as she was doing and to avoid war, and she would long ago have had the economic hegemony of Europe. But Germany could not resist the temptation of the short-cut by war, because all Germany had been brought up to believe in war as a destiny in itself. Again, so far from being ruined by the Treaty

of Versailles—which was dead long before this war—Germany experienced thereafter a period of unexampled prosperity, particularly between the years 1924 and 1929, during which her exports rose by 74 per cent while ours declined by 14 per cent. By 1930 she had passed us as an exporting country. Let us note that all this took place while she was still paying reparations. Thereafter came a wave of unemployment, but that had nothing to do with the Treaty of Versailles and was experienced by countries that had caused and lost no war. Unemployment at its worst was even proportionately higher in the United States, but there it produced Roosevelt and the New Deal. In Germany, on the contrary, it contributed to produce Hitler, but the contribution was in reality a small one; for what really produced Hitlerism was German militarism. That is the cause of Europe's troubles.

## CHAPTER VI

### PEACE TERMS FOR GERMANY

THE FOLLOWING ARE THE TWELVE POINTS ON WHICH WE MUST ALL INSIST. Alone they will not ensure peace; but without them no peace is possible:—

(1) The unconditional surrender of Germany and of the other Axis and satellite powers.

(2) The effective occupation of Germany by an Allied Army and Air Force and the establishment of an inter-Allied Council of Control, to be maintained until it is decided by the Governments concerned to be no longer necessary.

(3) The arrest and trial of persons believed guilty of war crimes, in the countries where they were committed. Insistence that neutral countries shall not give sanctuary to any war criminals.

(4) The complete and permanent demobilisation and disarmament of all German Armed Forces, including the surrender of the German Fleet and Luftwaffe; the same procedure to be applied to the other Axis Powers.

(5) The Police Forces in Germany to be regional and free from central control and to be demilitarised.

(6) The abolition in Germany of all military or semi-military training at any age in any form whatever, including the abolition of the Officers' Corps and Training Corps.

(7) The evacuation of all territories invaded by the Axis Powers.

(8) The restoration of, or compensation for, loot, machinery and equipment removed or destroyed. Also the restoration of, or compensation for, commercial and industrial interests forcibly acquired or seized.

(9) The effective control and, where required, the closing down of Germany's war potentials, including aviation in all its forms.

(10) No financial loans or assistance to be permitted to Germany or to any of the other Axis Powers without the express approval of the Allied Nations; their victims to enjoy invariable priority in any form of assistance.

(11) The curriculum of School and University studies to be under inter-Allied supervision and advice until the re-education of the German people is assured in accordance with the principles of international good will.

(12) The German radio, Press, films, and all propaganda to be under inter-Allied supervision for such time as may be necessary.

It is, however, of no use to ask ourselves how to deal with Germany, unless we know the Germany which we have to handle. The picture is a dark one. I shall paint it in a few strokes.

The German Right is beyond redemption. It is composed of militarists, Junkers, heavy industrialists, all unscrupulous supporters of uniformed aggression. Germany should be allowed to retain no armed forces *at all*, except a police, with which I will deal later. In post-war Germany all uniforms should be as strictly forbidden as the possession of fire-arms. By their ghastly atrocities in this war—as in the last—the Germans have disgraced their uniforms for ever. Away with them for ever. That is one of our main safeguards.

As for the mainstays of militarism, the Junkers must be expropriated, and their estates subdivided into small holdings. There was never any economic justification for these bloated and bankrupt enormities; and the effort to bolster them up has always led to orgies of political corruption, which reached their height under the so-called Republic.



The heavy industrialists must be expropriated, too. Their concerns may have to be nationalised; but that alone will be useless so long as militarism is nationalised, too. The only initial safeguard will be inter-Allied supervision. Neither of these classes should receive more than a pittance in compensation. Were they to remain a moneyed class, they would simply re-enter politics through a side-door.

The German Left is better, but not much better, than the Right. No one could trust it. Most German Socialists are infected with militarism. I have dealt with *their* black record elsewhere.

The first point needs little comment. It is the only way of breaking the pernicious myth of German invincibility, which all parties exploited after the last war to stimulate the German nation into its second bid for world-domination. The second point is obvious.

On the third the Moscow Conference rightly decided that not only guilty officers but guilty men must be punished. The Allied joint list of war-criminals will, therefore, be an extensive one. More than justice, however, is involved. After the last war hordes of these ruffians survived, and they quickly ruined any chance first of a better Germany, then of a better world. They murdered thousands at home before murdering millions abroad. If they remain at liberty again, with worse records and in greater numbers, the same consequences will occur on a vaster scale. We can then say good-bye to any chance of German reform or re-education. We must choose between extensive categories of retribution and future peace. It is the choice between evils that calls for the highest wisdom. In this case the choice is clear. There is no reason why murderers and sadists should escape merely because they are numerous. The brunt of dealing with them will naturally fall upon our continental Allies.

The fourth point is also obvious, but calls for an important comment. The more completely and permanently Germany is disarmed, the smaller will be the armies of occupation. Both the Allies and Germany will benefit by the reduction, but it can only be brought about by far more drastic disarmament, and supervision against rearmament, than was exercised after the last war.

On the fifth point it should be said that during the inter-war period the German police were used to train and swell the illegal armies. They were over-armed, and many were quartered in barracks. They were camouflaged troops. All that must be ended for ever. They must be regionalised and localised on the lines of county and city police. They must be armed with truncheons, not artillery, machine-guns and grenades.

Till they can keep order, the armies of occupation will be there to assist them.

The sixth point is important, too. Germany must be spiritually as well as militarily disarmed. This can only be achieved by supervision of the Youth and Sport Associations. By all means let the Germans have the healthy outlet of legitimate sport, but not *Wehrsport*, which is pre-military training. The Associations have hitherto served as cover for these activities. Let us destroy militarism at its source. German mothers raise their sons to be soldiers. In 1935 they hailed the reintroduction of conscription more wildly than the men. Hitler said truly in his speech of 8th November, 1943: "I have found my most fanatical supporters among the women." The liberated people of Brussels confirmed him. That also is part of our problem.

The seventh point again is obvious. The eighth involves not only restoration, but replacement and reconstruction where German destruction has rendered restoration impossible. I will deal with it more fully later; meanwhile I must join issue with Mr. William Green, of the American Federation of Labour. He has written that the Germans should *not* be compelled to reconstruct what they have destroyed. I notice that in this attitude he is supported by *The Economist*, where new appeasement is appearing. I can imagine nothing better calculated to encourage the Huns in their systematic and wanton devastations. I understand that Mr. Green has also pronounced against the transfer of industrial machinery from Germany to the cities that she has razed and looted. If he, or anyone in the United States, persists in these views, we shall have conflict. We must resist to the end the ratification of any treaty that does not entail compensation *by Germany* to her victims. All Europe will hold to this justice. The contrary view can only be held by those far from the scene of suffering. After the last war it was proposed that the Germans should reconstruct with their own hands what those hands had wilfully destroyed. The moral lesson to the Germans would have been priceless: it might have averted this war. A combination of French interests rejected the idea for relatively petty reasons: even French Labour did not recognise its own interests in the long run. We will certainly not be forced into the same blunder again by *The Economist* or any section of American Labour. The Russians will anyhow compel the Germans to repair their appalling ravages. Other European countries will be compelled by the Germans themselves to do likewise, for deliberate German devastation will have assumed, in defeat, such gigantic proportions as to make any reconstruction within visible time impossible without the extensive use of German conscript labour.

Point nine involves Allied supervision of German war-potential, controlled change over to peace-production. Some industries must vanish altogether. Others must be limited and controlled, like the heavy iron and steel industry. The German machine-tool industry must first be brought under control, and then eliminated so soon as European requirements can be filled from Britain or the United States. Legitimate German needs must be met by authorised import. The whole of this Ninth Point is dealt with in detail below.

Point ten goes almost without saying. After the last war Germany borrowed some £1,500 millions, used much of them for rearmament, and unblushingly defaulted on the lot. 55 per cent of these sums came from the United States. The American investor was paying Germany's Reparations. None of us will want to repeat that operation.

Points eleven and twelve may be taken together. After the last war Germany swindled us over spiritual as well as material disarmament. This time there must be an Allied High Commissioner for Re-education. He will require a staff of some thousand persons. That number will not overtax the resources of a dozen Allies. His and their functions will be mainly negative. I desire as little interference as possible; but travelling commissions of inspection will pay surprise visits—as in the case of material disarmament—to insure against the reteaching of militarism and racialism. The same negative principle will apply also to the supervision of German printing, radio and films. No misconduct, no interference. Misconduct—immediate veto. And there is certain to be much misconduct. In all these categories the Germans sinned greatly after the last war, and the evil inevitably got out of hand—long before Hitler—for lack of European control.

In all this there is nothing extravagant or even excessive, let alone inhuman. These points are, however, only a brief and simple summary of the main issues. They require much amplification. The problem of decentralisation is so vital that I have dealt with it in a separate and immediately following chapter. Meanwhile it is time to take the next step forward and fill in the further points of my complete Peace Programme. Before coming to details three or four points of principle must be stressed.

In the first place unconditional surrender must be signed by the German General Staff, plus any Nazi bosses temporarily left alive. This time there must be no shuffling off responsibility on to civilian backs.

Secondly, it is essential to remind ourselves daily that this is by far the greatest convulsion that has ever marred the story of man. We shall

then see that details, which might otherwise appear drastic—and only drastic measures will serve—automatically assume their proper perspective. This convulsion is very far from having spent itself, and will make not one but many efforts to begin again. The German evil has at last manifested itself in its full stature, and will not easily dwindle.

Thirdly, we must decide now, in this very year, the conditions essential to peace and security, and then be adamant. This time the Germans must have no chance of wrangling or bargaining or attempting differences of interpretation; we must stamp on any attempt to play off one Ally against the others, as continually happened after the last war, when they succeeded annually in setting the British against the French or vice versa. The United States actually concluded a separate peace. The Italians were gradually pulled entirely into the German camp.

Opportunities for such mischief-making will abound. There will be no ideal German democracy waiting round the corner. We shall be confronted by a nation infuriated by the second frustration of its inordinate ambitions and burning with hatred of the victors. A period of chaos may follow. Parts of the population may gain the support of parts of the nominally disbanded armed forces for ostensibly rival purposes, which may turn out to have common features. There will be at least three such factions: reactionary, revolutionary, pseudo-revolutionary. We must put down the first with an iron hand, for these people will only be imperialists or Nazis, that is, militarists, in a fresh shape. The Nazi movement will not subside but merely go underground, when Germany is finally defeated.

Otherwise, and save for definitely stipulating and enforcing decentralisation as a condition of peace, we should dabble as little as possible in the witches' cauldron of German politics. We should only burn our fingers, and foreign interference would only discredit the party that it most favours. Above all we must avoid enticement by refugees into the support of a minority government. That would simply open the way to endless blackmail. We should be continually pressed for further concessions to keep the minority in power. Incidentally none of the refugees in Britain or the United States or in any country is of a calibre to form a successful government.

Germany must, of course, pay for the armies of occupation, which will in all probability be necessary for a generation, though we must on no account tie ourselves to any fixed periods, as we did after the last war. Occupation must neither be prolonged beyond necessity nor fall short of safety.

Germany must be totally and unilaterally disarmed. Her aviation industry must be abolished. In the earlier stages Germans should not operate commercial aircraft even in their own country. It is certain that Germans must not be allowed for a generation to operate commercial aviation outside their own borders.

Disarmament is a matter not only for soldiers but for engineers and specialists in machinery. Germany must surrender not only all weapons, but all war potential, that is, the means of making any more. This applies particularly to the machinery for making explosives and machine tools. She must make no more of either. Her excessive plant for nitrogen fixation must be dismantled or enormously reduced; and no rebuilding allowed. Her synthetic petrol plant must be scrapped. This will involve the disappearance of the Leuna works, or their adaptation to some totally different line of business. I. G. Farben must be disrupted. The German chemical industry must be transformed and controlled, for it is an even greater menace than the German steel and iron industries, which should be nationalised and subjected to Allied supervision. The study of the best means to deal with the chemical industry—the backbone of both Germany's world wars—must be remitted to a committee of scientists, whose report should be published and accepted as authoritative.

A joint committee of scientists and lawyers must redraft our patent laws. This need is still greater in the United States, which have suffered even more disastrously from the war-plots and manoeuvres of I. G. Farben and other German combines. I. G. Farben alone had 162 cartel agreements with American firms, mostly concerned with patents, which operated to the detriment of munition-making in the United States. Both here and there we shall need not only to be cautious but extremely parsimonious in the grant of any patents to Germans, who have individually and nationally abused the facilities so madly afforded to them.

There must, moreover, be strict Allied supervision of all possible electro-technical inventions and methods of warfare and of plants capable of quick adaptation to war-production. Here also scientific advice will be necessary. The German "back-room boys" in university or industrial laboratories must be supervised for a generation to guard against V102.

The veto upon German manufacture of synthetic petrol must apply also to synthetic rubber. The Germans can import under licence the cheaper and better natural products, and so raise their own standard of living by lowering their war potential. German capacities for oil-storage should be limited to three months' civilian supply. There should

be no oil refineries in Germany. By these means the accumulation of war-stocks will be prevented.

The rationing of imported key war-materials must include a wide range: not only copper and nickel, but chrome, tungsten, wolfram, manganese, bauxite, sulphur, iron ore and any other substances capable of ready conversion to war-purposes. Imports should be liberally allowed for legitimate commercial purposes, but none for war-stocks. Undue accumulations of scrap must be removed; so must the machinery for working entirely non-commercial ores for purely war purposes.

Until a new and trustworthy regime arises and takes root, the Allies must be represented on the board of the Reichsbank and other important banks. The Reichsbank must be publicly owned. We will be fooled by no more Doctor Schachts.

All Germans must surrender all firearms, pistols, sporting-guns or any weapons suitable for assassination. These can only be held under licence rarely accorded; for murder will be widely attempted upon members of the armies of occupation and any collaborative Germans, and must be mercilessly put down. In this connection the treason laws of Germany must be entirely rewritten. In the inter-war period they were simply used to put out of the way any persons who discovered, disliked or disclosed Germany's illegal rearmament.

After the last war we suppressed the German General Staff, and allowed it to function disguised as an Archives Department. No more of that. The General Staff must surrender all archives, and—if they are not all previously destroyed—we shall have some sensational revelations.

Disarmament must also include the destruction of all fortifications, and purely military installations and communications. Strict precautions must be taken to prevent rebuilding.

All old-soldiers' associations and "patriotic" associations must be disbanded, as well as all pre-military or para-military organisations. In line with this policy military pensions must be kept to a low figure and limited in time. They were far too high and continuous after 1918, and covered many abuses.

There being no German Army, Navy or Air Force, there will be no German military, naval or air attachés. This will mark an important improvement in security, for these persons have been the chief organisers of spy-rings. The Germans have become a pest in every country that they infiltrated. Every country must in future be careful that fresh German rings for espionage, propaganda or Fifth Column purposes

are not organised under commercial or cultural cover. The Germans have everywhere willingly lent themselves to these purposes. They will do so again if we do not all forbid every kind of *Bund, Verein, Gesellschaft*, and if we do not equally prohibit the establishment of German-staffed sales-organisations and agencies in foreign countries. To prevent reinfiltration German subsidiaries or holdings in foreign companies must be sold, where required, to local inhabitants, or allied directors must supervise.

No war memorials can be allowed to remain either of this war, the last war, or any other German war. A distinction may be drawn between those commemorative of victories and bloodshed and those set up in reverence to dead relatives. Similarly the Germans must change the names of all streets, squares and institutions connected with battles, wars, militarism, imperialism. The "other Germany" will be able to display its resources in supplying substitutes.

In the same order of ideas duelling must, of course, be abolished at the German universities, and all snobbish corps and Colour students based on this disgusting practice must be swept away. All these provisions are part of the process of demilitarising the German mind.

It will be only fair and just that the German universities (most of them have been closed during the war) should not be reopened until those destroyed by the Germans in occupied territories are reopened also. The Germans, having stolen everything else in Europe, must not be allowed in any sphere to steal post-war marches also. All destroyed universities, schools, museums, libraries, churches, hospitals, factories—and wherever required, houses, villages, towns, roads, railways—must, of course, be restored by conscript German labour, as the victims may desire and decree. There must be no criticism of such justice in this country, which has suffered so much less, or in the United States, which has suffered not at all. This forced labour will have, on the contrary, two enormous advantages. Firstly, it will eliminate any fear of unemployment in Germany, and, secondly, it will stultify Germany's iniquitous policy of winning the war by reducing the population of her neighbours, while stimulating her own birth-rate. A period of celibacy in foreign labour camps will prevent the stealing of at least *this* blood-stained march.

On the score of Reparations, there are many possibilities, but Germany must provide the bulk in materials and forced labour. In the former category I include potash, timber, wood-pulp, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, machinery. To these can be added any *new* German

merchant ships that we or, more probably, our Allies may require, the holdings of the German Government or German companies or individuals in neutral or enemy countries all over the world; all foreign securities held in Germany, German rights on patents, processes, trade-marks. The Germans must also surrender part of the share and loan capital of the great war-combines, such as Krupp, Thyssen, Blöhm and Voss, Zeiss, I. G. Farben, etc., where allied directors and, if necessary, managers, must be appointed for a period.

Germany must further restore all loot, particularly livestock, however much this provision may be to the detriment of the looters. The same stipulation must apply to works of art: where the Germans have destroyed, lost or smuggled away art treasures, they must replace the equivalents from their own galleries at the choice of the victims. I do not, of course, exclude reparations in cash; they should, however, be more reasonably and practically calculated than after the last war. Lord Keynes then recommended a sum of £2,000 million.

Finally, it must always be remembered that making peace is not only a question of incapacitating Germany for aggression, but of assisting her neighbours to throw off or resist her yoke. Thus, for example, we should encourage them to discontinue all artificial lines of production established purely for the benefit, and under the pressure, of Germany. The cultivation of the soya bean in the Danubian countries is an example. We should, on the contrary, assist the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe to develop their own *industries* and thus render them less dependent on Germany for their manufactured requirements and for the purchase of their surplus agricultural products, which will accordingly assume more manageable proportions.

Let us revert for a moment to the real conclusion of this great matter. We must once for all get out of our heads that "German unity" (meaning Prussian hegemony) is of any advantage to Europe. It has, on the contrary, been a colossal disaster for us all. Our absurd and antiquated delusions on this score unwittingly hark back to the distant days when we saw in Prussia a counterpoise to France. The world has undergone utter change unrecognised by our insularity. That is why the ossified traditionalists in this country still incline to take the Prusso-German version of everything. That is also why we still tend to accept Prussia's word that all other Germans want to be her slaves. It is probable that they don't and won't, when once they have got over the mesmerism of Prussian success and plumbed the second abyss of Prussian failure. We must promote that tendency in every possible way, instead of



stumbling blindly on with a dangerous and outdated delusion. There is no cure for our sufferings and dangers except in a decentralised Germany and a disrupted and redistributed Prussia. I will explain this fully in the next chapter.

It may be asked why so thorough a programme is necessary—for we do not like being thorough. The answer is unanswerable, as will be seen from a brief recapitulation.

We are in the Sixth Year of Germany's Second World War. Is it not, therefore, time that we paused to rid our minds of the delusions that have so long been pumped into them? We can perform this simple operation by asking ourselves what kind of Germany *can* emerge on the morrow, or within many morrows, of the defeat of Germany's second bid for world-domination.

The German Army amounted to over ten million men. The ten million were brutes in their First World War. In the Second they have turned out to be even greater brutes. On the impossible basis of justice and human welfare the world would be better without them. But they cannot all be conjured away or deported to another planet. So what? What is to become of them? Does any sane person really believe that these millions will suddenly be democratised and humanised by defeat, these trampling, arrogant legions of *Herrenvolk*, long used to loot and massacre and torture wherever they have set foot? Of course not. They will constitute a persistent danger; many will soon be longing for a third chance to satisfy their lust, and be as impatient of any dull unadventurous democracy as they were after the last war. Have we forgotten the Illegal Armies of the inter-war period, and what they did? Have we forgotten the complicities of the German Democrats and Social Democrats with the militarists, and how together they suppressed democracy because it stood in the way of renewed power-politics? All this will again be dreamed and attempted on a larger scale; indeed, the plot is already being prepared. It succeeded once, and so easily; why not again, these Germans argue. Will they be reduced to sudden and abiding reason by a handful of returning refugees, many of them also advocates of Greater Germany, some even already talking of collaborators with the Allies as Quislings. Again, of course, not. Who then will perform the miracle? No one. At best Time, which means not these men and youths but their successors, and then only if reformed.

Or take again the brutes, hundreds of thousands, millions, of the Gestapo, the Sicherheitsdienst (S.D.); the S.S. and S.A. (A large

proportion of the latter were drawn from working-class elements during the unemployment period.) Many of the worst will be killed, more by the Allies than by the Germans, but not nearly all. A strong residue will escape, take other names and disguises, go underground, whence they will be with difficulty smoked out. That process has, indeed, also begun. The abominable residue will continue to infect German political and social life, which will accordingly need extensive and persistent vigilance. Have we forgotten what smaller forces of the same elements perpetrated after the First World War, and with such eventual success? Have we forgotten the prevalence of putsch and Black Fehme murder? If so, we should do well to remind ourselves. There can be no peaceful Germany so long as these men are alive. What time must elapse before they die out? The answer, to that question should give us pause.

What also of the reactionary civil service, of the corrupt and cruel judges, of the flamboyant teachers and professors of war and racial superiority? All these were at their work after the first defeat of militarism, and will still be at it after the second. They will be purged, you say. Yes, but not so easily. Many will ostensibly turn their coats. They will be faking their diaries, as some German soldiers are already doing. "A sudden light has dawned upon me. I can't think why I didn't see it before. How I hate Hitler and all that he has done to my country. Thank God for the Allies"—if the Allies will be mugs like last time. Others of this ilk may be maintained for sheer dearth of successors, as was indeed the case after 1918, though I would sooner risk a void than keep them. Vested interests will be strong. Who, indeed, will purge them, and who will replace them? Unless we can answer that question with confidence—and we cannot—again it should give us pause. While they are there it will be vain to cry peace, for there will be no peace either in Germany or beyond her borders.

And what of all the former Parties, that so slavishly threw in their lot with the Nazis, so soon as aggression once more bade fair? Will any of them revive, when the One Party has been nominally suppressed? What of the Nationalists, the National Liberals or People's Party, the Catholic Centre? How blatant, treacherous, inglorious were their respective inter-war roles! What would be the use of them if they *did* revive? On past form a revived cause for mistrust. What is left of the Socialist Party, and why should it prove less nationalist than in 1914, less double-faced after 1944 than after 1918? There is *no* answer to that question. Will the German Communists be less bellicose than

in the inter-war period? Of their three leaders we can certainly accept no promise from the two, Pieck and Ulbricht, now in Moscow. They are still working with the old militarists, and Ulbricht is one of our worst enemies. "The German Communists," says a fine German writer, "realised that the German people are nationalistic, imbued with the military spirit, and cannot conceive the life of a nation without it." To enlist this spirit they entered into unwise and unsuccessful competition with the Nationalists and Nazis, to whom they thus ministered. It is a comic comment on our tragic ignorance that we allowed the most vociferous of all our inter-war enemies to organise in London in mid-war an Exhibition entitled "Allies inside Germany."

In a word, there is no German party on which we can rely, even if it bobs up again.

What of the slave-driving German women, so long avid for the spoils of war, greedily taking the clothes of their conquered sisters, and then asking for more? By what sudden metamorphosis are *they* going to settle down to easy honesty and mildness, especially if we do our delooting duty to mankind? One of our greatest German problems will be to get a new set of German mothers. And what of the children trained to mock and stone slaves and captives? What, indeed, of the whole civilian population stoked by years of white-hot furies, incited, for example, by Kriegk and Goebbels to lynch our airmen, and actually joining in the man-hunt that handed fifty of them to murder? These German civilians, the German people—and the Army, too, is the German people—have been guilty of endless bullying and cruelty to alien prisoners, serfs, chattels. Are they going to lose that taste in a twinkling? The Herrenvolk is in for a hangover, and its palate will only be cleansed by a purge.

Where then shall salvation be found? Nowhere—ready-made. Democracy will have to be implanted, and slowly grown. It has never yet got beyond the seedling stage on German soil. If again you leave it entirely to German hands, it will again be eagerly and popularly torn up and thrown on the weed-heap; and round the flames again will dance the hell of a nation. Germany was hell, self-made, before the war. It will be hell again afterwards, unless we mercifully extinguish the legions of devils, who mercilessly minister to the fire. Shall we British and Americans be stern enough to put them out for ever, or merely to inflict some mild purgatory as prelude to release—and reaction? British, Americans—and Russians for that matter—Europe will trust you when you have given cause, not before. I do not wholly trust you

myself, when I see and hear so many of you still blind to the fact that Germany is truly the hell of a nation—not a clique—and will have the makings of one long after the ruinous cost of her second thrashing. The German propagandists in our respective lands are busy assuring us that German democracy is both immanent and imminent. Do not believe them. Nothing of the sort can happen. It is a hope, a possibility, no more. What is certain is a democratic façade—we got that last time—but behind it the German soul will be smouldering—again as after the last war—and at intervals the flame will leap up. Unless you are ready to extinguish it without wavering, the conflagration will start again.

In a word, on the eve of victory shall we cease to be silly?

If we need any reminder of what the Germans really are, take the people's performance in the summer of 1944, when the winged bomb was launched upon this country. The German people showed themselves a horde of whooping hysterical savages, gloating over the alleged total and notoriously indiscriminate destruction of all life and habitation in this island. Their gluttony for horror could not be sated. The brake had to be applied by the very Nazis themselves, but only because the German people were *too* elated, *too* hopeful of the extinction of our species by the foulest imaginable means. Then suppose that such a weapon had been initiated or even proposed here. What a huge opposition would have sprung to life and vociferation! In Germany not a qualm—just jubilation. Between Germanity and humanity "there is a great gulf fixed." Let us face it, but not hope to bridge it in a generation.

And now for an all-important postscript. For a generation after this war we shall all need a numerous and effective Intelligence Service distributed all over Germany. That will be the only way to ensure that the Germans do not prepare for us in secret something worse than the rocket-bomb. The Germans will prepare some more ghastly and easily concealable device for the destruction of their neighbours, unless we watch and control them meticulously until that far-distant day when they may have altered their homicidal propensities.

## CHAPTER VII

## REFORM AND PRECAUTION

THE GERMAN REICH, WHICH TWICE IN OUR LIFETIME HAS NEARLY DESTROYED the world, was mainly the creation of Prussian militarism and power politics united with German nationalism. The Germans as a whole are to blame; but the chief guilt lies at Prussia's door. In 1866 Bismarck fought Austria and the South German States to bring about the domination of Prussia. He gained his object, annexing at the same time Hanover and Kurhessen Nassau, including Frankfurt-on-Main. "What Prussia gets Germany loses," exclaimed a leading South German in 1867. Prince Albert, too, is credited with the observation that "the Prussians will turn the Germans into Prussians."

The next war, against France in 1870-1, was fought by the alliance of the "Norddeutsche Bund" with the South German States; and the victory was crowned by the formation of the Reich with the Prussian King as its Emperor. Before this war also there had been some anti-Prussian feeling, and there was difficulty in getting the war-credits voted by the Bavarian Chamber.

The Reich was achieved not only by military force but by some force of circumstances such as the dominating position of the Prussian railway system, and the coalfields which were almost exclusively in Prussia. Last but not least it was brought about by fraud, for example, by bribing the King of Bavaria. There remained, however, a considerable amount of resentment against this Prussian predominance; and such expressions as "*Saupreuss*" (Pig Prussian) in Bavaria, and "*Musspreuss*" (Must-Prussian) in Frankfurt remained as evidence of it. This rancour had material cause, for Prussia after 1871 had come to comprise three-fifths of the territory and population of Germany and more than three-fourths of the armed forces. There is no reason for this wholly unnatural predominance—except force.

Prussian "leadership" was calamitous. Germans as a whole enjoy a kick in the pants, if they can pass it on. The trait is endemic in Prussia, but only epidemic in Southern and Western Germany. Baden and Wuerttemberg in the South, and Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, in the North had democratic potentialities before Hitler wiped out all landmarks.

Prussia always thought in terms of the Nazi marching-song—for there is practically nothing new in Nazism—"Germany belongs to us to-day, and to-morrow the whole world." To both ends recurrent war and perpetual preparation for war were necessary. The Prussians esteem the Spirit of Subjection—"Untertanen-Geist," as they term it. War calls for the sacrifice of many libertarian hankerings apt to raise their submissive heads in peace. Therefore, war is excellently Prussian: in its name you can knock anything on the head at home and abroad. So let war be total! All Germans have been contaminated with *furor teutonicus*. I can make no allowance or exception for any tribe; but I recognise the contagion's source. Ineffective exceptions exist to every German rule. Can they be made effective, that is, greatly increased?

Yes, there may be a possible way; and it is, of course, the one that they and we have never sincerely tried to the full. It is one of the few guarantees by virtue of which Germany can become one of the civilised nations; for there may be still some Germans inclined to call their souls their own again, and to have a real say in their own destinies. It is Decentralisation—emancipation from Prussian domination—and Local Government in the widest sense.

Both in imperial and republican Germany Prussia dominated the Reich. On no occasion was Prussia voted down, not even under Weimar, though the other States then had a majority in the Reichsrat, and the Prussian Prime Minister was no longer the German Chancellor. What Prussia wanted was always done, and the Prussian State was practically a greater Germany. Berlin remained the capital. The Reich's Supreme Court had its seat in Leipzig, and the Supreme Court for decisions relating to tax and revenue was during the Weimar era in Munich, but Berlin ruled the Reich and Prussia. It was Prussia *über Alles*.

One of the first conditions for the decentralisation of this fatal Reich is the break-up of Prussia and the inclusion of the resulting new States, Provinces, or whatever the German people choose to call them, in the new State-form on an equal footing with those States or Provinces which may be left or will appear anew from the past in modified form. I note that Dr. Nicolas Murray Butler has recently suggested that the new capital should be either at Dresden or at Frankfurt. I prefer the latter as being in the West, and nearer to democracy.

Both at the end of and after the last war there were some German attempts to build such a decentralised structure, and the policy of "*los von Berlin*" found considerable support. In 1917 Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria had desired "the creation of a really federal Germany instead

of a Prussian Germany." "Prussia has hurled us into the disaster of this war: she shall not thrust us deeper into the abyss out of which we are trying to emerge," said the Bavarian Minister in Berlin. Kurt Eisner, who became the first Minister-President of Bavaria after the proclamation of the Republic on 7th November, 1918, wanted "the United States of Germany without the predominance of a single State and without encroachment on the freedom and independence of Bavaria." He was bold enough even to admit frankly German war-guilt and brutality, and to publish documents establishing both, thereby incurring abuse from Right, Left and Centre. His policy failed, and he was murdered. In the Rhineland in December, 1918, there were meetings to call for a new German State-form: and the formation of an independent Rhenish-Westphalian Republic was openly demanded. In Brunswick, Hesse, the Prussian and non-Prussian parts of Thuringia and the Prussian province of Saxony, there were tendencies to form a middle German block, not under Prussian rule. "It looks as though the whole of South Germany will be lost to us," cried the Prussian Stresemann.

I do not over-estimate these tendencies, which were partly an attempt to evade the consequences of defeat, but a certain animosity to Berlin was always harboured by the States, and even Hitler's Government had to take them into account. On 20th February, 1933, von Papen felt it advisable to declare to the leading Ministers of the Southern States that the Reich did not intend to interfere with their Governments. Three weeks later, of course, all these promises were broken.

When at the end of 1919 the representatives of Baden, Bavaria, Württemberg and Hesse unanimously opted at Stuttgart for the decentralised reconstruction of the Reich as a federal State, they were unsupported by the Allies. On paper they won to some extent, but this nominal success was practically wiped out by the laws then passed by the National Assembly, on the strength of which the Reich gained control of taxes, by the fact that the States became dependent on Reich's finance for the support of their police-forces, and last but not least by the creation of a Reichs Defence Ministry. Another event far-reaching in the direction of centralisation was the creation of the *Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft*, which took over all railways formerly owned by the States.

Hugo Preuss, draftsman of the Weimar Constitution—a wise man insufficiently known to the outside world—desired the territorial reorganisation of Germany by the reduction of Prussia to proper proportions, and the *organic* reorganisation of Germany through the decentralisation of the governing power. He pointed out that a great

power, Prussia, cannot be built into another great power, Germany. He contemplated for each new formation a minimum of two million inhabitants. In the words of his son: "To him Prussian hegemony was synonymous with reaction and militarism. He maintained that there could be no democratic or internationally trustworthy Germany unless Prussia were divided up into her provinces or other middle-sized units. He was defeated. By the slogan "against the destroyer of Prussia," invented by the Prussian Junkers but willingly accepted by the majority of the German democrats, he was beaten in the first Reichstag election after the so-called democratic revolution, and lived to see the German Reich become more than ever a greater Prussia."

While the Socialists of Saxony and of the Southern States also opposed centralisation at the beginning, they later succumbed to the pressure of the more powerful Socialists, Ebert, the first President of the Republic, and Otto Braun, the Prime Minister of Prussia for nearly the whole Weimar era. One of the arguments used for centralism was that it was "cheaper." Administratively it may be doubted whether this is true, owing to excessive bureaucratisation. Politically it has been ruinously expensive for everyone, including Germany, since Prussia has now twice led Germany to disaster. The German people will now have to make up their own minds to rid themselves of this costly Prussian incubus, and build up a new Reich on the basis of local governments.

Before Hitler came to power the States (*Länder*) decided all questions of education, justice, police, and, together with the municipalities, of social welfare and certain taxes, which were not demanded by the prerogative right of the Reich. All this was subject to the proviso that these decisions were in accordance with the Constitution and Reich's laws.

On questions of the police, as the Reich contributed largely to the upkeep of the police garrisons of the States, the Reich could demand that certain rules be followed, and failing compliance it could withhold the financial contribution. The police was state-police, organised on military lines to form part of the future army.

One of the conditions upon which the Allies must insist is that the police must be (a) decentralised, (b) unarmed, (c) not in garrisons, and (d) under the control of the local authorities.

The administration of all public departments, with the exception of customs and excise, post, telegraph and telephone, communications and foreign affairs, should be handed over to municipalities, counties and provinces. The guiding principle should be that responsibility should rest as far as possible with the local government.



Throughout my life the real Government of Germany, behind the scenes and despite many disclaimers, has been the Army. General Groener blurted out the truth when, at the end of the Weimar period, he admitted that the Government had never taken any important decision without consulting the Army. The Germans can never learn self-government so long as they are bossed by Berlin and Prussian preponderance. Prussia must, therefore, revert to her former components, Brandenburg and Pomerania. She has no right to rule the Rhineland, Westphalia, Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, the old Hansa towns and territories, Hesse and the Free City of Frankfurt. These must become autonomous federal Provinces, in common with others like Baden, Wuertemberg, Bavaria, Saxony. In these Provinces no Prussian can be allowed to hold any office or position of influence. Prussians must be excluded as officials, police, clergy and schoolmasters.

In regard to communications special regimes will, of course, be necessary for international rivers and the Kiel Canal. The German Army, Navy and Air Force having been totally and permanently abolished, their former departments will have ceased to exist. As to finance the Allies must reserve the initial right to inspect the central and provincial budgets to guard against camouflaged war-preparations. Decentralisation must be enforced as part of the Peace Treaty. If any of the Provinces wish to secede altogether they should not only be allowed but encouraged to do so; but the initiative must come from them. Such movements cannot endure unless they are spontaneous.

It may be expected, indeed hoped, that the latent germ of the old feeling against Berlin and Prussia will revive with the defeat and destruction of an evil system. Developments in regard to the Rhenish-Westphalia parts of Prussia, the Prussian parts of the Saar territory and the Bavarian part of the Palatinate will be affected by the views of the Allies in regard to security. In addition to the amputation of East Prussia there will also be a major surgical operation in Western Germany to compensate the Dutch for the wilful ruin of their land by sea-water flooding. The Allies must permanently control the Rhine bridge-heads; the Ruhr must be under permanent Allied control. Whatever may be decided, however, States or Provinces can surely be established under their own rule, just as other parts of Prussia can achieve their own solution and so bring her within the German Union in such legitimate proportions as to prevent henceforth her unbalanced hegemony. A balanced Germany may be a sane one.

If the United Nations are firm and sincere in their repeated resolve

to make it impossible for Germany, whatever picture the German organism may present, to re-establish militarism and to prepare for another war, there is hope that slowly but surely Germany will get used to democratic forms of government. We must, however, expect no cooperation in such a healthy development from any remnants of the old imperial, republican or Nazi administrations. They no more want to lose their heavy hold upon the German population than the German militarists desire or intend to give up their iron grip. If, contrary to expectation, any assistance is forthcoming from these sources, it will have to be long and well tested before any reliance is put upon it.

The Allied occupation should encourage all German aspirations or attempts at self-government, and protect whatever form of decentralisation may come to pass within the German Reich in the delicate period. The whole country will be full of lawless elements bent on destroying any peaceful or stable administration. It will not be the business of the Allies to impose any form of government at anyone's behest, but to see fair and free play for all legitimate and innocuous tendencies.

The way to true democracy is a long one, and no one must be impatient for quick arrival. There will be many setbacks and more difficulties to overcome, but there is no inherent reason why the Germans should not eventually learn the meaning of "liberty, fraternity, equality." They have never yet begun to master the notion, because wilder notions have always mastered them.

The way is one which the Germans will have to find mainly by themselves, and it is one which will in no way interfere with whatever economy the new German State-form may adopt. We are going to change the headmaster and the teaching staff; we may then gradually get a different school of thought. The aim must be a decentralised German State, which will give to provinces and communities elbow-room to maintain their individuality and self-determination. Only such a decentralised State is safe or justifiable in the centre of Europe; and only by familiarity with new forms of administration that grow out of the real democratic spirit will the German people be educated out of that spirit of militarist subservience and nationalist arrogance which has made it an object of simultaneous dread, contempt and loathing to the world. There are many ways to temporary, but only one to permanent, peace. "Just how far the decentralising process should go," say the authors of *The Problem of Germany*, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, "and how much freedom should be given to the separate States to choose their own constitutions and legal and educational systems, are

mainly matters for Germans to consider." Not at all. Decentralisation must be compulsory; and the *adequate* decentralisation of Germany must surely be the preliminary to her inclusion in any balanced federalised Europe in the more distant future.

In conclusion let us remember the wise words of Marshal Foch on the disappearance of the Hohenzollerns at the end of the last war. "A republic built up on the same principles of militarism and the centralisation of power, and taking the whole of Germany in hand, will be no less dangerous and will remain no less a menace to peace." All those of us who have thought likewise have been all too abundantly justified. Security can only be reached by decentralisation. If the Allies fail to impose it, they will deserve the censure of posterity.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE QUESTION-MARK

IN 1917 THE DISTINGUISHED BELGIAN PROFESSOR SAROLEA WROTE: "THERE is a most baneful delusion which has misled the Allies from the beginning of the war . . . namely that we are mainly fighting a sinister political dynasty, and a formidable political machine. . . . The truth is that behind the German princes and princelings and Junkers there is the resolve of a united people . . . the driving power of tremendous spiritual and moral forces, of an inflexible purpose, of a compelling idealism, of a mystical creed with more than Mohammedan fanaticism."

At almost exactly the same time another fine writer, Donald Hankey—author of *A Student in Arms*, and subsequently killed in action—recorded the following: "How they (the Germans) hate us! Every day you see more signs of it. . . . I should not be surprised if, when we are old, we see a repetition of this war. . . . I have little doubt that if, as seems likely, we beat the Hun pretty badly, he will start the moment peace is signed to prepare for his revenge."

That of course is what happened. Since, however, men rarely change their habits in politics, we paid no attention to the most obvious common-places, uttered by the best authorities, and so made quite certain of letting the Germans start, and again nearly win, their second World War. ("We are never ready for war," said Victorian Lord Wolseley, "and yet we never have a Cabinet that dare tell the people this truth.") I will give just one typical illustration of the flippety-gibbety disregard of salutary platitudes by the lightweights whom democracy has encouraged to its detri-

ment. In the issue of the magazine *Plebs*, of October, 1943, Mr. H. G. Wells wrote as follows: "This present frightful war is due very largely to an insane delusion of the very mixed assortment of folks who speak German that they are an aristocratic folk entitled to dominate, and if necessary exterminate, any other peoples who stood in their way." That was a glimpse of the obvious. Now hear the comment by the Editor of *Plebs*, whoever he may be: "*Plebs* readers are not likely to agree to the extraordinary notion that the present world war was due to German-speaking Europe having insane delusions." Giants are brushed aside by gnats. Our air has been so full of gnats that it looked like the evening of England. The greatest storm in history has not sufficed to blow them away.

Goethe once observed that "against stupidity even the Gods fight in vain." Let us face it. Throughout this century the outlook on foreign affairs of the English-speaking democracies has been marked by stupidity. It was not their fault, because no one, least of all their Governments, ever tried to tell them the truth. That is the reason why, as both Walter Lippmann and I have observed, the English-speaking democracies had no foreign policy. What is more disquieting is to find that so many people both in Britain and in the United States still don't want the truth—or a policy—even now when they can get it.

Take for example the attitudes of the Common Wealth and Independent Labour Parties. I am not concerned with internal policy; but there would be no surer way of losing our national and physical existence than to follow either of them in foreign affairs. The latter has issued and boosted a pamphlet entitled *Common-sense versus Lord Vansittart*. The weakness of his facts accounts for the strength of the young author's opinions. It has never occurred to him that I should be just as silly if I wrote a pamphlet entitled *Common-sense versus the Astronomer Royal*. These things are not a matter of "common-sense," which, being subjective, varies according to x, y, z—and so cannot be common—but of facts a, b, c, which, being objective, neither do nor can vary. So, unlike "common-sense," they can be learned—if so desired, not otherwise. Gnats have no desire save to sting.

To avoid the a, b, c of foreign politics the English-speaking countries looked the other way; for they would have got a shock if they had looked at Germany, and they did not want to be shocked. A few illustrations from the galleries of folly will suffice. A book by one of our Bishops, published in the inter-war period, contains the following passage: "Don't join in any talk which can add to the world's gloom and depression; forbear to repeat all the silly prophecies of coming evil, which are current; resist any temptation to make any forecasts of the harm which a suspected enemy is

supposed to be plotting in secret. Let your sense of humour save you from taking seriously the absurdities which are suggested by suspicion, fear and prejudice, and which are so solemnly repeated in many conversations. Shun these things as you would disgrace." The Bishop's grandson was recently killed piloting a Liberator.

As late as 1939 Chamberlain also affirmed that suspicion was at the bottom of all our troubles; and so returned from Munich waving that second "scrap of paper," and beaming that it was "peace in our time," and "with honour" too—quoting Disraeli. Shades of "the old Jew," as Bismarck respectfully called the most entertaining of our statesmen!

Chamberlain had not finished. When peace in our time became war in five minutes, he began it by declaring that we had no quarrel with the German people. That delusion is still widely extant in Britain, and still more in the United States. It effectively ruined from the start any prospect of Anglo-American propaganda to Germany making sense. It is a recipe for present failure and future danger. The British Government, by the mouth of Lloyd George, likewise lost the peace in the second month of the First World War. "We are not fighting the German people," he proclaimed. "The German people are just as much under the heel of this Prussian military caste . . . as any other nation in Europe." No wonder that the "gods fought in vain" against this stupidity which led to the Second German World War.

One glance backward at any time would have convinced our politicians and propagandists that we have every quarrel with the German people. They could, however, remember nothing except that the Germans, confronted with the Treaty of Versailles, at once began to whine, and ultimately convinced all the simpletons of Britain and the United States that a mild treaty—which they never read—was a hard one. The real German grievance against Versailles was that it ended the dream of domination. Here is a typical specimen, this time by an eminent American divine, and as late as 1939. His name is Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick:

"Let me state Germany's case. A defeated and humiliated people forced in the Peace Treaty to assume the sole guilt for the World War, an assumption which every intelligent historian now knows to be untrue. Lured to peace by President Wilson's Fourteen Points, and then let down on all of them; disarmed under promise of general disarmament only to discover that no other great nation in Europe had the slightest intention of disarming; burdened by taxation for war Reparations that made helots and slaves not simply of the guilty

generation but of their children, and then of their children . . . until at last Hitler arose. Supposing that had been our experience, wouldn't we be giving Hitler all the gangway he might desire?"

In all this there is not one word of truth. It is the crudest and most impudently mendacious form of German propaganda mechanically accepted and repeated. The divines of democracy were not sick of it *even after Munich*. This particular innocent draws crowded congregations; and so long as pulpits can be used for the dissemination of stupidity that costs millions of lives, so long will Goethe's gods fight in vain against it. What was the truth? It was always easily available—in the Allied reply of 16th June, 1919, to the German Delegation:—

"The German Revolution was stayed until the German Armies had been defeated in the field, and all hope of profiting by a war of conquest had vanished. Throughout the war, as before the war, the German people and their representatives supported the war, voted the credits, subscribed to the war loans, obeyed every order, however savage, of their government. They shared the responsibility for the policy of their government, for at any moment, had they willed it, they could have reversed it. Had that policy succeeded they would have acclaimed it with the same enthusiasm with which they welcomed the outbreak of war. They cannot now pretend, having changed their rulers after the war was lost, that it is justice that they should escape the consequences of their deeds. . . ."

All that is exactly and incontestably applicable to-day; and it is the essence of Vansittartism. The German nation is responsible, and no sane man then doubted it. Yet here we are, a quarter of a century later, and with every fresh illustration that ignorance or inattention could desire, still arguing violently about a platitude. When I wrote *Black Record* that was also a platitude. Yet it was considered so "controversial" that I sold half a million copies of it. I still have a vituperative mail on the *least* contentious of my proposals for reforming, or re-forming, Germany. I would sooner speak of reforming than re-educating the Germans. Re-education smacks of a desk and a schoolmaster. The Germans have got to become reformed *characters*—that is of more importance than their book-learning. They never had a real revolution till 1933, and then it was an evil one. They have not had their real Reformation yet. Luther—with his state-worship—did more harm than good. ("The worst evil genius of Germany," wrote Dean Inge, "is not Hitler, or Bismarck, or Frederick the Great, but Martin Luther. . . . Bismarck liked to appeal to Luther for the separation of an external

policy of force and an inward piety.") "Hitler," says Professor Foerster, "expresses most perfectly this primitive mentality which for many years the worship of material success had induced in the German people, an attitude of mind which rendered it impossible for them to make their defeat the starting-point of a moral conversion." Again a profound commonplace, and a situation sure to be repeated. But how many will face it?

Is there not enough in all this to warrant a doubt whether the enlightenment of Anglo-Saxon democracy can extend to foreign affairs? That is the Real Question of our time. It is so much more pleasant to "pass by on the other side" and not to see the sufferings that former blindness has allowed German brutality to bring twice to Europe. How easy it was to take the comfortable view from across the Atlantic, or even across the Channel! To justify that ease the democracies are already being tempted again to deny German atrocities, and so to earn the contempt of Europe. I have before me the letter of a British Member of Parliament dismissing even the horrors of Maidanek as "propaganda."

To this distaste for hard facts is due, psychologically, the joint effort of the Left Ideologists and the German refugees—they have, of course, very different motives—to represent this war as a class war, or international civil war, instead of the plain national one that it is. "You can call this an ideological war if you like," wrote Ilya Ehrenburg, "that is, if you regard cannibalism as ideology." Some pacifists see the uses of adversity, when it can grind a private axe. Anything rather than face the German problem for what it is and is long going to be. The world, by the way, is getting rather cluttered up by people who see not "God in everything" but class. The word is always being dragged in like King Charles's head, and serves to obscure serious argument. This war is, of course, no more a class war or international civil war than the last—indeed less. The national bid for world-domination is even more naked and unashamed. Behind the Führer and his assistants there is again—to hark back to Professor Sarolea—"the resolve of a united people." Class has no more to do with that urge than the Man in the Moon with the Lunacy Acts. It is, indeed, precisely the *classless* fanaticism of which Sarolea wrote, that has twice nearly brought the German dervishes to their goal.

This, again, is the central theme of Vansittartism. The dervishes of Europe must be broken, and broken of their taste for Mahdis and Mullahs, if a third World-War is to be avoided. But how break something if you refuse to recognise it? Will the democracies come at long last to their senses in the little time that yet lies ahead of them? I could

quote hundreds of writers and speakers still struggling to prevent them. Fortunately the response of the people to plain truth, and impatience with the old quacks and shamateurs, are growing, and may make an end of those who habitually absolve themselves from prolonged effort by denying the necessity for it. The most influential are those who, having made some name in one sphere, endeavour to exploit it in this one; and one of the worst features of modern publicity is that it encourages this habit in almost *every* sphere. But that is another story.

## CHAPTER IX

## TEST CASE

HITLER SAID OFTEN THAT HE WOULD SETTLE HISTORY FOR A THOUSAND years of German supremacy. I am far more modest, and would be content to settle for a tenth of that period of German humility. That is about the time that the Huns have taken to make themselves utterly intolerable in their arrogance and brutality. For an equivalent number of generations Germans must now learn to speak humbly, lowly, with downcast eyes, in half tones. If ever again the nation of the flying-bomb is allowed to bawl in guttural bass, we shall be near its next self-expression, in which the breath of all existence but its own will vanish "according to plan."

The German soul cannot learn humility without being humiliated, and *kept* humble. There is none other way under heaven. The Germans have had every opportunity—and after the last war every cause—to be humble. Instead they have become inflated beyond human semblance. As such they would have been recognised long ago, but for the wholly undue influence of a small and perverse breed of our pseudo-intellectuals, who have been cravenly pro-German and sourly anti-British, persisting in the insular and inhuman folly that we are all much of a muchness, and that it is just the Germans' turn to be bad. It is partly due to this species that the Germans, never having learned how the wide world detests them, have never learned one touch of humility, and must now have it inculcated by steadfast force.

This abiding moral lesson is going to be the only consolation for having had to teach it a second time at such an appalling price. The lesson was there after the last war, ready-made. We cancelled it, and have had to reteach it at thrice the cost. We betrayed our own dead because we would not ram humility home when it was most needed.



Excuses were made for the poor Germans, their atrocities were hushed up, because we were lazy, and saw that the road to self-indulgence lay through indulgence. The Germans, therefore, "must not be humiliated;" and, therefore, the Flying Bomb War was certain. So also will be the next devilment, unless the Germans are convincingly humiliated.

The only way to ensure that Germany learns this humility, in which alone lies salvation, is that she should be occupied by the forces of the small countries whose very right to existence she has so long, so repeatedly, so brutally denied not only by the mouths of all her prophets but by the explosives of her scientists, the rapine of her soldiers, the tyranny of her administrators. A broken and a contrite heart we will not despise, but we have never yet seen the German semblance; and the breaking must now be done thoroughly. The method that I suggest is the gentlest available, and it must be adopted. The Germans can never, of course, learn humility from occupation by the Big Three. They will only hate and intrigue until they have prised loose the corner-stones of peace, just as they succeeded in doing after the last war. They will do it again but for the mortar of the smaller powers hardened by suffering. The European edifice will be better built of bricks than of boulders.

From the end of 1918 onward the great powers made great fools of themselves. As Voltaire noticed, the ears of the great are often long. I have not sufficient confidence in the wisdom of great powers to believe in the duration of a world controlled by them. I have seen too much of their foreign policy to hold with any monopoly. In the inter-war period the Americans never had any policy at all; we never had a consistent or visible one; and the Russians followed three in turn and sometimes together—all conflicting—to their own and to the world's confusion. The Great Powers may well break apart again unless they are kept together by the smaller Powers whom they must learn to regard as an asset, not a nuisance, as a bond, not a stumbling-block. They must all get over the tendency described by Commander King-Hall when he wrote: "The last chapter in the history of the economic and political (not cultural) sovereignty and independence of the small States is now being written in blood and tears." The full participation of *all* our Allies in the occupation of Germany—and in the direction of all policy toward Germany—is indispensable if there is ever to be any improvement in Germany.

I said that I do not trust the Great Powers alone. I have good ground for that. After the last war the British and American soldiers not only

ruined the moral lesson that should have been inflicted on Germany but provided her with her first great platform for propaganda. They did this by fraternisation. (Our politicians tried to do likewise: witness the policy of Conciliation by Conference.) It is possible that the British and American troops will be tempted again. They have not been receiving the right kind of political education from their own authorities; but events, and the Germans themselves, are teaching them; and I am heartened when I see the United States Army paper, *The Stars and Stripes*, frank with such advice to beginners as: "These Germans are dirty fighters . . . every one of our guys should remember that . . . Jerry is yellow. . . . The German soldier cannot be trusted. . . . The Jerries bayoneted our paratroops who lay on the ground with busted legs and ankles. They hung some of our paratroops, too—we saw that with our own eyes."

That's telling the truth: but how long will it last? I do not know; but I do know that without prolonged and inter-allied occupation all prospect of reforming the Doodlebug Nation will collapse like a house of cards. Without this surety there is "nothing doing." I am, therefore, much afraid that, on previous form, there will be, after a short season, great pressure in the United States to "bring the boys home," long before the job is done. If the cry is started in the United States it will soon reach this country. It will be taken up by the sentimentalists with *their* parrotry, "You can't hold a nation down"—as if the worst criminals do not get long sentences, when they are not executed. It will be taken up by the economists with *their* parrotry, "Europe can't get on without Germany"—as if Europe would not have been a relative paradise without the source of all her twentieth-century sufferings. The cry will be taken up by all the long-winded pacifists, all the short-winded weaklings who urge that it is hard on a British lad to spend a year away from home, all the professional budget-crabbers who will say that we really can't afford the effort, and want the money for their own purposes. This last will be an entirely dishonest argument. By the end of 1920 the British Army on the continent was restricted to 13,000 men on the Rhine. That is all that I am asking of the British and United States Armies after the first few years, one mechanised division each for an unspecified time, to be defined by experience, not sloth or sentiment. This limitation of effort is admissible only on one condition, which should, therefore, be welcomed.

All the Allies must take their share in the duty or privilege of occupying Germany. If Germany is as completely and utterly disarmed as I postulate,

a small number of mechanised divisions dotted about the country will suffice to nip in the bud any German attempt to organise the War of VIO2. If the disarmament of Germany is less thorough, more divisions will be required. Therefore, let us be thorough. Now there are a dozen Allies, and—if we are thorough—I reckon that some dozen mechanised divisions will be sufficient to control a weaponless Germany. The reduction will also be in her interest: she will have to pay for the upkeep of occupation, which will anyhow be only a fraction of what she so prodigally spent on her own hundreds of divisions in her unhumbled days. On the score of economy complete disarmament should, therefore, be welcome to her.

On political grounds, moreover, all the Allies *must* bear their share. They will all be not only willing but eager to do so, and it is hypocrisy to pretend that they cannot do so. The will being there, this way will prove surprisingly easy. We may be very sure that there will be no fraternisation between the weaker Allies and their barbarous oppressor. *Their* memories will not be as short as those of the uninvaded countries. They will be stern and aloof, and even when the first decade is past they will remain very "strange and well-bred." Thus will the Germans learn, for the first time in centuries, the Christian import of the words that we have so often chanted: "He hath put down the mighty from their seats, and hath exalted the humble and meek." They at least will never be tempted to run out until they are sure that the nation of savages may also safely be counted among the humble and meek; and only a new Germany can qualify for trust. Without the tenacious fears of the smaller States the Big Three may relapse into their inter-war levity. The Powers of Occupation might first become two, Britain and Russia, and then Russia only. I am an advocate of Anglo-Russian collaboration, but not of leaving to Russia a European monopoly that would necessarily be the negation of collaboration. The weaker Allies, particularly their stronger members, France and Poland, will correct any such tendency: they will stay on the job, and we shall have also to do so, for very shame if for nothing else.

This issue is not only a material but a moral test. In the Moscow declaration the Big Three recognised "the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, *large or small*, for the maintenance of international peace and security." Do we mean business, Yes or No? If Yes, this is the first opportunity to say so. So far that splendid maxim is not in force. In domestic affairs we are past the stage where there is one law for the rich and one for the poor; but in international affairs

there is still one law for the strong and another for the weak.

There are, indeed, some signs that the small countries are going to be treated with a very relative equality. We may be heading back to the world from which I had hoped to escape, where the small countries are the boys and the big ones the masters. The machinery of Dumbarton Oaks has not yet relieved my apprehensions. Principle and practice remain to be harmonised. Let me, however, illustrate my point in lighter vein. When American policy toward France was at its most questionable, a French paper, *La Marseillaise*, published here, became, I understand, vehemently critical. I did not read the paper, but I knew its editor, a French journalist of talent. We suppressed it. I do not question the decision. But did we ask the United States Government to take any action in regard to the worse anti-British venom of the *Chicago Tribune* or the Hearst Press? Of course not. The United States are a great country. But what *could* we have done? Something effective and easy.

Colonel McCormick at one time tried to introduce his mischief-making paper into Australia. The Australian Government rightly told him "where he got off." We on the contrary allow his stuff to be imported into this country. So, in closing the *Marseillaise*—had there not been one law for the weak and another for the strong—we should have informed the United States Government that we also were banning the Colonel on the ground that he is not funny enough to be anything but a nuisance. This, however, is the realm of fantasy, because the United States are very large. We are, therefore, fair game for any malevolent mischief-maker in the United States, the more so if he is influential; but an unimportant Frenchman who says as much against the United States is promptly put out of action.

Or take the case of the numerous Polish papers suppressed here for criticising Russia. Again I do not question the suppressions; they were no doubt wise and justified at this juncture though, being unable to read Polish, I do not know what they said. They doubtless exceeded the allowance that must be made for the effects of suffering. Into that grievous history I am not entering to-day. I am merely pointing out that, were there not one law for the weak and another for the strong, we should at least have asked, in suppressing the Polish papers, that the Soviet Government should suppress, or at least restrain, the persistent attacks of the Russian-controlled Polish newspaper, *Wasna Polska*, against the Polish Government in London, with whom we have been in recognised relations for many years. We might even have suggested

to the Soviet Government that they should sober the similar outbursts of their own paper, *Pravda*. In a world of real equality we should, of course, have said to the Russians: "Look here, do put the brake on, or level things up."

Naturally we say nothing of the kind, for Russia is a great country. If I even suggest in the House of Lords that the Polish Committee of National Liberation in Moscow and Lublin—which represents but a fraction of the total Polish population—might emulate the moderation and restraint shown by the British Parliament on this delicate topic, Communist organs are angered by the very idea of reciprocity. Glaring, if petty, inequalities encounter us at every turn. We affect not to notice them, but they are there, and so long as the Moscow Declaration is not translated into daily practice, will remain with ultimate danger to *this* country.

May I continue to be logical? In the past I have always loathed and fought the Germans because they were fatal to the defenceless, among whom we nearly classed ourselves. Are we in the future to sink in the scale because there are less than 50,000,000 people in this island? Of course not. This island alone may be a cruiser-weight, but the greatest cruiser-weight the world has ever seen. I have known cruiser-weights win world championships. We did so in 1940, and may yet have to do so again. The British Commonwealth is an authentic heavy-weight; and if it does not use its weight to assert the practice of the Moscow principle, we may ultimately find first that component parts of the Commonwealth are being written off as small Powers, and next that, both in the Old World and the New, the same trend is being applied to the Commonwealth as a whole, including this island with its dwindling population. In standing up for this principle on behalf of all the lesser Powers and States, I am therefore also defending our own eventual position from the growing encroachments of mere quantity. If we want equal collaboration among the Big Three, we must logically concede it to those of lesser poundage than ourselves. *On a souvent besoin d'un plus petit que soi*, is the moral of one of La Fontaine's fables. He was a wise man. Here is our first chance to show convincingly that we recognise both expediency and principle. Faith in our sincerity will be determined by the test.

## CHAPTER X

### THE NEW MORALITY

#### *A Speech to the Society of Inter-Allied Friendship*

I HAVE DONE MY BEST TO FOLLOW MY FEELINGS IN PUBLIC AS IN PRIVATE life. That, I hope, is a luxury that will never be denied to us. But the luxury of affection involves also the duty of dislike. So I have long disliked the bully of Europe. Strangely enough some people still think this wrong. Perhaps they forget that dislike is rarely one-sided. One of my few satisfactions in the inter-war period was a quick glance at a letter from Herr Abetz to his headquarters, in which he wrote: "The first step must be to get rid of Vansittart: things will be easier afterwards." That is one of my testimonials.

I am asked to speak of Justice and Morality in post-war international relations. If these abstract virtues are to be translated into concrete action, we shall have to get rid of quite a lot of people and quite a lot of notions. Let me begin with people. There will be neither Justice nor Morality nor Security in Europe unless there is a purge, and an extensive purge, in Germany. It is not charity but hypocrisy to pretend to believe in the impossible just because one has not got the courage to face the inevitable. In a recent speech in the House of Lords I defined the categories of the guilty, and I tried also to give to that House and this country some idea of the magnitude of the sanitation that will be necessary; but I cannot define the numbers. It is impossible for those distant from the scene to judge. The victims alone can number and identify; and they must not be hampered by any of my fellow-countrymen, whose restrictive passion for symmetry would apparently lead them to condemn as many Germans as they would appoint judges to try Hitler.

Retribution is not a passion or a procedure but a European necessity. That must be our guiding principle. There are only two horns to the dilemma. Either we mean to give Justice and Morality a fair field, by cleansing it of the weeds that would choke both, or else Justice and Morality will be mere words, because the fainthearts will fade away, when deeds are demanded. We had our lesson after the last war. Are we really going to disregard that lesson, and let the same sequence be

repeated on a larger scale? In that case we should be here to discuss unrealities.

Justice and Morality however have naturally more abiding and constructive aims and values than the mere elimination of a pestilence. One acid test of the New Morality will be its treatment of small nations. And here I am a doubly interested party. My family came from a small country and went to another little larger. And when the first attempt was made to subject Europe to one leadership, that second country, with a population inferior to that now possessed by some of Germany's minor victims, "saved herself by her exertions and Europe by her example." That little country was Britain. I have therefore had an instinctive fellow-feeling for those small countries who this time have succumbed to a tyranny ten thousand times more detestable. Moreover this island had grown no larger in extent when it repeated in 1940 the feat so well described by Pitt in 1805.

I know there is much sympathy in this country for the weaker victims, but there is still not enough. There are too many people who just do not believe what Europe has suffered. That is insularity, and insularity at its worst. And, at its worst, it is a vice of the spirit. I recently listened to a Scottish padre, repatriated after three years in German hands with our wounded prisoners. He said that what shocked him most was the incredulity, leading to indifference, among great sections of the people in regard to German cruelty. Again, I recently read the first impressions of a distinguished journalist returning to this country after years of absence. He wrote the same story: to many people German atrocities were "myths of Vansittartism," or something distant as "earthquakes in Chile," or "floods in the Yangtse." This egotistical detachment is a disgrace to us, and it is even more marked in the more distant United States. I appeal to the Press of both countries to help me in combating it.

I continually encounter something equally bad: the people who say that we must not leave a great country like Germany with a rankling sense of injustice. I never hear them say that we must not leave the victims with a rankling sense of injustice. That is not insularity but cowardice. They say this because Germany is still strong and united, and the smaller states are weak and separate. There is an obvious answer to that: firstly destroy Germany's military strength and then decentralise her—these two measures are equally indispensable; and secondly let the smaller States draw together, particularly in the economic sphere. Perhaps then there will be less fear of dissatisfying Germany. Unfortunately that remedy

is being neglected, at least in Central and South-Eastern Europe, by a curiously old-fashioned policy. Personally I am quite prepared to leave Germany with a sense of injustice, because she will acquire that anyhow by losing the war and being no longer able to trample on her neighbours. The Germans have always "a rankling sense of injustice" unless they get everything they want, and the sky's the limit. Has no one learned anything from fifty years of Appeasement? It is quite certain that they will anyhow do everything in their power to upset any peace settlement. So I'm not worrying about that. What does worry me is the insufficient priority accorded in the average mind to the rights, interests, susceptibilities of the small Powers. That is not only neither Justice nor Morality, it is stupidity; it is the surest way to lose the peace and to alienate us from the confidence and affection of Europe.

I shall therefore be serving not only Justice but Expediency in recalling the words of one of our greatest historians, the late Mr. Fisher: "Almost everything which is most precious in our civilisation has come from the small States: the Old Testament, the Homeric Poems, the Attic and Elizabethan Drama, the art of the Italian Renaissance, the Common Law of England." He might have added that the time of Germany's chief contribution was also the time of her small States, and that her contribution dwindled steadily as her strength mounted, until at last that strength destroyed far more than she can ever replace.

It may be doubted—and the case of Germany strengthens the doubt—whether material strength stimulates intellectual or spiritual output. A good case could be made to show that the most glorious era of the French mind was not the reputedly peak period of Louis XIV but the inglorious one of Louis Philippe. Be that as it may, I conceive it to be an eventual and essential part of Justice and Morality that there should be less emphasis in our minds on the old notions of strength, size, numbers, when we have finally liquidated the chief apostle of the creed that Might is Right. That conscious or subconscious obsession must end sometime, and the sooner the better, if civilisation is not to end. Why should not the psychological process begin with the suppression of the military power that has most retarded it? Disarmament must be rigidly unilateral, and this time with no vague, rash and premature hints of the multilateral. The resulting security, which should be shaken by no fresh ambitions, might become—if only we are *all* willing—the start of a fresh standard. The cult of wealth is already on the wane; why not also the mesmerism of strength? The mental transition should be no more difficult. All this, of course, will remain a pure chimera unless unilateral disarmament is



permanent; and that means prolonged occupation. There is no other way.

I do not however pretend that my sympathies are wide enough to include for example those lesser countries whose record of hostility can find little excuse. Their regimes certainly have none. Hungary and Bulgaria have twice joined Germany against us, and no single word can be said in mitigation of the double offence. "We are not amused" by that strange form of alliance, in Turkey and Portugal, consisting in a neutrality which supplies costly war material to our enemies. The resources of diplomacy should be able to find a new word for this fantastic relationship. In the interest not only of morality but of common sense Neutrality also needs sharp redefinition. The word is incompatible with the conduct of Sweden that gave passage to enemy troops, or of Spain that fought against our Allies, and supported our enemies in every possible way, or with that of Eire, nearer home, that banned a film showing British merchant seamen in a good light, and maintained on its territory Axis spy-nests, disguised as Axis Legations, that caused the death of many of those same seamen. As for the mock-totalitarians of Argentina, they have strained the world's patience to breaking-point. Therefore when I speak of small countries I mean specifically those who have suffered from, not those who have pandered to, our enemies. The latter have a past to live down.

In the eventual settlement the former are of course entitled to their full say not only on their own destinies but in all the dispositions affecting the aggressors. Justice and Morality demand that this should not be the monopoly of the great. Needless to say they demand also that the smaller countries should enjoy proper self-determination. There must be no tone of "I've rescued you, so now I'm telling you." It would—and should—be superfluous for me to say these things, did I not encounter people who have already half forgotten that self-determination is explicitly provided in Articles 2 and 3 of the Atlantic Charter.

That document may have been quickly drafted, but it is a solemn engagement to which all concerned have set their signatures, and it must therefore be faithfully observed. There are already many signs of incipient neglect. This earth has been brought to its present pass by the neglect of the pledged word, which Germans have even erected into a state-virtue. Treaty observance is the first condition of future Justice, Morality or Security. That also is a platitude, but what a different world we should have had if we had stuck to that platitude in the inter-war period. We cannot get a brave new world by bad old habits. I have seen suggestions that emphasis on this condition was the sign of a "small nation mind."

It would be ominous indeed if such a notion gained currency. It would be the precursor to some new worship of strength, which is the very vice of the Germanic spirit. The religion of good faith is the only political alternative to the religion of strength.

On this subject of strength I still come across some disquieting contradictions. In several learned and boring books I have seen it argued that the day of the small States is over because they cannot hold their own in modern war. But firstly, are we not going at long last to make an end of war? What about Article 8 of the Charter? Is that forgotten too? Secondly, when it is suggested that another answer would be for the weak to get together, to pool their policy and resources, they receive no encouragement, and sometimes positive discouragement. That is neither just nor moral. Surely those concerned may be trusted to judge their own interests in this respect, above all in the economic sphere. Why should not wisdom be justified by her children of all sizes? They have all learned a hard and abiding lesson from this cataclysm—at least I hope so. In any case my experience during the inter-war period justified no theory that size is a measure of receptivity.

Other minds do not seem able in other respects to free themselves from the old mesmerism of magnitude. Thus I still stumble over suggestions that this or that part of the world must be somebody's sphere of influence. I hope we shall hear no more of such backward and reactionary notions. I was in Iran when one of the last samples was manufactured in the shape of our treaty with Czarist Russia in 1907. Britain is a European necessity; and to me the one consolation of Germany's second appalling world war is that it has at last fulfilled my long-deferred desire of joining Britain to Europe in spite of herself. That ideal would be completely frustrated, were her interests merely localised; indeed in that there would be no ideal at all. I have always agreed that peace is indivisible. That profound definition means something, and something exactly the opposite of spheres of influence. That old jargon is not only immoral but short-sighted. It may lead back towards *Lebensraum* instead of forward to a new Europe. It already culminates in such loose phrase as that Central and South-Eastern Europe must be under the domination either of Germany or Russia. That is less a policy than an immoral excuse for continuing to have none. Anyone tempted to a course that might moreover reconstruct a balance of power with Germany as the balance is in need of medical rather than political advice. Zones of security, or regional agreements, are another matter: they are matters of defence and prosperity, and can be dealt with on a basis of equality and independence. They will be

necessary whatever international machinery may be devised for united action.

I round my theme with the sad tale of one who thought otherwise of small Powers. Long ago I had a dim and ancient relative in the diplomatic service. His career was not a success. He was never employed at any great posts, but served sometimes as Chargé d'Affaires in minor ones. His methods were unusual. He liked arguing with Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and would clinch his argument by saying: "So you may think, but you are only a little Power." And when the Minister said "I am speaking for my Government," he would answer "Yes, but your Government represents nothing." This seemed intolerable even in the last century, and he was rightly relegated as Consul to an island still suspect of occasional cannibalism. I remember as a child hearing him complain to my father that the tomtoms gave him a headache. He is long since dead, but I still sometimes hear echoes of him. I should like to be sure that this ghostly voice has been laid, for it belongs to another world.

With Germany and Japan permanently out of the way as military powers, the great Allies have nothing to fear, provided that they hold together and reject the inevitable intrigues of their defeated enemies, which achieved such amazing and senseless success after the last war. They will have to bear the major burden of policing the world to enforce the new Morality. They must therefore be doubly, trebly, careful not to let their collaboration be ruffled by any pettiness, envy or suspicion. May I give an example of how not to do things? After the last war the United States conceived a passion for naval parity. Our right answer would have been "You are welcome, help yourselves, and more if you like. We trust you, *we* are not jealous; but you can't have it on the cheap, till we know what is going to happen in Europe." Instead of that we all rushed into a most premature Conference at Washington for the limitation of naval armaments, the calamitous beginning of an endless process of bargaining about guns and tons and categories, which ended by nearly costing us our very existence. Once is enough. The new Morality cannot be based on any captious counting of heads and wings. Unilateral disarmament is simple enough: it can and must be enforced; but there is only one possible basis for the multilateral *limitation* of armaments; and it is confidence not categories. There can be no confidence without permanent unilateral disarmament of the aggressors, which means prolonged occupation. You always come back to the same key-point. For lack of confidence the Disarmament Conference of 1932 failed, and indeed

should never have been called. How the French distrusted the Germans, and how we blamed them, and how right they were! Until confidence is really thus established the Powers concerned would be well advised to go slow in their approach to the more complicated and technical problem.

In a world where the Germans come to us with umbrellas, instead of vice-versa, in a world thus, and thus only, enjoying freedom from fear, Justice and Morality should at last come into their own—they have never done so yet—and display themselves in the treatment of smaller units. The ideal is that all powers observe the same rules of conduct toward each other regardless of size—the rule of magnanimity not magnitude. All other roads lead to Munich. We may look forward to the time when all will find their place in a wider entity; but while we are on the road—and it will be longer than optimism predicts—we might bear in mind the wisdom of one who knew something of humanity:

God gave all men all earth to love,  
But since our hearts are small,  
Ordained for each one spot should prove  
Beloved over all.

On the day when that spirit fades from the world all colour will fade from it too. Let us therefore never decry it, for it is not only compatible with but indispensable to the greatest of all Arts—the Art of Living.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE FUTURE OF AUSTRIA

IN MY YOUTH I SPENT MUCH TIME IN AUSTRIA, AND ENJOYED IT ALL. I WAS little concerned with international struggles or party squabbles, and delighted in the pleasures and graces of living so abundantly afforded. I was fortunate too in the finding of friends, some greatly permeated with art, all with good nature, and none with politics. In consequence I saw no more than necessary of the dirt beneath the gilt, of the seamy side of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; and there was plenty of it. It leaped to the eye in its internal injustices almost incomprehensible to a naïf English boy; and as time went slowly and sunnily on I began to have uneasy inkling of the politicians' full subservience to the Huns, whom all my friends disliked and ridiculed. The cloud spread and burst at last and the sky has never been clear again. The past still comes back to me smiling

in its way, and I am grateful in mine. I still have some old weakness for Austrian weakness, but I hope that I have never let it affect my political judgment. The old attachment has no part in the detachment with which I view the Austrian problem and its solution.

In any case this is not an instalment of biography, but a political study and programme in brief dimension. How is Austria to be handled after the second collapse of this intolerable pan-Germanism?

The main answer has already, but very tardily, been provided by the Moscow Conference: Austria is to be liberated not only from National Socialism but from the Germans. This measure is quite indispensable to Europe; but how far will it suit the Austrians?

Let us glance back quickly. As the years took me from youth toward manhood and 1914, I began to realise that many of my acquaintance—not my *friends*—were pan-Germans at heart, particularly among the upper classes, however much they may have resented the Germans. There were moreover the noisome hunneries of Schoenerer and his supporters, who were no better than German agents. After the war pan-Germanism in Austria had two main pillars: certain influential Socialist leaders, such as Otto Bauer, Renner, Julius Deutsch, on the one hand, and the German-subsidised traitors and hooligans on the other. I computed their combined forces in 1937 at under 30 per cent. Our last Minister in Vienna in his last report computed them at only 20 per cent. There was perhaps 30 per cent. of real resistance: the rest was malleable. Not a promising basis.

What will be the position after this war? I confidently anticipate that the traitors and hooligans, from Seyss-Inquart, Guido Schmidt, Kaltenbrunner, etc., downward, will be killed. Here is a case for ruthless elimination. As to the Socialists, no pessimism is called for. After seven years of German oppression all those in Austria will have learned their lesson by bitter experience. Only some of the Austrian Socialists in safe exile have clung tenaciously to their delusion, and have but reluctantly and ostensibly forsworn the Anschluss in consequence of the Moscow decision. I do not trust these a yard: they will need very careful watching, for they would easily return to their vomit. Indeed they should not be allowed to return to Austria till we are sure of their conversion. In this I include some members of the London Bureau and their corresponding numbers in the United States.

Austrians have sinned very greatly. We must not forget that; but our problem is to fit a free, independent, democratic Austria into the defence system to be built up in Central and South Eastern Europe, in order to

prevent any future German aggression. This is the overriding consideration, and all other questions of internal politics, the form of the State or international status, must be largely affected by it, and that not only in the case of Austria.

In other words, whatever form Austria may take she must be made politically, economically, militarily, spiritually independent of Germany, whatever form Germany may take. This means that Austria must be equipped to assert that independence *vis-à-vis* of Germany in all circumstances. She can only do so within a system of well-organised co-operation with her non-German neighbours. Austria's destiny lies East not West. Her people, State, government, parliament must be made—I use the word very advisedly, for some compulsion as well as persuasion may at times be necessary—made able and willing to conduct the country so as to resist any form of German penetration, ideological or otherwise.

At this point we must remember that Austria has been subjected to a generation of pan-German propaganda and seven years of German occupation. There will be much Austrian readiness, but not automatic and immediate capacity, to rid her system of the German poison. This means that there will have to be effective inter-Allied control over Austria for something like a generation, that is until a new and reliable generation has grown up, ready to assert its own interests, which are our aims. There should be no fixed time limit—we must judge by experience—and the control must be as little burdensome as possible; but, at this key-point of Europe, it must be there. There will have to be some temporary Allied supervision of Austrian policy, internal and external, and of Austrian education, direct and indirect, including printing, radio and films. In the case of Germany I have explained that such control should be negative, i.e. that we should see that the Germans do *not* teach militarism, revenge, racialism or imperialism. In the case of Austria the Allied contribution might also be more positive, because it would be more welcome. After all that has happened there must be some training in democracy; let it be elastic, liberal, generous—but let it be there, till no more needed. Meanwhile “who wills the end wills the means,” and the end is real, not transient, Austrian freedom and democracy without let or hindrance.

For this purpose Germany must be demilitarised, but not Austria. On the contrary, Austria must be enabled to play her part in her own defence and that of organised European peace. In this respect Austria must be on the same footing as all other States interested in crushing the rebirth of any German militarism. (As in Germany so in Austria, a

special Intelligence Service will be required to detect and nip any incipient manifestations, which will of course not be confined to, or initiated in, the military sphere.) For this purpose again Austria will need to co-operate with her neighbours to ensure their co-existence. In the earlier stages at least it would be advisable that the efficacy of such co-operation should be started and co-ordinated with the advice of an Allied military mission, acting with the military staffs of the countries concerned.

To eliminate so far as possible the likelihood of renascent, or underground, Nazism, Fascism, pan-Germanism, all Austrians who were members of the Nazi party before March, 1938, must be removed from Austria, unless "wanted" for execution. This applies also to all those who after the liberation may be detected in the overt or covert dissemination of pan-German propaganda. All these should be deported to Germany, together with all Germans who entered Austria after 1933, again unless wanted for the gallows.

On this matter of the Anschluss there can of course be no plebiscite as impudently demanded by some of the pan-Germans in exile—Frank, alias Hagen, for example. Austria's total independence of Germany is not an Austrian or German-Austrian family affair. It is a vital matter of European security and European peace. It was not for the sake of Austria alone that the Moscow Declaration guaranteed her independence. Whatever the future of Austria may be, it is not to become part of a Greater German Reich but part of a systematic European defence against German aggression. Austria does not desire to share Germany's fate—which is to be crushed—but, if she did, that would be a reason the more, not less, for denying to her the pleasure of this inflammatory self-immolation.

The future place of Austria in Europe should be within a Federation or Association or Union—call it what you will—of the nations of Central and South-Eastern Europe lying between Germany, Italy and Russia. This Federation or Association might have regional sub-divisions, consisting of equal sovereign and peace-loving States—to use the language of the Moscow Declaration. They would have a common organ for foreign and military affairs, and probably also for social and financial policy.

This Union would be a bulwark against Germany, and a security to Russia. On this score our Allies need have no mythical apprehension, which can only cause needless trouble and obstruction. This opening is already being exploited by the pan-German intriguers bent on maintaining a "strong" Germany after this war. They calculate that any course other

than an association of the Central and South-Eastern European States will ultimately push Austria back into Germany. And so it will. We shall long need organised security against Germany, and so long as these regions are not adequately cemented, German intrigue will be wedge-driving between them. This apprehension should be Russia's only one, and it is easily met. There is no analogy between the sequel of this war and the sequel of the last one. I therefore urge our Russian allies to favour, and not to frown upon, the only wise solution on any long view. Europe would live to regret any failure to adopt it. Without this organisation there will be no European security: the way will be still open for German power-politics to play the world back to war again.

We shall need to be stern at this key-point, Austria: the police must be on duty at the dangerous corner of these cross-roads. If Austria should backslide at any time after the cessation of Allied occupation, should prove unable or unwilling to fulfil her destiny of independence, should weaken the European defence system, or hark back toward Germanity by any form of anti-social conduct or legislation, she must be rigorously dealt with, perhaps even forfeit her very existence as a State. But we must also be kind, offer to her every incentive to avoid this fate, assume, as we well may, that after her terrible experience she will be as anti-German as the rest of Europe. Economic reorganisation of, and Allied economic support to, Austria must therefore be such that the Austrian standard of life shall be as high as that of other neighbouring democratic countries, without being turned back toward a German economic hinterland which would still mean German economic dictatorship. *Los von Deutschland* means "free from Germany" in every respect. The common advantage of all the neighbouring democratic or democratised countries might well be served by the establishment of a customs and monetary union as well as the free use of an internationalised outlet to the sea, in the North as well as in the South; but the union would of course be "free from Germany."

Austria must receive territorial justice also. She must receive back two territories which she should never have lost. The first is the town and area of Oedenburg-Sopron in the Burgenland, which was ceded, for the sake of good relations, to Hungary in 1921. There will be no question of any concession this time to that consistent offender. On the contrary, what awaits Hungary is unconditional surrender and the working of a long passage home.

In the last war Italy fought on our side and was immorally rewarded. This time Italy, like Hungary, must take her gruel; and South Tyrol



must accordingly return to Austria. Even apart from the justice of these two claims it is in our own interest to strengthen Austria as part of the European defence-system. In the last war we broke Austria too much and Germany too little. In neither respect must that mistake be repeated. In spite of the scandalous pact between Hitler and Mussolini, many former Austrians have remained in South Tyrol under cover of assumed Italian names. They can now re-emerge as Austrians; and we must sling out neck and crop the surplus Italian population of "reliable" Fascists artificially imported and imposed by the fallen Dictator.

Austrian access to the Adriatic is also a matter for consideration, indeed a matter of necessity. The defeated aggressor, Italy, will of course not be left in possession of the Istrian peninsula, with Trieste, Pola, Fiume, still less of Zara on the Dalmatian coast. The two latter will naturally go to Yugoslavia; perhaps Pola, too. Trieste might become an internationalised free port.

I put forward one further territorial suggestion in this connection. It will be indirectly to the advantage of Austria. Let there be direct communication between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia by means of a corridor starting from Bratislava, leading past Oedenburg through Szombathely and St. Gotthard in Hungary to the nearest junction with Yugoslav territory. The European defence system, including Austria, will profit by a measure which will prevent Hungary from again becoming a German bridgehead.

Here is a programme for Austria, a mixture of severity, benevolence and hope. We must not forget that Austria has a partly criminal record. The Catholics who followed the culpable Cardinal Innitzer, the Socialists who followed Renegade Renner, were the accomplices of the Anschluss. They are not exonerated by the weakness of western democracy toward German infiltration and intimidation. Austria is a country greatly corrupted, in which, after a long period of instability, a strong minority sold her and their souls to Germany. There will be much moral rubble to be bull-dozed out of Austria after this war. The country will at first be racked with bitterness and recrimination, and in all walks of life past sinners against the light will be numerous enough to obscure it. We have a definite part to play in correcting chaos. In Austria, but never in Germany, we can prudently and sternly comply with the Pope's adjuration to set a former and dragooned enemy "on his feet again," but keep them firmly on the ground.

## CHAPTER XII

### REVELATIONS

THE BRITISH VIEW OF FOREIGNERS OSCILLATES BETWEEN TWO EXTREMES. They are either bits of no good or endowed with mysterious superiorities. We long allowed the Germans to persuade us that they possessed some superior competence. This is of course an absurdity. In any national grading of all-round accomplishment the Germans would rank no higher than fourth. The two tendencies, however, continue to run side by side, and the foreigner, where he is not mocked or ignored, receives unreasonable credit. It has taken a second and longer war to get Germany down in public esteem. Even so the second death of a resurrected illusion would have been impossible without the whole-hearted transfer of credit to Russia. Russia for the moment can do no wrong. Everything done or said by Russia is *ipso facto* more intelligent than anything said or done by us. This is merely to put the old schoolgirl complexion on new things. In the case of the Soviet Union, as of the United States, the surest way to misunderstanding and disappointment is the uncritical attitude. Long ago the Soviet Government erected into an official virtue the practice of "self-criticism." In the twinkling of an astute eye it became criticism of others.

It is better to be frank, and to say that, in the matter of propaganda, for example, Russian practice and policy has been at least as far out as ours or that of the United States. The Russians, indeed, often do and say foolish things, and it is wiser, subject to reciprocity, to attempt correction rather than imitation. The same remark applies to the United States. In this country there never has been, and probably never will be—despite terrible opportunities—much comprehension of Germans. Even so, one would have hardly supposed that, in the fifth year of Germany's Second World War, the British Government would have allowed the formation in Britain of a German Society for the Preservation of the German Army just because the Russians did so.

When a National Free German Committee for the salvation of militarism was founded in Moscow, the example was promptly followed in this country. Our less welcome visitors started "branches" in London, Leeds, Manchester, Glasgow. The episode is instructive because it illustrates the lengths to which German propaganda in this country will go

on the least encouragement. Most of them were German Communists, and were "free" because they were in Britain. During the inter-war period they had been peculiarly "free" in their hostility to this country. Instead of at least earning their keep by repentance, their aims again diverge from ours. British Governments usually sit by with folded arms, and in the name of toleration allow intrigue. This was no exception.

You can never get a revolution in Germany by dulcitudes and pussy-footing; you can always and only get a revolt by licking Germans. That is what we did, and got, last time. The Russians only tardily tumbled to this fact. For example, the word "Hitlerite" occurs rather less frequently in their broadcasts and writings. (We never talked of "Kaiserites" in the last war.) On the other hand, the Moscow Agreement preambled with such a spate of "Hitlerites" that one wondered whether the draftsmen had ever heard the word "German." Fortunately they recovered their memories in the operative passage. On the other hand, again, here was Moscow playing with the fire of German militarism, disguised as the glow of German "freedom." No wonder that the Generals of the Free German Committee rubbed their hands. The fire was less dangerous at Moscow than in Britain and the United States, where tinder abounds, and publics cannot be debamboozled. All three machines of political warfare worked on false lines. They tried to induce revolution by sweet reasonableness, honeyed words, sugared pills, a repertory of glucose. Promises which neither can nor will be fulfilled (because world-conscience and common sense will revolt against them) are simply a repetition of the mistakes committed in the closing stages of the last war. They are a guaranteed incitement to "revenge" and a third war. No one with a remnant of horse-sense would allow the German Army again to survive, but many continued to toy with the notion—as if a slightly speedier victory would be any compensation for a third German World War. The episode of the Society for the Salvation of the German Army is not so trivial as it looks. Some 450 enemy aliens—some almost undisguised enemies—soon collected in its name at the Holborn Hall. The proceedings merit description as a warning.

Only one voice—the proportion is significant—was raised against the Committee's manœuvres to ensure that Germany should remain armed. It was cogently pointed out that the Communists, if they lent themselves to this militarism, would be playing exactly the same game as President Ebert and his Social-Democrats played in 1918 when they united with the militarists to save the German military caste. This argument for

*bona fide* disarmament was greeted with derisive laughter by the "good" Germans.

The solitary voice next vainly suggested that this Moscow Committee was vitiated by its preponderant proportion of German officers. What guarantee had we—it was asked—that these German soldiers had not committed horrible crimes during four years in occupied territory, like the bulk of their fellows? Moscow did not seem to have thought of that, and the enemy aliens did not care. Next the solitary voice objected that the business of the future German Government would be to make war impossible: lasting peace could only come from the complete overthrow of German militarism. The Free Germans of Britain would have had a free fight rather than agree. If they could not have a real army they would make do with a People's Army, and hope for the best. They would maintain Germany as a military power by arming "the anti-Fascist masses." It is needless to observe that, if you arm the German people, you have circumvented Article 8 of the Atlantic Charter, the bugbear of most German emigrants. Were the German "masses" armed, we should find that the German militarists had opportunely developed extreme leftward tendencies, and the arms—plus the "masses"—would soon be under their effective control and organisation. Indeed the German "masses," who have not been militarised for nothing, would soon press to be effectively, that is militarily, organised.

Another speaker was an even greater revelation of what "democratic" Germans really want. He replied to criticisms: "Yes, we are ready to fight under every flag, even under the Black-White-Red flag" (the old Imperial colours) "for the salvation of Germany." Are we going back to the days when "*Rote Fahne*," the organ of the German Communists, could declare: "We are even prepared to work with the men who murdered Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg"—that is with the militarists? A little later Holborn heard an even more surprising remark—surprising, that is, from a German Socialist: "Anyone who to-day speaks of Socialism in Germany is working for Goebbels."

Other utterances were on the following lines: We Germans don't want Socialism; there can be no total disarmament of Germany; we Germans must co-operate with all nationalists, and the Moscow Committee must be the future Government: we are against any federation of Germany—it might weaken her. (The German Social Democrats in America have worked hard on this line.) Weaken her for what? War? The tone throughout was: get rid of Hitler, and ensure the continuance of a Germany so strong and well-armed that her influence will continue to be

effective in Europe. None of these things should be forgotten; for if Free Germans will say them in the green tree of England, what will they do in the dry of the Fourth Reich? The one man who objected to democratic militarism was greeted with cries of "English agent." I want everyone to note the real views of "good" Germans. The Home Office should inscribe the scene on its records of impunity. In the last war we invented the tank; in this one the Trojan horse reappeared. It is a familiar hack. The German Communist Party was always so bellicose and anti-British that a motion to collaborate with the German Generals at Moscow—and save the German Army—was carried at Holborn with the unanimity of a Nazi plebiscite. "We might have been in Germany," subsequently said one of the participants. They were. These proceedings were undisguisedly part of a widespread German endeavour in the three Allied countries to procure a peace that will leave Germany in "a position of power." When the history of this war is written, these "goings-on" must have their place. There was nothing like them in the last war. Bedlam and international affairs were only connected during the inter-war period. The Committee's appeal contained of course no word of overthrowing German militarism; that is the key to everything, and not one German in ten among the emigrants is willing to turn it, least of all "the Free Germans."

Till now the German organisations of the Left, both here and in the United States, as well as their British sympathisers, have professed the destruction of the German heavy industrialists and the Junkers for their complicity in German militarist aggression. What are we now to think when the same people come out here in favour of collaboration with the militarists? There is no excuse for them save the confusion that caused the German Communists to sing one of their songs to the tune of the Nazi *Horst Wessel Lied*. It is only a step to singing the International to the tune of *Deutschland über Alles*. In fact some of our guests are already in choir practice. When once a German gets the notion of strength he is an international nuisance for all his international pretences. The German Left bears no relation to other peoples' Lefts. At least half of our Leftists have not yet grasped that fact, and shrink from it as from a nettle.

Now for the German Committee in Moscow. It contained a number of undistinguished writers. I have read some of their compositions; the German word for a poet, *Dichter*, is certainly elastic. One of them was chairman. He is less obscure than some of our young Communist poets here: that is the most that can be said of him, though I believe that

he has recited himself in cabarets. From that form of entertainment at least we are spared by our aptitude for embarrassment. Next came some Communist ex-members of the Reichstag, and former officials of the Komintern. I hold no brief for the Weimar Government; it was a fraud; but we may doubt the political sagacity of those who contributed to replace it by something infinitely worse, and then praised their achievement as a victory of the German working-class.

The other members of the Committee were officers, soldiers, army chaplains and doctors; and it is to the officers that we should pay most attention. They held pride of place in the list, and there are some whose dossiers deserve attention. They belong to the school which, in early post-war days, "collaborated" with Russia in the illegal arming of Germany—an error which has cost the Russian people dear. They represent the old policy of alliance between Soviet Russia and a Germany ruled by Generals. Stalin shot a number of Russian Generals, headed by Tukachevsky, who had been playing with this idea. Tukachevsky was working for a Russo-German military *rapprochement*, and many breathed more freely when Stalin's action put an end to the intrigue. In the minds of some German officers the notion is not yet dead. German Socialists and German militarists are always equally convinced that their "superiority" will eventually enable them to control anything and anybody that they touch. These Germans could not have entered such a Committee without the approval of Field-Marshal Paulus, also a prisoner of war in Russia. The old fox was fully cognisant of the proceedings of his subordinates, and subsequently joined them. According to German military regulations, it could only be by his permission that such abundance of senior German Generals, Colonels and Majors from the newly formed "Officers' Union" flooded the Committee. They said that they were looking forward to a new lease of life. Let us draw and retain our conclusions.

Here were the heads of the German fighting-machine urging the German Army to throw up the sponge in circumstances which their own militarist code automatically classes as dishonour. They made no bones about the motive in explaining away the breach of their "sworn faith." They salved their consciences with the reflection that they were working round for that "new lease of life" by way of that German People's Army, which Stresemann and his friends also desired in their day for a similar purpose. (Another variant was General Schleicher's conception of a Germany ruled by a union of the German Army and Herr Leipart's Trade Unionists.) Give a German a chance and he will always wangle an

army somehow. "There must not be another 1918." The German nation must not "further wear down and exhaust its strength by continuing the war." If the German people will rid itself of Hitler (and so conserve that "strength"), "it will win for itself the right to decide its own fate, and other countries will have to reckon with it." Note the threatening ring of those last words. They were straight from the war-horse's mouth.

"German soldiers and officers on all fronts," continued the manifesto, "you have arms in your hands, take care of them." In other words, keep them. Could any surer recipe for calamity be devised in a nation sizzling with baulked militarism? Then came another typical touch: Clausewitz—the Bible of all German militarists—is cited among "the best of the Germans." His successors have no intention of ever laying down arms. Here was one of the Colonels, a "high-up" in the Intelligence: "Hitler is a failure both as a politician and a General; the guarantee of an honourable peace must be sought in the strength of the German nation at the present moment, when Germany's armed forces and economic strength still represent a factor of power." Another of these champions called on Hitler "to resign." That's all. The Kaiser did that, too. And the result? "Bigger and better wars." The next sample was a General: "Only a few months ago I was a convinced Nazi. If I stuck so stubbornly to my Nazi faith, it was because I did not want to lose faith in goodness." (A gem, that!) "Further faith to our sworn oath is immoral," because "total war must lead to total destruction of the defeated side." The General worked hard at destroying the losers, so long as he was the winner.

The next sample was equally revealing. "When the danger of a national catastrophe became more apparent, an awakening began affecting wide circles which have so far followed Hitler in complete allegiance." The whole nation will go this way, and for this reason, in due course. "S.A. members and Hitler Youth Leaders, who were expressing complete allegiance to Hitler only six months ago," when Germany still might have a chance of winning, are now quoted as "changing their attitude." (Deep in the sixth year of the war we will be deceived by no deathbed repentances. A revolt in Germany might still be militarily convenient, but morally it is now meaningless and worthless. We shall win without it.) Throughout all these utterances runs the same note: destroy Hitler, and save Germany. Hitler only. Get rid of the incompetent corporal, say the Generals, and save up for more Generals later on. This time the legend is to be not the "stab in the back" but the "stab from above." The Third War is already in and on the German air. "Think of your Fatherland, and save the Army." The Fatherland is the Army. Down only with the

losing leaders. The Kaiser again. "Prevent the war from reaching German territory." The calculation of the German General Staff in November, 1918. "Conclude peace before our material and man-power are exhausted." "We must have something in our hands to be thrown into the balance." All this from Moscow. The German officers do not trouble to disguise their aims. "There is the danger that the armed forces might break up. The salvation of our Fatherland *and its power of armed forces* demands courage to decide. The armed forces must be led back to the borders of the Reich *intact*."

I have an unhappy memory of Karl Radek's pressure on German Communists to collaborate with German Nationalists against "Western Imperialism." I do not want to see collaboration with Russia hampered by any revival of such false and muddled thinking. The programme of the Moscow Committee would ultimately lead—after a period in which Germany, while ostensibly under Russian influence, would in effect hold the balance of power—to a renewed attempt by the Teutons to dominate the Slavs. Communism plus militarism would lead back to Nazism. It is vital to realise this in good time. This revelation must be remembered.

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

#### *A Speech in the House of Lords*

I HAVE ALWAYS OPPOSED PREMATURE STATEMENTS OF WAR AIMS FROM official sources. In the main they have been avoided, despite much amateurish pressure. The exception is the Atlantic Charter. On the whole it was probably a mistake, but its intentions were evidently excellent, though sometimes wrapped in a not unhelpful sea-mist. The time, however, has come to dispel one nebulous passage. The British Government have intimated that the Atlantic Charter permits geographical rearrangements at the expense of our enemies. The Government of the United States has said nothing very audible as yet on this subject. The Soviet Government has said little, but its intentions are in manifest line with our views. Hitherto the Allied attitude has been: "I'm not arguing, I'm telling you." It is time to go further than that, for the Government



seem unaware how strong their case is. I am perfectly certain the public do not know that it is not only strong but impregnable.

Cast your minds back to 8th January, 1918, when the Fourteen Points were first promulgated. They were immediately rejected by all Germans, Right, Centre and Left. The Press records are definite. The Germans fought on, expecting to win. Not till September did the High Command realise that defeat was inevitable, and from mid-September send in more and more alarming reports. Ludendorff was soon pressing for an armistice and for some democratic window-dressing to trick the Allies into better terms. By 1st October he had declared that "the Army could not wait forty-eight hours." Accordingly on 3rd October—and only then—Hindenburg wrote, insisting on an armistice, to Prince Max of Baden, who was still unconvinced. The military situation was becoming desperate. So on the night of 3rd to 4th October—but only then—the German Government addressed President Wilson, accepting the Fourteen Points "as a basis"—note only as a basis—"of peace negotiations." As late as 25th October, Ludendorff and Hindenburg pretended to change their minds and to want to go on fighting. Collapse, however, was now imminent, and it is surely significant that Scheidemann himself wrote: "Without the collapse the Revolution that broke out six weeks later would probably not have occurred." I agree (except that it was not a revolution but a revolt), for as late as 17th October the Majority Socialist Party also issued a proclamation breathing the spirit of protracted resistance. The facts speak for themselves. The Germans only gave in because the High Command knew the Army was beaten.

In dealing with Germans promises have proved rather an embarrassment to us than an inducement to them. The Fourteen Points no more shortened the last war than five years of futile propaganda have shortened this one. No political offers or blandishments have stopped the Germans from fighting. Even if the Atlantic Charter had been wholly applicable to the Germans—of course it isn't—they would still have ignored it for three years. There is only one way to deal with them: to beat them.

It would have been quite open to the Allies to say that the Fourteen Points were no longer available. They would have been wiser still not to have argued at all. At long last they have learned wisdom, for unconditional surrender in itself stultifies any notion that the Charter can have been integrally applicable to our enemies. That is probably one of the reasons why so many Germans, and even Allied subjects, have been working steadily against unconditional surrender and its consequences.

Here is a sample by George N. Shuster, President of Hunter College, U.S.A., in "Foreign Policy Reports" of 5th October, 1943:

"Anybody who has ever known not the Rhineland but East Prussia, will tell you of the upright, courteous folk he met there—of great ladies and gentlemen, of godfearing and modest Sunday crowds, of amiable and efficient workmen. These of course are the people who have not swallowed Nazism. . . . The last time we marched into Germany hating our enemies. Yet it proved impossible to prevent fraternisation. To the American soldier the Germans he met were folks like those back home. . . . Therefore all fantastic schemes for 'educating' the Germans and teaching them 'democracy' are not worth a moment of serious consideration."

Who could have lured Mr. Shuster—even as a good German-American—into picking East Prussia as the land of "good Germans," East Prussia, the very home of Junkerdom, reaction, militarism, oppression! Fancy anyone choosing this as a proof that Germans need not be educated in democracy! The fantasy is too remarkable to be home-made. Mr. Shuster must have been deceived by some good German nationalists, who have realised that this stronghold of all that is worst in Prussianism will have to be transferred to Poland. They are therefore conferring fabulous virtues on Junkerland to stake out a claim for its retention. This in fact is the prelude to the outcry of all those who have seen nothing wrong in partitioning inoffensive Poland, but holloa at the bare idea of diminishing or decentralising by a jot the offensive Prussianised Reich. Flushed with the success of their inter-war propaganda, the German intriguers feel always sure of finding some amiable and authoritative mouthpieces. Therein lies the significance of this silliness. It is only one in a thousand, and that is why we should take it seriously.

I said the Atlantic Charter was not "integrally applicable." As a matter of fact, only one article is applicable to our enemies and that is Article 4. But Article 4 is a platitude. The Germans have always had access to raw materials. Their trouble was that they did not want to pay for them. As a matter of fact they have had far too much access to *war* material, and many of us intend very firmly that they shall never have that access again. The Charter goes back not nine months but three years—three years in which the Germans have converted Europe from a continent into a blood swamp. It is not open, never has been open, to German and Japanese savages to say: "Let us wait and see for three years, during which we will kill another thirty million people, and then say 'Kamerad, the Charter.'"

It is not open, and, if it ever had been open either directly or by implication, it has long ago been nullified by holocaust; but there never was any direct or indirect implication that the Charter was applicable to our enemies. If it had ever been suggested that under Article 3 the Germans were entitled to re-elect this Führer or any other Führer dear to their ferocious hearts, the Charter would have been shattered by a national, and probably an international, explosion. There never was, however, any question of that. Article 3 was not applicable to Germany. Though I feared some misuse of its loose wording, I always understood the Charter as an honourable understanding between Allies, not an insane and unauthorised commitment to our enemies. Similarly as regards Articles 1 and 2, the Charter constitutes a self-denying ordinance on the part of the major Allies, who thereby renounce territorial aggrandisement and the imposition of any territorial changes undesired by Allied but occupied countries. The Charter does not therefore preclude change at the expense of the felon Reich.

It so happens moreover that the detachment of East Prussia from the Reich is the only conceivable way in which we can ensure to Poland free and safe access to the sea, unless we are going to revert to the timorous absurdity of the Corridor. It happens, again, that to detach East Prussia from the Reich is the only way to ensure against future war. Here was the nest in which were hatched and fledged the first and worst illegal armies after the last war. East Prussia in German hands is further a guarantee that the Poles can never in any circumstances defend themselves successfully. Article 6 of the Charter promises the peoples that they shall dwell "in safety within their own boundaries" and "live out their lives in freedom from fear." Failure to detach East Prussia from Germany would render both these promises incapable of fulfilment and would in fact be a breach of the spirit of the Charter.

This is in no sense a question of compensation for Poland, compensation for the loss of nearly half of her territory elsewhere. East Prussia is a vital necessity to Poland. She must be treated generously in this matter. Our Russian Allies have been stiff but not exorbitant in the terms offered to Finland and to Rumania. It is unthinkable that greater magnanimity should be displayed towards two of our enemies than towards the first of the Allies to resist Germany. Poland cannot be "compensated" for her diminution by East Prussia minus Koenigsberg.

As to Article 7, which seems related to the amenities of sea-travel, I say nothing because I do not understand what it means, and I do not

believe anybody else does—including its illustrious authors. Article 8, providing for the disarmament of the aggressors, is again proof that there is no contract or bargain with our enemies. It is the most valuable article in the Charter and it imposes a statesmanlike and unilateral obligation on the aggressor.

I would like to take this topic to a little higher ground than the misty lowlands of expediency. Why is it that in this country and in the United States there are so many people ever ready to fly to the help of strength? There is a religious body which is called the Little Sisters of the Poor. There is in politics a body which might well be called the Little Brothers of the Strong. Their creed consists in the literal interpretation of the text: "Whosoever hath, to him shall be given, but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath." How could that be more crudely exhibited than in the attempt to interpret the Charter in favour of the strong and against the weak, when its very beginning shows that it was meant to be the Charter of weaker vessels. You cannot set it upon other courses, steer it into other channels, without shipwreck of the faith in which all hands were set to it.

I must take the matter a little higher still, and here the ground is steeper and stonier; but it is time that someone stood upon it. I have done so already and shall do so again. I have often noticed in the course of my life that when the interests of the strong conflict with those of the weak, moral courage is apt to flounder, and the weak to fall out of favour. Next criticism gets out of hand and goes beyond bound or reason. Men are most critical of those whom they have most wronged; and that is the case of oft-partitioned Poland.

For years I have hardly heard a good word for Poland. On the contrary, there has been steady, subtle, indecent "smearing." I think it is time to call a halt. We should think more frequently of the Poland who, out of her thirty-four million original inhabitants, has already lost nine million by deportation and massacre, and we should think also more frequently of the Fighting Poland who has played so brave a part throughout the war, in the last lap as in the first. It will be a poor prospect for a brave new world if gratitude and sympathy are to become drugs on a political market. "Be to her virtues very kind; be to her faults a little blind" will not make a bad motto for all the Allies in their dealings with each other both during and after the war, and I recommend it not only to Soviet Russia but to some among our Allies, both great and small, who are already inclined to be over-critical of *us*. There is too much ill-informed criticism which often tends to degenerate to mere crabbing, and there is no

decoration more ignominious than the Iron Cross of a whispering campaign.

In this great matter and in all the other great matters that lie ahead of us, we are confronted with a perfectly clear choice, and we have got to make the choice. We have got to choose between murderers and murdered. That was quite clearly put by the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Mr. Jan Masaryk, at the meeting of the International Labour Organisation at Philadelphia in a speech which shone like a good deed in a naughty world compared with the new appeasement of the American delegate, Mr. Watts. Mr. Masaryk said: "The peoples of the occupied countries will not understand unless their cause is given priority, definite and lasting priority, over the aggressors." We should all reflect first on that stark sentence, and then upon the consequences of two generations of appeasement. I make full allowances for the intoxication of good intentions:

"But men at whiles are sober,  
And think by fits and starts,  
And if they think, they fasten  
Their hands upon their hearts."

If we fasten our hands upon our hearts we shall hear little more of the notions and emotions arising from the idea that good can ever come from considering one's enemies before one's Allies.

We are making headway, for we are all now agreed that a great slice shall be carved from Western Germany to compensate the Dutch for the wanton flooding of their country by sea-water. The land thus flooded by the Huns—who have brought this retribution on themselves—will long be useless. Meanwhile the Dutch must have somewhere to live. They will live on former German territory, which will be cleared of all Germans. The Atlantic Charter is not being invoked against this justice.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE DESTINY OF FRANCE

I HAVE HAD A LIFE-LONG HABIT OF FRANCE, AND DURING MANY OF THOSE years it was almost a reproach to prefer association with democracy, however defective, to the allurements of tyranny. I began going to France during the Dreyfus case, and I therefore never judged her by her politicians. I have been a good friend to her in spite of some of them.

It is impossible to understand modern France, without experience of the full and unhappy story of the Third Republic; and there has been some lack of this background in the handling of Anglo-American—preponderantly American—policy toward France. The Third Republic was sown in corruption, though it was purity compared with the Third Reich. The Third Republic had indeed hardly got into its stride when it discovered that its third President, *le père Grévy*, was dishonest, and that his son-in-law, M. Daniel Wilson, was a shameful crook, who carried on his crookeries from the very Elysée. An Augean stable of widespread bribery, forgery, tampering with the course of justice and with the Press, was exposed and never cleansed. From that moment corruption was always smouldering, and there were repeated eruptions of red-hot scandals: Panama, Dreyfus, Rochette, Oustric, Stavisky. A series of Prime Ministers—three of them personally known to me—numerous Cabinet Ministers, Senators and Deputies galore, political Generals, all sorts and conditions of politicians, judges, lawyers, newspaper men, police, were involved and besmirched. They were admittedly exceptions, but the unfortunate people of France were demoralised, perhaps mesmerised, by an exaggerated impression of having no choice—broadly speaking—but to oust one set of mediocrities or self-seekers, and to put in another. And during this protracted pessimism the real rogues went free, and confusion grew, until, long before the final collapse the Communists and the *Camelots du Roi*, the extreme Left and the extreme Right, were rioting simultaneously—as in the Stavisky affair.

I was shocked and puzzled by the bitterness and contempt with which, in my boyhood, angry Frenchmen spoke of the political ring. Yet a fatal apathy restrained them from breaking it, until it broke itself. Before their eyes the Third Republic, the dream-child who had looked so lovely under the Second Empire, lost her figure, her looks, her virtue, became an indulgent, self-indulgent, matron, *La République des Camarades*, the Republic of pals and log-rollers. At least so they thought in their warm and cynical hearts. The Ring had too long dreaded strength in its ministers, too long preferred its figure-heads to be nonentities, who culminated in M. Lebrun, and, worst of all, in the senile and treacherous reactionary, "*Nous Philippe Pétain*." The price of all this was that poor France was twice exposed wholly unprepared to incursions by the Germans, and in the second was wholly betrayed. This country and the U.S.A. have a considerable share of responsibility in the collapse of France; but the vast preponderance of blame must be borne by the French political system.

It may be asked why then am I Francophil, and the answer is easy and manifold.

(1) Geography should make us charitable not critical. We too sinned, but escaped. And, for a different reason, I think that the United States—remembering the corrupt story of President Harding's régime—may also incline to be indulgent. Indeed our American friends were at one time *too* indulgent to the relicts of an *ancien régime* just as manifestly ripe for collapse as that of 1789.

(2) With all its faults the Third Republic was essentially peace-loving, in contrast with the German barbarians, who were persistently seeking to crush Western civilisation.

(3) The contribution of France to that civilisation has been so splendid as to make German *Kultur* look second-rate at its best and sheer savagery at its worst.

(4) The political circus of the Third Republic was not France. The virtues and qualities of the French people have remained beneath the overlay. We must be careful indeed not to be too sweeping. "The tradition of Republican purity," wrote Bodley in his *France*, "is like that of the smoothness of the Mediterranean, which survives the adverse testimony of the ages. . . . There are days of flawless perfection on the Mediterranean, just as there are men of spotless repute in Republican Governments; but days of exceeding beauty are perhaps less rare on seas without pretensions to calm, and upright statesmen are perhaps more common in monarchies which have no peculiar attribute of purity." The period may be judged by the style. It is pure 1898.

(5) Even if I had not always felt from my youth up that the Germans were going to make their vile wars upon humanity, I should still have held it—and I shall always hold it—a vital British interest to have a friendly and healthy France for our nearest neighbour, and doubly so with the advent of aviation. The flying bomb is a winged word of warning. The Entente was well-timed and ill-implemented; but I prefer a sick friend to a deadly enemy.

The last and greatest reason, that vital British interest, has passed through a period of dangerous disregard. It would have been fatal to our prospects had there been any substance in General Smuts's gloomy and easy prognostication that France was "gone." His speech was so typical of the way in which our elder statesmen have underrated not only France but the Anglo-French connection that I must deal with it more fully.

General Smuts said: "France has gone, and if ever she returns it will be a hard and a long upward pull. . . . She will not easily resume her

old place again. . . . France has gone, and will be gone in our day, and perhaps for many a day."

Our French friends were naturally pained and indignant, the more so that the General, in also foreseeing the disappearance of modern Germany, found words of appreciation for German qualities. The French would naturally have preferred to be the recipients.

That France's physical strength has been waning since Napoleon I, and that the Germans crushed her at their third attempt, is of course as true as to say that no one on earth can speedily recover from the horror and destruction wrought by Germans wherever they go. My only comment is that France, judged on past form, will recover more quickly than some expect, but not more quickly than we must all desire.

France not only was, but will be, a great country. She was corrupted and betrayed. She will deal with the betrayers. Forty years have passed since Kipling wrote: "We have had no end of a lesson; it will do us no end of good." He was wrong. We also failed to learn the General's wise lesson that power is necessary in peace as in war. Moreover, a percentage of responsibility for the collapse of France rests with our own lack of resolute policy during these forty years. We must therefore not be over-critical.

To underrate her is not policy. But what, it may be asked, is policy? The noun has never been defined. I have my own definition: decide what you want, and then make it happen by every legitimate means. Our policy then must necessarily be to have as our nearest neighbour a France, friendly, contented and strong, a great Power again in fact, and as quickly as possible.

She had *not* "gone," and we must not let her go. Equally the interest of France commands—unless we are silly enough to discourage it—that she should look for understanding and co-operation to *her* nearest neighbour. We, rather than Russia or the United States, are billed by nature for that part. We can, and can only, play it by showing that our interest, knowledge, understanding, are—as they should be—beyond question. I regret, however, to note that France is already sheering away from the notion of any *special* relations with us. Time and practical needs will correct the passing tendency and efface counter-pressure.

Meanwhile we must remember that the injured are sensitive, the misled suspicious, and be prepared for the necessity of tact and patience when the first enthusiastic gratitude for liberation has worn off, and the touchy process of convalescence begins. We may need all our powers of understanding that we have not yet exercised.



Coming generations will not, should not, forgive us if we alienate or let slip again one of the inevitably principal factors in Western Europe, however temporarily enfeebled. I should feel happier if this country, discarding at long last all inter-war perversity, would unite in making more allowance for France, and less for our, and her, enemies. In this we utterly failed after the last war. Shall we do so again?

Yes, France has surprising recuperative powers. She recovered speedily from the defeat of 1871. With better understanding on our part she might even have recovered from the victory of 1918. She would indeed have had a far better chance of survival if the United States and Britain had not short-sightedly deprived her of security on her eastern frontier. Shall we show better comprehension now?

This time the security must be full and unassailable. Let us realise not only what we want but what we need, and then insist on the objective. We shall have to help France to her feet; then she will help herself more than is realised by those who imperfectly know her.

The time has come when we must return to faith—faith in miracles. That is the most important conclusion of this war. They will be needed everywhere. In my youth a famous French writer affirmed: "The age of miracles is not over; we only need saints, and they are rare." In my age I vary that: we only need heroes, and they are plentiful.

It is in looking back that I find my justification for looking forward. I began by dealing with French political failings. I must say something of ours, for my high hopes of France were not wrecked by France alone. Just over forty years ago was signed the historic Anglo-French agreement. I was intimately concerned with its course from beginning to end. It was high time for understanding. The two countries were usually bickering about some wishbone of contention and behaving rather like naughty children in the naughty nineties. On both sides of the Channel there were vague and tenacious memories of the centuries during which we had fought each other. Of course the old battles were so out of date that they ought to have been out of mind; but they weren't, because most people aren't particular about dates. So we still talked of the French as frogs, while they talked of us as rosbifs. Indeed we called each other a lot of other things, too, and our presses were continually hostile. The British stage Frenchman was an amorous gesticulating chatterbox, and the Briton of French caricature and comedy was a figure of unfriendly fun with long teeth and drooping red whiskers. Our common enemies were only too anxious that this state of things should continue.

I had grown used to this chilly atmosphere when in 1903 I was sent as

an attaché to our Embassy in Paris. Then in 1904 came the great change. France and Britain actually agreed about something, indeed quite a lot of things; the world seemed suddenly to have gone sane. It felt so normal to have drawn closer to our closest neighbour, and so silly not to have done it sooner. I have never forgotten that spring in Paris. One doesn't usually notice springs enough when one is young.

The political differences between the two countries seemed supremely unimportant to me: one has something better than international affairs to think about at that time of life. The differences never seemed quite serious even when I was older. There were moreover very serious reasons why we should be friends. Here were two peoples next door to each other, with splendid records and tranquil desires. Between them they had contributed more to civilisation than any other two countries. Why shouldn't they combine to guarantee peace on which civilisation depends? One didn't need to be old or clever to see how much we had both done for the art of living, and that is an enormous bond. What else are we here for, after all?

There were naturally temperamental differences, but they didn't seem quite serious either; besides if one waits for identity one will never have a friend. I felt then exactly what I wrote when France fell in 1940:

So we were mingled, destined side by side  
To face a world we could not face alone.

Alone we couldn't face what was coming, and came in 1914; but in 1904 it did seem possible that the new friendship might change the face of the world. There's something wrong with those who are not optimists at twenty.

The Treaty didn't *look* anything remarkable. We cleared away some troubles, and undertook some diplomatic obligations—that was all. But the Germans didn't like it for two main reasons. They wanted to show France that she must not do anything important without German permission, and they wanted to keep us isolated. So in the next year they tried to break the agreement, and the French were forced to discard their Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had negotiated it. I remember saying timidly to a French politician: "I hope you are going to keep him." And he replied: "What exactly can you or will you do to help us?" Of course I couldn't answer. That was frequently the dilemma.

So the start was shaky; but agreement grew, mainly because it was the natural course for us both, but partly because the German threat

forced it into its second stage—the Entente. We would not go as far as an Alliance. We were afraid of becoming a European power, though we weren't far enough from Europe to avoid that destiny. I think everyone realises that now, but in those days the Channel still looked broad, and we used expressions like "I'd no more dream of doing this or that than flying."

It is arguable that the first World War might have been avoided if our relations with France had been more clearly defined. I am personally convinced of this. As it was, we might have been fools enough to leave France to her fate when the long-expected war did come, if the Germans hadn't been greater fools still, and forced us to respect our moral obligations by tearing up theirs and marching into Belgium. In 1914 the Entente was at last welded into an Alliance by the most pregnant act of perfidy in all the long German tradition up to date.

Four years of war, sacrifice and victory should have drawn the Alliance closer, but we were both tired and irritable after the great effort. France was completely exhausted; she had lost more than twice as many men as we, though her population was smaller. We both began thinking too much with our heads and not enough with our hearts. The real trouble began when we and the Americans persuaded France to renounce her plan for security on the Rhine in return for an Anglo-American guarantee, which the Americans failed to ratify. We foolishly followed their example. Thereafter French policy was governed by fear, which turned out to be only too well founded. The French were still afraid of the Germans, and we were still afraid of becoming a European power. So the Allies began to fall out, and German propaganda leaped into the breach. The ill-humours of the naughty nineties began to creep in again.

The breach widened when the French went into the Ruhr. The action was unwise but not unnatural, because the Germans were deliberately bilking on reparations. We were entitled to stand aside, but not to cry out almost as loudly as the Germans. Again German propaganda exploited the opportunity. The face of the world was not changing after all; indeed the old wrinkles and crows' feet were reappearing. I sometimes fancied that Anglo-French relations might even go into reverse and, having progressed from Agreement through Entente to Alliance, regress from Alliance through Entente to Agreement—and not even enough of that.

Outwardly there seemed no change in the relationship, but inwardly it was deteriorating. To be a whole-hearted Francophil in those days (I am speaking of the thirties) was to be a member of a criticised minority.

The same process was at work on the other side of the Channel. My opposite number, the head of the French Foreign Office, once said to me: "We could count on our fingers those who are really keeping the Entente together." That spring day of 1904 was passing to midsummer madness.

The two democracies had their pacifism in common, and both failed to note or to check Germany's growing preparations for her Second World War. When the danger began to loom, we should both have done better to realise that criticism, like charity, should begin at home. I needn't touch upon the contentious events of 1938 and 1939. It may simply be said that we lost faith in each other, and that France lost faith in herself.

There will be historic interest but no political advantage in arguing who failed whom and why. If the argument is begun in my time, I shall have something to say, but not now. It will be enough to recall that we were saved from the fate of France by those twenty miles of sea that seemed so broad in 1904 and so narrow in 1940.

France has suffered immeasurably for shortcomings that we shared; but where there are no graves there are no resurrections, and we shall see in France not only a resurrection of the body politic but of the spirit that makes alive. To that spirit the men of the Maquis have borne witness. When the art of living has triumphed over the science of killing, I shall look forward to our old unity, though it will henceforth be part of a wider unity. No narrow friendship can now ensure our common prospects; that is where we were too optimistic forty years ago.

But there is an if in all this. If we really mean to recover lost ground in more than the geographical sense, we must both avoid recrimination. The temporary failure of an ideal does not affect its validity—thank God; and I have only touched on the weaknesses of the Entente because I want to revive it without them. We must remember when all is said and done—and preferably earlier—that together we did break the first attempt of the new barbarians to enslave mankind; and mankind might have been more lastingly grateful to us both had we been more lastingly grateful to each other. We must remember too that, if the French were infected by German propaganda in the inter-war years, so were we. That propaganda was, of course, intensified during the occupation. It hasn't checked the overwhelming hatred of the Germans, but it has been industrious to sow distrust of the Allies. If we are to defeat the Germans in that field too, we must be aware that the Germans have everywhere left mines, and watch our step accordingly. There will be some delicate

going in all liberated countries, though we may hope that the Greek calamity of E.L.A.S. may be avoided elsewhere.

The story of the Entente contains a further lesson for us. One cannot have a policy without a very simple principle: never shake the confidence of friends by listening to the complaints or cajoleries or intrigues of foes. To ignore that rule is not diplomacy but lunacy. We shall all need to practise that principle on a wide, a generous and a pertinacious scale after this war, for of course our enemies will go on trying to make mischief between us and *all* our Allies. We must not let them succeed again, for we know the consequences. I am still optimist enough to believe that in this respect at least the coming generation will be wiser and therefore happier than my own.

## CHAPTER XV

### THE CITY OF ILL-FAME

WHENEVER ONE OF THOSE EXCELLENT PATTERN-MERCHANTS, THE TWO Black Crows, asked the other a stumper, the stumped would counter: "Why bring that up now?" Lord Maugham has seemingly not heard of the Two Black Crows, and now it is too late; for one of them is dead, and Lord Maugham has published an apologia entitled *The Truth about the Munich Crisis*. I see the truth in a different light.

Lord Maugham's position and mine were of course different too. He was a member of the Cabinet that sacrificed Czechoslovakia in September 1938. I had been relieved on 1st January, 1938, of participation in policy. On the other hand I had previously been Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, and had sat on the Committee of Imperial Defence, for eight years, and was perhaps better informed on the state of our and other peoples' armaments. Apart from the amorality of Munich I would sooner have fought in 1938 than 1939 for reasons that will appear later.

I shall follow Lord Maugham's narrative as a fair sample of a school of thought, which suffers from the false assumption that the Third Reich had some claim on the German Bohemians. Had I ever allowed Germans to enter my house in bulk and uninvited, that would not have made it German. If dissatisfied with my accommodation, their remedy would

have been to go home, not to turn me out of mine. These German-Bohemians were in fact the best-treated minority in Europe.

Lord Maugham next suggests that we were under no obligation to Czechoslovakia, despite the Covenant, and that even France might be likewise held exempt despite an explicit treaty. In support he quotes a French jurist, whose reasoning was on the level of the quisling Déat.

He further suggests some ground for believing Hitler's assurance that this was positively his last demand. There was none either in the case of Hitler or of any of his expansionist predecessors. The carrot of satiety had been dangled before our noses from Bismarck onward.

Lord Maugham thinks that one of the factors leading to the acceptance of the German demand was "the way in which the Republic of Czechoslovakia came into being." The process was not seriously challenged until the Germans declared the small State "a pistol pointed at the heart of Germany." The phrase was echoed with subservience here and in France. All sorts of vices were then attributed to an orderly and eatable Republic.

Lord Maugham is right in his estimate of Henlein as a German tool. I spent some time during his visits here in trying to frighten him, and keep him from contact with British appeasers. He was, however, too poor a creature to be anything but a German stalking-horse, groomed for the crisis of May, 1938. The Germans moved troops to the frontiers of Czechoslovakia; but the Czechs countered by calling up reserves, and the Germans not only backed down but denied their own troop movements. The reason was that they thought the Czechs would fight, and that first the French and then we would have been automatically drawn in. They decided first to isolate their victim.

There was still a little fight left in the French, and time was needed for it to evaporate under the ministrations of M. Bonnet. M. Reynaud lunched alone at my house, and swore that, at the first sign of French acquiescence, he and three of his ministerial colleagues would resign. (When September came not one of them budged.) The May crisis showed at least what could be achieved by showing fight. That was not to be allowed to happen again.

I shall waste no time upon the lamentable Runciman mission, but proceed to the autumn tragedy. "It was believed both in Paris and London that the cession to the Reich of the lands occupied by a majority of Germans might yet leave Czechoslovakia a country with a noble destiny," writes Lord Maugham. No one could seriously have believed that, but the pretence was the background to what followed. France and Britain

were not prepared to fight either morally or materially. They had neglected their armaments in the face of repeated warnings. I had uttered many myself on both sides of the Channel. Caught unprepared, they cast about for excuses. Lord Maugham writes: "Clearly the Treaty did not compel France to advance beyond the Maginot Line," and then asserts that she *could* not have done more. That is untrue. In chance and unofficial talk General Gamelin had told me that he could break the incomplete "West Wall"—the cement had not yet set—and march into Southern Germany. I do not know what he told the two Governments in the official September meetings, for, of course, I was excluded from them.

I admit the arguments drawn from our own unreadiness, but Germany was unready too. I felt that war was only a question of months any way, and delay would be too dearly bought, for Germany would speedily grab the great armament works of Skoda, which would increase her advantage. Further, the Czech Army was more highly mechanised than the Polish, and the mountain frontiers of Czechoslovakia, save where they had been turned by the annexation of Austria, more easily defensible than the Polish plains. Finally, though Germans will always and readily go to war, a war against Czechoslovakia would have been rather less popular than a war against Poland.

I do not know how other and more influential minds worked, but in the flurry no one seemed willing to admit that the contemplated surrender to Germany would be the end of France as a first-class power, and would ruin our reputation both in Europe and the United States.

Lord Maugham explains that Dr. Benes' "far-reaching concessions" of 6th September were too late. The real explanation is that the Germans now knew that France and Britain would *not* fight. Thereafter it was vain for the British Government to issue the "authorised statement" of 11th September, saying that we "could not remain aloof" if the integrity of France was threatened, and that Germany could not invade Czechoslovakia "without the fear of intervention by France and even Great Britain." That word "even" speaks volumes. France was by now too far gone to be heartened by formulæ, and decided—with notable encouragement from *The Times*—to capitulate. "Hitler held all the trumps," says Lord Maugham. By whose fault?

Mr. Chamberlain went to Berchtesgaden and agreed that the west wing of the Bohemian home should become a German annexe, thereby making the rest of the house untenable. On September 18th, Daladier and the disquieting Bonnet arrived in London. It was soon plain that M. Reynaud had deceived me. The French were going to give way. I

had decided to resign from my ridiculous post, if they stood firm and *we* ran. The French Government, who had specific treaty obligations, made it impossible to ask more from the British Government, who were not similarly bound. It was agreed, as "an exceptional procedure," to carve up Czechoslovakia—"subject, of course, to the consent of Czechoslovakia," adds Lord Maugham by way of grace before meat. For what they were about to receive on a silver plate the Germans should have been truly thankful. The French curiously forgot their own proverb that appetite comes with eating. "The Anglo-French proposals," says Lord Maugham blandly, "were an acceptance of Hitler's ultimatum." They were indeed.

The Czechs tried to argue: they even appealed to their Treaty of Arbitration with the Germans. This, says Lord Maugham, amounted to refusal: "there was now no scope for arguments or delay." Such was the spirit of stampede that the British and French Ministers at Prague pulled President Benes out of bed at 2 a.m. and told him that he must yield or fight alone. This, suggests Lord Maugham, was not "pressure." Nor was our advice "not to mobilise or to do anything which might infuriate Hitler."

Lord Maugham sums up: "Czechoslovakia as reduced in area and after some concessions of territory to Poland and Hungary, would have had reasonable prospects of a successful existence." Take away from a man half his body, and he will enjoy excellent health. I felt sure that the Huns would be in Prague within six months, and six weeks before 15th March, 1939, they left me in no further doubt that this was indeed their intention, and I said so.

There followed "the Godesberg crisis." The blackmailer put up his terms, found that he was forcing the pace, and decided to make two bites of the cherry. Our tardy stiffening was reflected in a Foreign Office statement of 26th September, that if the Germans attacked after all "France will be bound to come to her (Czechoslovakia's) assistance, and Great Britain and Russia will certainly stand by France." The appeasers of the French lobbies immediately put about the story that this was a forgery—by me.

Lord Maugham here raises the question how Russian aid could have been furnished. I never knew. Czechoslovakia's neighbours would not have given passage to Russian troops; and therefore the Soviet Government could at most have sent assistance by air. I do not know whether even this was promised. That, however, does not alter the fact that to exclude the Soviet Government from these negotiations was a calamity,



for which more than the full price was paid by that second and worse "Munich"—the Russo-German Agreement of 1939.

I shall pass over in silence Sir Horace Wilson's "mission," and the hysterical scene in the House of Commons, when Hitler deigned to receive the British Prime Minister for the third time.

Mr. Chamberlain was off and Munich was on. The Czechs were not invited to participate, and Lord Maugham explains that we had no power to *invite* them. We could, however, certainly have insisted on their presence, and so avoided the indecency of causing them to be informed so cavalierly of their fate. Lord Maugham claims that "the Munich Agreement was not a German 'dictate.' " It most certainly was—under threat of war. He claims that "the new frontiers were to be determined by an international commission," which proved to be a farce. The Germans banged the table, and dictated again.

He credits Munich moreover with "an international guarantee of the new frontiers." That was the unkindest cut of all. On one unworthy pretext or another it was postponed, emasculated, explained away, was in limbo well before the Germans annexed the whole country.

Lord Maugham considers that "the Munich Agreement was one which honourable Czech statesmen could properly accept." Mr. Chamberlain claimed to have secured "peace with honour." The second error is the measure of the first. There are many varieties of honour, but none into which history will fit the Munich transaction. It was not really an endeavour to "buy time," as Lord Maugham puts it, for Mr. Chamberlain definitely believed that peace was secure. His cession of the Irish ports on the eve of war is irrefutable proof of the delusion. In any case the interlude was better used by the Germans than by us for the purposes of rearmament. Even by 1940, we were still miserably under-armed. Lord Maugham wisely avoids the question whether either France or Britain "should ever have got into the unfortunate position in which they were situated in September, 1938." That, however, is the whole point.

In one respect I agree with Lord Maugham. "All parties must take some share of the blame" for our unpreparedness. I am continually coming up against a pro-German section of the Left, which rails against the old appeasement, while preparing the new. The truth is that this section has never abandoned pre-war appeasement, which it strained every nerve to impose by its opposition to rearmament. There is no more despicable type than the politician who, gambling on public forgetfulness, tries to make party capital out of a sin which he not only shared but has

not even forsworn. "No one was so base or foolish as to suggest that this was 'a capitalist war,' " says Lord Maugham of 1939. That is exactly what the New Appeasers do say, and on that they are trying to let Germany win the peace.

A few odd points crop up at the end of this untimely publication. Lord Maugham says that we should not go to war with a country "on account of hatred of its internal policy." The duty of a government is surely to realise when the policy of a country, internal or external, is bound to lead to war, and to prepare its own country accordingly. Lord Maugham professes, and many still believe, that Hitler, not Germany, was the cause of Mr. Chamberlain's failure as a Prime Minister. No wonder they were taken aback when the Germans took their second bite. "Our Foreign Office could not have foreseen and were not to blame for these events," writes Lord Maugham. I close on that indulgence; I for one do not need it.

## CHAPTER XVI

### THE CHURCH IN POLITICS

IN "THE FUTURE OF FAITH" I MADE IT PLAIN THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF the Church in politics is not only inevitable but desirable. Politics surely need a spiritual content, and what body should be better fitted than the Church to supply it? I pointed, however, to the danger that the Church might divorce itself from politics by its own actions. There are now signs of such a possibility.

It can only be furthered by the incursions of political priests into the fields where their knowledge is insufficient to warrant an authoritative tone. We had a recent example of such trespass when the Bishop of Chichester encroached upon the policy of bombing. An episcopal strategist is so hard to justify that some strain was put upon the patience of the House of Lords. The effect in the country was graver.

Even in the Church itself justifiable uneasiness arose, for the Church has no lack of level-headed members—I know many of them—who deserve better guidance than they sometimes get. They are mostly in the rank and file, but can also be found in the upper hierarchy. Thus the Bishop of Fulham condemned the Bishop of Chichester's speech, 'rightly adding that such debates do infinite harm.

Other comment was even more outspoken. For example, the Reverend Herbert Tomkinson, Vicar of St. John's, Hove, expressed so exactly what is in many minds, that his views should be widely pondered. He pertinently quotes a former Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Oxford to the effect that "whenever the Church has interfered in matters outside its province it has generally made a fool of itself." The effect of such interference he points out, is: (1) "to expose the ignorance of theologians in the realm into which they have thrust themselves. . . ." (2) "To identify the Christian Minister so much with this or that policy that men label him accordingly and, if they disagree with it, are less willing to listen to him when he speaks to them of the primary teachings of our Lord which he was specifically ordained to preach." (3) "To create what our country has never yet had, an anti-clerical party in politics."

The Bishop was not content. He plunged in with another pamphlet open to all the charges catalogued by Mr. Tomkinson. The Bishop is unlucky in missing opportunities for silence. He is a high-minded man, but that does not excuse high-handed treatment of facts with which he is imperfectly acquainted. For no other reason could he, in the fifth year of Germany's Second World War, have been still repeating the stale old falsehoods of inter-war German propaganda: the post-war continuance of the blockade, the iniquity of the Treaty of Versailles, the injustice of the territorial cessions and of the disarmament of Germany (which never took place), and of "the tremendous reparations which Germany had to pay" (and never paid or dreamed of paying).

All these myths have been blown sky-high again and again. They are as misleading as the Bishop's account of the occupation of the Ruhr. Here he quotes the Swedish episcopate in a travesty that contains no word of condemnation for the deliberate and organised bilking of the criminal debtor, and the plots of the German reactionaries and heavy industrialists. He does not seem to know that the Swedes were almost entirely pro-German during the last war. It is a mockery to quote these tainted sources on German behalf. The Bishop does not know the inside story of Germany. He has had other things to do!

There follows the usual exaggeration of German "resistance" to this war—which has been negligible—the usual absurd over-emphasis of the "heroism" of the German Churches; the usual insistence on the "mistakes" made by other Powers, with the implication that they are to blame for what happened in Germany. That tale was made in Germany and there is nothing more disingenuous than such endeavour to fob off

responsibility. Can the Church do worse than lend itself to this manoeuvre? Other countries did indeed make the "mistake" of *trusting* Germany too much; but the mistake began in the Weimar period, and by 1933 the ply was too firmly taken to be undone.

The Bishop sets curious store on the tardy declarations of German prisoners in Russian hands, who are all sorry for what they have done, now that they have lost. We shall have masses more of such repentances. They would have had some value in the first month, and have mighty little in the last year, of the war. We shall often be told that, in the Bishop's words, "it is a simple matter of fact that Germany was the first country in Europe to be occupied by the Nazis." That sentence alone shows little understanding of the country that *produced* and welcomed the Nazis. Nor is it reassuring to be told by a British Bishop that this "is not primarily a war of the United Nations against the Axis nations," but "an ideological war"; for that is the familiar first step toward exonerating all Germans by a process that equates invaders and invaded. Is the Church going to take it, and the consequences? After this no one will be surprised when the Bishop culminates in the suggestion that Germany should not be disarmed completely, but left with an organised military force, under illusory safeguards. It is even apparently forgotten that after the last war we left Germany with an army of 100,000 men; and it became the 10,000,000 who have made *this* war.

The merits of this publication are nil, but its tendencies are significant. For the Bishop is not alone; I could name many other eminent ecclesiastics whose courage is not matched by their equipment. Whither are they trying to lead us? Mr. Tomkinson and the Regius Professor are right: the high dignitaries of the Church are making fools of themselves. What has the disarmament of Germany to do with them? The indispensable influence of the Church would be better served and preserved if they adventured less dogmatically into territories beyond their competence. Such weighty imprudences damage our country's reputation in Europe and our Church's authority at home.

The ultimate danger of some form of anti-clericalism is not illusory, though it would certainly take a milder form than has been the case in some foreign countries. In other words, it might be ostensibly directed less against religion than against religious leaders, if it were widely felt that their knowledge or policy was so superficial as again to endanger national existence by over-indulgence to our enemies.

The danger of anti-clericalism indeed is visibly growing with other violences of the spirit, like anti-semitism, a continental monster that has

crept into Britain and grown prodigiously during this war. Surely that should act as a warning.

But no. The Church will not take heed. Before the fall of Rome the Australian Catholic Bishops butted not only into policy but strategy by a pronouncement against the inclusion of Rome in the area of hostilities, with the underlying suggestion that the Allies would be to blame for such a calamity. And the Pope himself fanned resentment of ecclesiastical intervention by suggesting a negotiated peace and "the setting of our enemies on their feet again," as we did after the last war! Will not the leaders of faith pause in time? If we lose *this* peace we shall lose all faith too.

So much for the international field. Let us next consider some of our Bishops at home. One of the worst effects of the horrible time through which my generation has passed is that the totalitarian complex has communicated itself to some of those most convinced that they are fighting it. We find men and women, in every other way professedly humanitarian, calmly proposing to "liquidate," persecute, oppress and suppress those who may not agree with them. This is the literal translation of the German maxim: "If you won't be my brother, I'll smash your skull in." When, as is now sometimes the case in this country, this programme is laid down by the "anti-fascists" as a prelude to the Single Party, one rubs one's eyes, and wonders how the human mind has got into such utter confusion. One rubs them all the harder when the programme of persecution is rammed home as an ingredient of Christianity and "brother-love."

Have you heard of the C.C.M.C.O.? Everything is initials nowadays; so I should explain that these stand for the Council of Clergy and Ministers for Common Ownership. Its President is the Bishop of Bradford, and the Vice-Presidents are the Dean of Canterbury, the Bishop of Malmesbury, and the Reverend Oyler-Waterhouse. Common Ownership, like many other "platforms," is a perfectly legitimate object for which to work. Everything, however, depends in such cases on the methods by which political objectives are to be fitted into the ethical frame that they profess. In consequence, I was greatly interested in the Council's first pamphlet, *Christians in the Class Struggle*, Magnificat Publication No. 1. The author is a priest named Cope. In a foreword the Bishop of Bradford commends "this pamphlet as a lucid and penetrating analysis of the class struggle which the system has produced. The point of view which it puts, and the arguments by which it supports it, are well worth the careful consideration of all who, in these apocalyptic days, have the duty

of trying to declare the mind of Christ." The ensuing pages seem the perfect example of how to go one way while arguing the other.

"In all such activity it is desirable that members should make clear the Christian basis of their convictions," says the Council's manifesto to potential subscribers. Let us see how this is to be done, according to Mr. Cope. He begins: "Class-conflict is claimed to be the key." So far so good; there is nothing original about that. Mr. Cope suggests that "conflict" and "revolution" may be no less Christian terms than "co-operation" and "mutual understanding." He adds that "class" is only a technical term of economics. That should not frighten anyone. So on the next page "the conflict of economic interests develops into a physical struggle for supremacy."

We come next to the straight question: "Can we say that God is working out his purposes for human society by means of the process of class conflict?" The answer is straight too: "Evidence may be forthcoming which supports the view that economic class-conflict is a way in which God orders the evolution of human society." It is therefore a sin to resist this form of progress.

Again so far so good. Nothing illegitimate in that; but what sort of a "conflict" is it to be, and how precisely is it to be promoted? Here the trouble begins. "The temporary success and efficiency of fascism," writes Mr. Cope, "depends (*sic*) upon first the annihilation of certain groups within the community." We shall see how he is fatally drawn in the direction of the enemy-system. Most violences have indeed a strong resemblance. He explains that such hatred as may appear is directed not against individuals but against the system that blocks common-ownership. Violence, however, must necessarily apply to individuals; that is another of its catches. Moreover, Mr. Cope has bitter feelings against sweeping categories of his fellow-beings: there is no virtue in these sinners, their morals are a bad joke. They are therefore ripe for the destruction that comes to them in the ensuing pages. But first existing freedoms and the parliamentary system must be discredited. We shall see the importance of this part when Mr. Cope advocates the establishment of The Single Party. "Members of Parliament mostly represent 'vested interests,' and local representation is a 'fiction.'"

So now the decks are cleared for the shedding of Christian blood. "No revolution has yet taken place without some bloodshed." As "men do not all think alike . . . one group must impose its will upon all others" with such force as may be necessary. "For one group to wrest power from another has always involved armed conflict." In certain circumstances,

i.e. if there is any resistance—a typically German argument—"the struggle is likely to be bloody indeed," and the Church militant must be in it. Another of the most famous quotations in the German language says: "If you don't go quietly, I'll use force."

So here we are—or rather here is the priest Cope—up against the snag of the Christian pacifist. The "internal contradiction" seems almost as insuperable as that of capitalism; but Mr. Cope has a way with him. He will have no "prolonged discussion"; he just states and resolves the dilemma; how are you to get and maintain a revolution "without the use of force"? Well, you can't, he says; and if the Christian pacifist doesn't like it, he can lump it—consoling himself with the reflection that wars only come of imperialism, and can therefore only be avoided by the annihilation of certain groups within the community. (See "*Fascism*.") On this assumption the Christian pacifist may

Look upward to the skies,  
Where such a light affliction  
Shall win so great a prize.

And, if he gets a pain in the neck, "the pacifist can never really be a socialist." So there. This point of view, says the Bishop of Bradford, is well worth careful consideration. It puzzles me, as I have known people who were certainly both; but the Reverend Cope is ready with his comforting syllogism; if you are a pacifist you must want to abolish war; you can only do that by the application of armed force to capitalism. There will accordingly be no difficulty with the Christians who believe "that God's will is done by taking up arms. . . . The nationality of their opponents has no relevance." The concern of Christians is to get it over quickly "whether it be in a war of liberation or in a revolution." That is exactly what all Huns have been told for a hundred years by Clausewitz and his successors. It is the stock excuse for all foul play, atrocity, devastation, poison-gas, the slaughter of civilians.

Well, what is the exact proposal of these ecclesiastics? Very simple. There is no virtue in the two party system, and the Labour Party—being "reformist"—is just no good for the job in hand. It "has ceased to be a real opposition." Therefore "full democracy can be established only by a single party." That is what both Hitler and Mussolini said.

There remains then only "the method by which the revolution will be completed." "Is it conceivable that common ownership could be established if in Parliament there were a permanent opposition?" Of

course not. Therefore "all the fundamental opposition must be 'liquidated,' i.e. rendered politically inactive by disfranchisement, and if necessary by imprisonment." Here the Reverend Cope is not being quite honest with us. The verb to liquidate does *not* mean to disfranchise; it means to kill, and Mr. Cope has already admitted that "the struggle is likely to be bloody indeed." That is why he has tried to work his way round the Christian pacifist's objection to bloodshed—not disfranchisement. The verb to liquidate is always used as a euphemism; that is also why Mr. Cope puts it in inverted commas. Vide a passage from the Kharkoff trial in *Soviet War News* of 22nd December, 1943: Prosecutor: "What does it mean—liquidated?" Heinisch: "To liquidate means to destroy or shoot." The question was rhetorical and the accused gave the requisite answer.

So that is that. "Every attempt to arrest the change must be nullified. . . . The methods of enforcement would depend upon the strength and general policy of the counter-revolutionaries." That is franker. Imprisonment will only serve if they don't resist, i.e. if they use "constitutional methods." But isn't this rather rough on constitutional methods, for this is terrorism? No, not at all. And this isn't dictatorship either. It is just what has been decided. The Bishop of Bradford calls it "lucid and penetrating." I endorse the latter rather than the former epithet.

"In the period of transition" (indefinite, it necessarily is) "the workers must be led and organised by a single party which tolerates the existence of no other party fundamentally opposed to it." Penetrating, but also Nazism. The sequel, however, is not lucid. "Class-collaboration contributes to the continuation of international war. That is the basic fact which must be faced by all Christian Socialists." Then how came it that Germany, with a Single Party, made war so successfully till confronted with a real medley of systems and parties? To that the Reverend Cope can only mutter of "the evil of Vansittartism." He is also angry with Mr. Noel Coward for having written *Don't Let's Be Beastly to the Germans*. Mr. Cope seems itching to be beastly to some of his fellow-countrymen. This is another of the "internal contradictions" from which not only capitalists but civil war-mongers suffer.

Mr. Cope recognises very handsomely the puzzle thus presented to Christians. Their present task is to release the puzzling tension between their desire to 'love'" (note Mr. Cope's inverted commas) "their neighbours and their enemies," and to liquidate the latter. It certainly is a headache, for men, says Cope, have usually to decide between two



evils, selecting the lesser—in this case obviously liquidation. So, he concludes, Christians must discover the real meaning of “love”—more inverted commas. So must their victims. There must be no more of this nonsense that “it takes all kinds to make a world.” “Common ownership . . . excludes all other solutions.” Now for the rewards.

“The boys” cannot, of course, be expected to impose so rigorous and vigorous a nostrum without recognition. “In the period of transition, the apparent domination of such groupings as the most active political party-members . . . must not be mistaken for the emergence of a new economic class.” For party-members read *Parteigenossen*, and you have the Nazi doctrine and practice in full. “Certain limited privileges may be enjoyed by those who contribute most to the development of the socialist community in the intensely difficult interim period.” Such privileges always begin as “limited” and “transitional” and go on indefinitely. Ask any *Gauleiter*. Here is the British facsimile.

Privilege being thus reasonably and temporarily redistributed, we come to the peroration. “To assert that Christianity is a revolutionary religion and yet to refuse to take part in political activity is a pernicious piece of hypocrisy.” All Christians must wish to avoid such a charge from a source sponsored by a couple of bishops. There is no way out of the dilemma by suggesting that Christianity *need* not be quite so fierce, for that would not suit Mr. Cope’s book. You cannot liquidate people on the milk of kindness. “A hero must drink brandy,” said Dr. Johnson. Throughout this remarkable new version of the Holy Spirit—which is early introduced—there is mercifully no word of un-Christian pity for those about to be liquidated, no crocodile’s tear. The Reverend Cope’s eye is bright and dry as a German’s on top of the wave. “Lucid and penetrating.”

The totalitarian hangover seeps out through page and pore. Are we not here confronted with an incredible confusion of the mind? I repeat that I have no objection to Common Ownership as a political aim or thesis on soap-box, platform, or in Parliament. I do not even object to it in a pulpit, though I doubt whether Christianity will be forwarded by subjection to a political process. What I do object to is that a collection of “Christians”—I use inverted commas as Cope does for “love”—with episcopal backing should sponsor a policy of persecution, imprisonment and eventual slaughter, to suit their own *material* fancy. If all variations of faith were to adopt these methods, we should have not one but a dozen non-stop civil wars. There would be nothing left to own—commonly or otherwise. It is the old story: force is chiefly commanded

by those who feel that they cannot otherwise conscript the consent of their fellows.

I want to know where we stand about this. What have the Archbishops of Canterbury and York to say of the Bishops of Bradford and Malmesbury? Not that this is a free country, please. We know that already—and Cope and company want to put an end to "all that" with a Single Party. That is not the point. Cope and company have the right to advocate anything they like as politicians. We know that too. But have they the right as Christians in *Holy Orders* to advocate political persecution and civil war? Is this Christianity? Should they not take their combative chance on a real equality with the rest of us? We want no marches stolen under a "cure of souls." Cope has given his definition of "pernicious hypocrisy." I have one too: to debase priesthood into an echo of the system that we are fighting.

That system has well-nigh ruined the world. For that it ever got the chance the inter-war Church must take its share of responsibility. Some at least of the leaders are still on the old line. Is the interval between the Second and Third German Wars—on which the German General Staff have always banked—to be filled in with a civil war becoped and bemitred as a Holy War, the *Jehad* of C.C.M.C.O.? How could such notions be anything but harmful to religion as most of us understand it? And what, if any, is the difference between the God of Common Ownership and the conscript go-getting God of the Germans? The Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Oxford might well have added that "whenever the Church interferes in matters outside its province it may make something far *worse* than a fool of itself."

## CHAPTER XVII

### TRAILING MY COAT

IN "BLACK RECORD" I TREATED MYSELF TO THE LUXURY OF A QUOTATION from Tacitus on the Germans of his time. The sequel showed the danger of a classical education. I was immediately attacked as a racialist by all the pro-Germans of Britain and the United States. Their next step was to say that I wished to exterminate all Germans—which was what the Germans had been telling them to say before the war. A number of

other unpleasant characteristics were subsequently attributed to me: I ultimately lost count of them.

Long ago I enjoyed a book called *The Pleasures of Quotation*. Even my recent experience has not caused me to discard the reprehensible taste of writing sometimes to enjoy myself. At the same time I take occasion to warn all good men against such unchristian selfishness. (The Bishops have reproved me sorely.) The first duty of a political writer is to be dull. He should recognise that political literature is not literature; the prose of politics must be prosaic. The writer may then be sure of finding few, but like-minded, readers. Even his friends will not be able to distort him, if he takes the simple precaution of making his style so flat that there is nothing for them to grasp. In such case the companion volume, *The Pleasures of Misquotation*, will never be written; it won't be worth while. Style being thus planned—like everything else—by those who regard German aggression as class-war, we may contemplate an intellectual era fruitful as a field of mangold-wurzels.

For myself I form no such virtuous resolutions. It is too late. I have been denounced as Hitlerite, or anyhow reactionary—see the entire Press of the pro-German Left—and as Britain's "leading racialist"—see *Truth*, and other similar "organs," not the virtue—for denouncing the Germans instead of the Nazis, in other words for refusing entirely to forget our 800,000 dead of the *last* German war. I have therefore decided that I may as well be hung for a sheep as for a lamb, and I return to the classics in the frank hope of rousing Suckers' Chorus to fresh vociferations.

With no desire to avoid misunderstanding I repeat that biology has nothing to do with the case, that by nothing more than literary coincidence were ancient Latin and Greek writers saying exactly the same things about the Germans as all Europe is saying to-day. Europe is, of course, aware that this is the merest accident, and will relish the irrelevance, being content as I am to start our abhorrence of Germany and the Germans from Friederich, or Wilhelm, but *not* from Adolf.

We are equally aware that our own ancestors were nothing to write home about: I am told by the pro-Germans that mine were Batavians. I am not greatly interested in ancestors, but these seem to have come along nicely compared with the ancient Teutons and Alamans. I am glad that nobody is *still* writing about Batavians as Horace wrote about German "ferocity" and "delight in slaughter." We Europeans realise that there is no significance in Seneca's description of "the Germans, as a race eager

for war," their "sole occupation," or Pausanias' assertion that "the Germans are the most warlike of the barbarians in Europe." That Appian should refer to their "savage instincts," that Symmachus, Claudian, Nazarius, Ammianus Marcellinus, Ennodius and other minor writers should record habitual "ferocity" and "immense barbarity" of "the most fierce German nation," "human monsters," will not be misapplied by any of us. The persistent breach of faith and treaty by Frederick, Wilhelm, Adolf, and the erection of this habit into a doctrine are sufficient for us. Salvianus adds nothing to our knowledge by repeating that they "look upon perjury itself as a mere form of speech and in no way a crime." There were no scraps of paper in those days. Strabo is labouring the same point in his platitude that "by far the best course is to hold them in distrust." In the view of Procopius they were "of all men the most prone to break faith," a prudent recollection on the part of those "having already had experience of the craft and treachery of this people," which Dion Cassius ranked as "impregnable." These classical writers seem obsessed by Germanic violations of faith or treaty; a chorus of them harps upon it, and since ancient and modern can only be connected by "racialism," it seems superfluous to record fixation. We do not need Eumenius to recall the "treacherous inconstancy" of "that slippery and deceitful race of German barbarians." "With them might is right," wrote Pomponius Mela. That has become a state-doctrine too. "History repeats itself?" That is somebody's bit of fun—not ours. It would be definitely wrong to allege even parody.

"The Germans," observes Velleius Paterculus, "are savage to a degree almost inconceivable to anyone who has not had actual experience of them, and are a people born to deceit." It would naturally be absurd for Europe—least of all for us who have lived beyond the range of experience—to pay the least attention to him. I should make it clear that he is not a first-class writer, thus preventing, by timely quotation, any misuse of ancient knowledge which might be turned to the detriment of our enemies. It would be well indeed that, in the words of Sidonius Apollinaris, "we should no longer ridicule, despise and dread by turns the stupidity and ferocity of their nature." This desirable result will, however, be achieved not by dwelling on any past events or opinions but by the unremitting application of the principles of Dr. Coué. Again, the Italians might with profit have remembered the passage in Dion Cassius: "Who would not feel affronted at hearing it said that while we have the names of Romans we do the deeds of Germans?" That Italian connection with the Romans is as remote as that of Hitler with the Germans would not

have detracted from the value of the maxim. Even more serviceable to *all* the satellite States would have been a digression into Tacitus—I hope there will be another row about this: “The Germans had imposed slavery on friend and foe alike. . . They use as a pretext the specious name of liberty.” He was simply describing the New Disorder.

Since I am now quoting from writers of the first rank, I will pile them on, lest I trail my coat in vain. Just one more from Tacitus. “They were overcome with fear in defeat, though in victory they respected no law, human or divine.” (It would be unfair to mention that, according to Ammianus Marcellinus, they were “at one time abject and immediately afterwards arrogant to the highest degree . . . spiritless in adversity and the reverse in victory.” The man was obviously anti-German.) There is nothing in that, and I set my face firmly against any old analogies drawn from “a nation of unrestrained ferocity,” as Quintilian called them, “rivalling their own wild beasts.” That idea had occurred to Josephus too: “Their rage is more violent than that of wild beasts.” This unanimity of judgment is really rather monotonous, and can be safely disregarded. Caesar has a considerable though identical contribution to make. They are “bred from their birth to war and rapine.” They plunder “to exercise their youth,” a more practical method than any daily dozen. “They consider it the greatest national honour that the lands should lie uncultivated for the greatest distance from the boundaries of their territory.” Julian continues the monotone: “Between us and themselves they had left a district three times as wide again by means of their devastations.” Even Plutarch has a passage about “the intolerable arrogance of these barbarians” and their “lootings and layings waste.” But all this is tittle-tattle, and should on no account be repeated; for it has no more to do with the policy or conduct of modern Germans than Julian’s mention of their systematic destruction and depopulation of towns, or Caesar on their practice of taking and maltreating hostages.

Literary exercise should never be pressed into the service of augury. It would be as crass superstition to quote the optimism of our old friend Ammianus Marcellinus (“these Germans are barbarians whose rage and unrestrained fury drove them to bring upon themselves the ruin of their fortunes”) as to depress ourselves by his contradiction (“that savage nation, though diminished by manifold disasters, continually revives.”) Never pay attention to history, still less to chroniclers, or to stylists such as Tacitus. Every reference to events more remote than the last General Election but one may expose you to the charge of “racialism.” I have enjoyed writing this chapter—a sure sign that it is wrong. Yet it’s odd,

isn't it, that so many people all these centuries ago were groaning about the Germans for precisely the same causes as to-day! Anti-German propaganda of course. *Greuelmaärchen* of atrocities so promptly disbelieved in 1919. These literary accidents are sometimes painful, and it is our proud island duty not to comfort but to lecture those who have suffered from them. Literature, being so frequently incompatible with this purpose, must therefore be excluded from politics. This proposition at least will provide no Bone of Contention.

"The German plan is to lay desolate as wide an area as possible between themselves and the enemy. In a few weeks what had taken generations of toil to build has been laid in ashes." That's not Caesar, but a Norwegian refugee in 1944.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### FOLLOW MY LEADER

IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, 1944, THERE APPEARED IN THE PRESS AN ANNOUNCEMENT which, coming from Argentina, may well have received insufficient attention. It suggests, however, some profound reflections on past and future politics.

General Arturo Rawson was, after the revolution of 1943, for one day President of Argentina—a tenure on which he may be unthinkingly congratulated by students of records, for there have been cases where stop-watches have set up even smarter performances.

The General was sentenced to eight days' arrest—in the bosom of his family. Why this savage sentence? The General got talkative and walkative on the liberation of Paris, and appeared in uniform in a street demonstration. What, have things come to such a pass in near-Naziland that an ex-president can't even use the liberation of the spiritual home of every Argentine pleasure-seeker for a little beano! (The word is not Spanish, though the late Lord Curzon so pronounced it.) Well, when "justice is what suits the State," raw deals replace square ones. Many a British investor has learned to his cost in Argentina that Lewis Carroll wrote no idle word in *The Hunting of the Snark*, when

"They threatened its life with a railway-share."

The reason for the doom of the General was this: "the police said that General Rawson led a procession of anti-Government demonstrators; General Rawson said that the crowd followed him."

There you have the whole question of leadership. "Some men are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them"—from behind. Most politicians at least pretend that they belong to the third category. It sounds so much better to say "the people *would* have me" than "the people *must* have me." It is imperative to give out that you look for nothing, that it is the people who look to you. "I give myself to France," quavered *Nous* Philippe Pétain. Some people actually believed the last echo of a period in which a man might hope to get anywhere by virtue of the right formula. Even Hitler never ceased to babble of "legality."

The General may have been inspired by the famous Frenchman who said, "I am their chief, so I must follow them," and thus begat a great progeny of democratic leaders. In any case the question "who followed whom?" involves the whole of inter-war history, while posing the problem of the future. What in fact had the world in the way of leadership toward calamity?

It had the Führer and the Duce, oh, and the Caudillo blushing behind Mr. Churchill's bouquet. Their technique involved a minimum of the pretence "that the crowd followed them," though the people were more than willing in the first case. There is little doubt that the Leaders "led a procession," and *what* a procession! Some people, and some peoples, would follow anything, even an oversexed pantaloon like Musso or a sexless mongrel like Schicklgruber. "What shadows we are and what shadows we pursue"; but is there any excuse for pursuing caricatures? None. It is the twentieth century—whatever that means—so let us be dispassionate. The Latin sisters need not detain us; they may coquet with several systems before being wedded to one. The Italians have had a scunner of Duces. You may call them misguided, and they are unlikely to revert to a megalomania founded in no real conviction. It was the German connection which made them more than a nuisance, and Fascism is more likely to lurk than to revive. The Germans on the other hand were not misled; they knew well enough what they were getting in their Leader, and the ancient doctrines will move them to follow another equally fatuous and ferocious, if they get half a chance.

It is of more importance to us to inquire what was recent democratic practice in the eternal game of Follow my Leader. Briefly, as I have seen it since 1918, we confused the pastime with Round and Round the Mulberry Bush. The leaders followed the people, and the people followed the leaders; and so a completely vicious circle was formed. The leaders sought to give the public what it wanted, and the public was encouraged

to want the wrong things. Leadership often meant no more than occupying a leading place with an ear to the ground. The leading politicians had their sycophants, but were in a sense sycophants too. That is the inner story of our democratic failure to rearm and prevent this war.

We should look at the inside story more closely, but we must above all do so briefly, if we want any guidance as to the future. Accumulation of detail only blurs the vital outline.

The French had no real leaders at all after Clemenceau and Poincaré, and neither of them had a reliable following, when the strain of war was lifted. When Millerand tried to lead he was liquidated. Briand was an orator rather than a thinker; and he rarely read. He was a lovable but never a commanding figure. The multiplicity of parties and rigidly fixed elections ensured ceaseless and kaleidoscopic ministerial combinations, together with increasing discredit of the political world to a point where effective leadership could not have emerged from it, even had it existed. The crowd might tag along, but not far, and then only because it had nothing better to do. The French accept authority in a tight place; but loose thinking and loose living were the order of the day. The people were permanently dissatisfied: they did not look up, and they were not fed. I don't know who followed whom. Not many people seemed to follow anybody. There were sometimes more people at the head than at the tail of the many "processions," and one could not make head or tail of them. It was all very sad and light-hearted.

The British went the other way; they were satisfied and self-satisfied, though God knows why. Lloyd George long outlasted Clemenceau; but he, too, when the acclaim of war petered out in peace, was always falling despite great appearances of omnipotence. He ultimately fell more by his own fault than The Tiger, who was treated with blitz ingratitude. Thereafter power, or rather office, alternated between Baldwin and Macdonald for thirteen years. In their respective choices the Conservatives were uncritically conservative, and the Socialists sufficiently critical to murmur and maintain—till the break of 1931. So the more the French changed their Prime Ministers, the more we kept ours, though we never swore by ours as the French swore at theirs. Indeed outside their sworn and interested adherents at Westminster, the people thought little of ours—in both senses of the phrase. Why should they have done so, or what in particular should they have thought about? The world was not what they expected, so they were complacently ready to turn their backs on it. Baldwin was an adroit internal politician of phlegmatic temperament. He was at his best in the minor crisis of



the abdication of Edward VIII, when what was required of the Prime Minister was to sit tight. There was still much strength in Lord Melbourne's maxim: "When you don't know what to do, do nothing." And we frequently did not know. Both were lovable, like Briand, and gifted with artistic discriminations; but few can follow those who are going nowhere in particular. The excursions, that seemed so important, led nowhere in particular; the alarums were not heard, for they found no ministerial utterance. Macdonald for his part did his best in devising formulæ to reconcile the irreconcilable, and building bridges without banks. When he formed the so-called National Government, he lost his own party and got no real new one. The long alternation ended in Mr. Chamberlain. Having had no discernible policy we acquired a wrong one. The House of Commons passed from docility to enthusiasm; the people remained unstirred, following their bent rather than events. The Press didn't help them much. Again I don't know who followed whom—if the verb implied anything emphatic. The Whips were very busy, far too busy for democracy, as I thought. They wanted Yes-men, in France called *Bene-oui-oui*. The Commons made do with what they had, trying hard to deify one in whom it was hard to believe as a man. As in France, it was all very sad and light-hearted.

Of the United States little either need or can be said during this era. They had no policy, and it was their policy to have no policy. It is impossible for people who want no policy to follow men who therefore have none. So the United States threw up, with an exception, a sequence of weak, silent men, even duller than the French Presidents, who at least possessed "small talk." The fiction of leadership was maintained by the vigour, venom and vulgarity of Presidential elections. Sufficient noise persuades men that there is something to be heated about. There was really Nothing with a big N. Yet Americans are such famous hands at whipping up enthusiasm without need—watch their cheer-leaders at a football match—that the impression of Something was given without a Cause. Again it was all very sad and light-hearted. When trouble began to trespass upon Fools' Paradise, leadership was so scarce that they were reduced to break every rule of their political game by electing four times a man opposed not only by the Opposition but in his own Party, though there was some cynical talk of dispensing with him if the European war were won before November, 1944!

This is not satire, but truth, which does not aim at popularity. I say again that this is the twentieth century, whatever that means, so let us be

dispassionate, whatever that means too. (I have been passionately dispassionate about the Germans.) What is the conclusion of the whole matter raised by the farce of General Arturo Rawson and the tragi-comic leadership of *Homo Sapiens*? Why, Nothing very startling, but Something highly important. To a large extent great men are, and always have been, show men. (I am speaking of politics, not art.) They have great qualities and weaknesses. (Great artists are often less uneven.) There is no reason to think that they, or we, have really deteriorated because talent, and therefore criticism, have become more diffused. On the contrary, leaders are still there, and our own vagaries must not blind us to the fact that they more than bear comparison with the dead to whom distance has lent its purple enchantment. At a pinch we still find them; but how hard we have to be pinched!

Cannot we keep awake, and choose better *before* we are pinched? Cannot leadership be something better than the racket into which it can again so easily dwindle when again the strain of war is lifted? Yes, it can in certain conditions. Clearly the public must be more "choosy," to use a term applied by authors to actors; and new stars arise more freely on the stage than in politics. The public would do well to mistrust publicity, which is usually fatal to its recipients. The trouble of Mr. Chamberlain's Cabinet was that it contained too many ex-future Prime Ministers. Let men *come* to the fore, if they can, without boosting, and stay there, if they can, without favour. The spoils of political life are considerable—to those who like that kind of thing. The risks should be recognised as commensurate. There must be an end of merry-go-rounds. I have known scores of Ministers, of all countries and complexions, to whom life was very kind: they held half a dozen offices, and were mediocre in them all: yet they were aggrieved if they didn't get more, and they usually did.

A sound international situation can only be assured when it is impossible for leaders to put *themselves* at the head of peoples or affairs, and when the crowd will no longer follow indiscriminately. The people must themselves *put* the man at the head of the procession—for that is the essence of democracy—but must do so with more enlightenment, lest procession and principle lead to totalitarianism. As a specialist I am no doubt liable to trace all diseases to the one on which I have spent so much research and practice. To my mind foreign policy governs home affairs, which are deprived of validity by the constant threat of cataclysms. What does that mean? Why, simply that the public must learn, or be told, a great deal more of the things that belong unto their peace than ever emerged from lips sealed for fear of losing votes. This is no golden

road or deep discovery, 'but it will at least give to the people the first yardstick by which they can and must be more "choosy."

I have been trying to explain to our people why they have twice been at war with the German people, and why nothing but a most drastic and relentless peace will prevent a third outbreak. You *can* tell the British people the truth. They can take it. With the rise of their own standards, not only of living, but of knowing, there will be no more question of who leads and who follows, and how and why and whither.

## CHAPTER XIX

### WHY IT HAPPENED

#### *A Speech to a rally at Bradford for the rebuilding of blitzed churches*

I HAVE OFTEN RESOLVED THAT I WOULD NOT MAKE SPEECHES ON ANYTHING of which I know nothing; and I know nothing of raising money. I suppose that the secret of raising funds is fellow-feeling, and we all know David Garrick's famous line:

"A fellow-feeling makes one wondrous kind."

I should perhaps add that a wit subsequently rewrote this passage in Garrick's Prologue, and made it run as follows:

"A fellow feeling makes one wondrous kind?  
Perhaps the poet would have changed his mind,  
If in his pocket he had chanced to find  
A fellow feeling."

So here I am, the inexperienced, though I hope not ineffective, embodiment of that fellow feeling; and if I do it clumsily I hope that my first offence will benefit by the option of a fine.

There is, however, one contribution that I can make without violating my vow. I can tell you not only why you should rebuild your churches—anyone can do that—but how and why it is that you are having to rebuild

them. The explanation will, moreover, show the appalling and inevitable consequence when science and savagery combine in the pursuit of false gods. Savagery alone could achieve no such results; in a primitive world there was also much less to destroy. The destruction of your churches is no accident but a portent: it is the symbolisation of a process fermenting in the German mind for generations.

There were in Luther strong strains of treachery, violence, and destruction, which he sought in vain to sanctify and to reconcile with his profession of constructive reformer. He was particularly bloodthirsty toward all who would not accept his authority and that of the princes. Peasants, Anabaptists, Jews—his anti-semitism grew more virulent with the years—all in turn brought out the brutality in him. I have no time to-day to enumerate the other respects in which Nationalism and National-Socialism have derived from him. Intolerance, blind obedience, the dethronement of Reason—how he hated Reason—Germanity and a German God all have roots in his worst utterances, which are all too easily forgotten in the greatness of his best.

When I was young I sometimes heard German thinkers spoken of with bated breath as pioneers on the road that would lead to agnosticism. Most of us felt adventurous in peeping into David Strauss. Doubtless we should all try to see life steadily, but to see it whole is beyond our power, especially in view of its ever-growing complexity. Yet I sometimes wonder whether the pieces of the puzzle of these past 150 years, when their history is written not less than 150 years hence, will not fit into a whole more easily than we can now imagine. May it not then be seen that the debilitation of faith in the nineteenth century was in the German case no mere episode of scholars and sceptics but one eddy in a great current with many tributaries ultimately directed to a definite, though at first not defined, political end?

That of course is simple speculation. What is sure is that the notion of the *Herrenvolk*, and some basic doctrines of National-Socialism, were already foreshadowed nearly 150 years ago in the teachings of Fichte. The beginnings were small, but as the mind of the master, through his disciples and successors, obtained a growing mastery of more German minds, a series of questions also presented themselves in a fatal concatenation.

Firstly, how could the mastery be affirmed and demonstrated? The answer was by conquest and domination. More peaceful, and mere cultural, methods provided no serious rivalry, and soon became subsidiaries or unsubstantial pretexts.

The second question was inevitable. How then could the mastery be confirmed and consolidated? The answer was logically inevitable too. Only by replacing Western civilisation—the only serious obstacle—by a new order and a new faith. Thus a new move began in the wrong direction, though not yet on any grand scale.

Then came the third unavoidable question. Could Christianity be made to serve the new order, and—adequately adapted—could it be itself the new faith? In time it became clear that the answer must be No, because Christianity was itself an intrinsic part of Western civilisation.

What then, we must here ask, is Western civilisation? Surely it is an amalgam of Græco-Roman thought, law, tradition, fused and suffused with Christian faith and ethics. Western civilisation decided at an early stage with its eyes wide open—or, as some would have it, with eyes devoutly closed—that no ethical code was, or could be, a sufficient rule of life, and that religious belief was also necessary.

That is why we are here to-day. Holding firmly together, this amalgam produced both the humanism and humanity that Germany must needs destroy, if any sole domination was to be imposed on the manifold mind of the world.

On that amalgam of the Bible and the Classics the education of our forefathers was mainly founded. As late as the last decade of the last century it was the main part of mine. Consequently when I first began going to Germany, I seemed a rather ill-equipped simpleton. At times I felt somewhat ashamed of my education, though I have long since got over that. In the evening of life I recognise that in the morning there was given to me a clear idea of right and wrong. I have failed by those standards, but they have not failed me. It is those standards that the Germans have been systematically taught to ignore.

Partly because we were sensitised by that education and by the reception that it encountered, some of us began subsequently to apprehend—though at first very dimly—that the Germans were gradually embarking on a course which might land them in a combined effort to replace not only Christian standards but the high moral codes and values of classic paganism.

We might indeed have seen earlier and more clearly, for there was little mystery about all this. Many German writers were steering this course even in the nineteenth century, and they were clearly gaining. A single example will suffice to-day. I choose Nietzsche because he was by far the most influential, and some of his teachings are already known to you at least in outline. In one respect he was a maligned man. He did not

select the Germans as supermen; indeed, being of partly Polish origin, he was keenly, sometimes vehemently, critical of them. But he did proclaim the superman, he did advocate the transvaluation of all values—that is the denial of those simple standards—he did press toward the attainment of a state beyond good and evil—the same thing in other words—he did charge Christianity with inculcating a slave morality. Benefiting by his dazzling command of an unhelpful prose-language, he attained an influence that increased with every year after his death, and has never been equalled by any other artist of our time. Against this increasing urge and surge we have been fighting for much longer than five years, and not only against the ephemeral scum of the Nazis. It is a shame to go on deceiving the poor public on this score. Once bent upon this policy the Germans were bound to bring it to a head which, as shown, meant war. And here this school met and merged with a cruder and more voluminous one, which simply taught war as the purpose, and even the purification, of life.

I was brought up on another principle: that of inevitable progress. Man was bound to rise, because ascent was his destiny. That assumption is now discredited. We have learned that it is easier to go back than forward, and twice we have been nearly pushed back into the jungle. Yet was the doctrine really so silly? Would it not have held its own but for the havoc, moral, material, physical, caused by these two German wars? Will it not resume its ascendancy when the German danger has been finally quelled? Why not? Indeed, I hold it to be indispensable that confidence should be regained, though it will be a slow business.

It will not be in my time. The first balloon ascent was made in 1783 by a Frenchman, Pilâtre de Rozier. The Court of Louis XVI turned out to see the miracle. When it was over, a courtier found an old lady of eighty crying her heart out. "Didn't you enjoy the ascent?" he asked. "Oh, no, no," she wailed. "But surely it was terribly interesting?" "Yes, that's it—terribly. If men are as clever as this they will soon have invented the secret of eternal youth, and it will come just too late for *me*." Yes, the old optimism will return in different guise—though "just too late for me"—but only on one condition: that you get and *keep* down anti-Christ. I use the term not in abuse but literal description of a long matured policy.

How was the policy applied? That is easy to follow. The first stage was a tentative but distinct motion to turn Christ into a fighting man. I saw something of this both before and during Germany's first World War. The line was not long pursued, for it was soon apparent that there was a

complete incompatibility between a *Herrenvolk* and a kingdom not of this world.

The second stage was therefore necessarily to discard, or anyhow to discourage, Christ so far as possible, and to stage—I use the verb advisedly—an unconvincing return to an exclusively German God. That notion was also forcibly invoked during the first German World War, even by leading theologians like Professor Adolf Deissmann and others who pushed it considerably further. This line, however, also came to a dead end; the “honest-to-Thor” push simply wouldn’t work, for an exclusive God became perforce a tribal god. Now you can’t really put clocks back even in heathenry; you can only put them forward to new heathenry. And so it came about that, after many experiments in drivel, Bismarck’s political creed of “blood and iron” was at long last matched and mated with the religious creed of “blood and soil.”

It is because of this unholy marriage of convenience that you are rebuilding your churches, and you had better rebuild them strongly, for we are far indeed from the death of the real German God, which is worldly success, no matter how attained. That god is going to be the worst of all die-hards, since he will again cause, if he can, the death of more scores of millions and the final downfall of Western civilisation. He aims at nothing less, and his flock is behind him. You also must be die-hards in resisting that god in your own strength. Put no faith in “Allies inside Germany,” not even in the insidious German Churches. I have shown what Luther made of German Protestantism. As to German Catholicism, I cannot do better than quote Heine—a century ago. “The sense of probity demands that I should distinguish, as accurately as possible, the party called Catholic in France from the rogues who bear the same name in Germany.” Against the deep-seated forces of this god of evil you must be constantly on guard for at least fifty years, if you wish to preserve not only the life physical, but spiritual.

Because all of us here, whether we recognise it or not, are the product of the mingled essence of the Graeco-Roman and the Judaeo-Christian, we are here—regardless of any denominational or political differences—to build and rebuild, literally and metaphorically, against Thor and Fighting Jesus, against “living dangerously” “beyond good and evil,” against the transvaluation of all values, blood and iron, blood and soil, and all the other Teutonic soul-fodder and vain flounders toward an originality that an essentially pedestrian nation never possessed and never will possess.

I began with a speculation, an attempt to penetrate the past from a far-distant future. I will end by another. I used the expression Judaeo-Christian. That brings us face to face with the greatest horror in history. There were, before this Second German World War, some fifteen million Jews, of whom the majority lived in Europe. The Germans have practically exterminated the European portion, together with millions of other civilians. Say so calmly; don't call the criminals Huns. The word "German" will be sufficient opprobrium for the centuries. Put it in inverted commas. Why have the "Germans" done this? There are a variety of superficial reasons whereby men may explain anti-Semitism. I suggest that it springs from a root deeper than commercial jealousy, for example. Let us reflect not only on the horror but on its ultimate cause, which may be apparent when the dust and smoke of this greatest human convulsion have subsided, and those of us, who saw through it, have ceased both to exist and to be called extremists.

The "Germans" early recognised the vital Jewish element in the joint world-story. For example, the Old Testament contains such great literature that it cannot fail to leave a trace on the mind of the most unbiased reader. Its effect on our art and language has been almost as great as on our religious thought. It has affected the very structure, balance, rhythm, of our sentences. It was made plain to me in my teens that one "German" reproach against Christianity was that it had not been "made in Germany" but in Palestine. That was the more unforgivable in that the make had been so successful.

Modern Germanity couldn't kill Plato, or the other high and ancient thinkers. They were dead, and so impregnably alive. Germanity couldn't kill the Psalms, or the book of Job. But here were the Jews, available in the flesh, and weak; here too were the Greeks, also in the flesh, and fewer still. So the "Germans" have deliberately tried to exterminate them by starvation. They have fastened on the weakest and most ancient links in the chain that holds together their enemy, Western civilisation. There is no sense in their action of course, but what of that? There has long been no sense in "German" ambitions of blood and soil—other people's blood and soil.

If your mind will retain the Teutonic ground-plans, it will be continually illuminated by flashes from a leaden sky. Thus the senseless "Germans" suddenly began bombarding San Gimignano, long after the battle had rolled by. Why? It was a treasure-townlet of the Renaissance. We should be wrong in saying that it contained gems of architecture: the town and the buildings were one. We should be wrong in saying



that the churches contained masterpieces of painting, some depicting the life and death of Jesus of Palestine; churches and paintings sprang and flowered from the same root. All was an integral part of the total Christian story. That is precisely why the totalitarian "Germans" were suddenly, viperishly, impotently, moved to damage the place. The Græco-Roman and the Judæo-Christian had got together here, and to some tune. Aristotle said that "man is a political animal," and, after more than two thousand years of continuity, Burke observed that, "man is, by his constitution, a religious animal." "Continuity," that's the key. The historian, 150 years hence, will diagnose that the "Germans" were out to break it all along the line, political and religious, Græco-Roman, Judæo-Christian. This is my explanation of the past, and I believe that it will be accepted by the future. This is why I advise you to build strongly, and to stand on guard.

## EPILOGUE

### *A Preface to the French Edition of LESSONS OF MY LIFE*

MY FRENCH FRIENDS, I WANT YOU TO READ THIS BOOK. I THINK NONE OF you will disagree with it; indeed, I am glad to doubt whether you will now find in it anything that you do not already know by bitter experience. Why then do I want you to read it? With an eye to the future, of course.

The past is one long warning. Even before hostilities ended in 1918 a conflict of ideas broke out between the Allies. We hoped to make the Huns companionable; you did not. We and the Americans stood for appeasement, you for security. In this conflict you were right and the English-speaking politicians were wrong, as events have shown all too clearly. The trouble began when Colonel House turned up and blackmailed the Allies into accepting President Wilson's Fourteen Points by threatening that the United States would make a separate peace. The Allies should have threatened to expose the pressure; instead they yielded, the British more willingly than the French, and then the Americans, after thus letting us in for any amount of trouble, failed us by making a separate peace after all. This was the beginning of the policy which led to Munich. The Americans should logically have been the last people to criticise that calamity.

Firing ceased, but the struggle between appeasement and security continued. There was much confusion in the *melée*. Lloyd George was even more fluctuating than Wilson. "I am ready," said Wilson, "to modify the clauses which can be shown to be unjust, but not to sacrifice our decisions to the desires of the Germans." Lloyd George, and some of his colleagues, on the other hand, were not only influenced by German desires, but by his other disastrous view that the "British public has made up its mind that it wants to get peace, and is not so much concerned about the exact details." As for the soldiers, Haig had already proved even more timorous. On the other hand Pershing should be gratefully remembered for his prophetic advocacy of unconditional surrender. Foch and Clemenceau not only knew their own minds, but the Germans, of whom the British and American politicians knew little. From the start however appeasement was winning all the way; and on this

fundamental misconception of the German monsters peace was lost before "the" peace was signed.

The Americans withdrew altogether, and so deserve the greatest condemnation; but during the inter-war period there also grew both in Britain and France a calamitous school that excused its own sloth and mental corruption by repeating like a parrot: "Oh, the Germans are not as bad as all that." In France many members of that school turned out to be traitors; in Britain they were only fools, and fools may remain, having been undeservedly immune from the sufferings of France. Many of my compatriots—and of yours—had got into the miserable habit of suspecting anyone who wrote or spoke with fire and feeling. They felt uneasy in his company, especially in international affairs.

My views on Germany and Germans shocked many long before the war; and the extent of the disease is shown by the almost incredible fact that many are shocked by them even now—after all that has happened. For example, it took me three years to get *Black Record* published in the United States, where the disease is even more prevalent. Indeed it is still an international menace in 1944. From that significant episode we should take warning. We may all be threatened, perhaps ruined, by moral sloth again, when the fighting is over, unless we are very resolute not to slip back into the old morass. My outlook—I prefer to say my experience—is at least a corrective of this tendency to relapse. So I want you, my French friends; to read me for your own sake, not mine.

Well, what is my view on Germans? Briefly that they are indeed "as bad as all that"—and even worse. The Germans have reached a depth of degradation and savagery almost unimaginable in the twentieth century. They literally behave as sub-humans; and they have sunk to this condition by a logical and inevitable process. They have so ordered their lives that they could have reached no stage *other* than this, which many of them have for generations desired. Even in their First World War they exulted explicitly in their barbarism. The inhabitants of liberated Antwerp rightly put them into the empty cages of the zoo. That gesture must be long remembered.

This, briefly, is the reason why it is vital for both of us, British and French, indeed for all good Europeans, to *remember* daily and for long what the Germans are; because it will also be long before they are anything else. And because it is vital for you to remember this, I want you also to remember me, seeing that I have said this longer and more loudly than anyone else. If we admit a less vivid tone, we shall forget and be lost: if we feel less strongly, we shall forget and be lost.

I want you to remember long and clearly all that the Germans have twice done to you and Europe, and how and why it came about that their national will was clearly and deliberately bent to this end. I ask this of you because you are what I have called you: my friends. So are all sufferers, but particularly you. I have spent a good part of my life in your country, a good part of *my* mind in the study of *your* mind; a good part of *my* interests have lain in *your* interests. In other words, I am a Francophil, and that means one who, guided by common interests not personal sentiments, is not such a damned fool as not to see that there is no hope or basis for a stable Europe without close relations between close neighbours, and such confidence and respect between their peoples as an ever imperfect world affords.

There is another school in Britain and the United States which will tell you the same thing about another country. They are Germanophils. They will be disguised as pseudo-intellectuals, economists, ideologists, bishops, magnates, and other forms of insensitive innocents or grasping materialists. They will tell you just the opposite of what I tell you, just because they are Germanophils and little else for all the fine variety of labels. I know them all: I have suffered from them—like you. They are going to tell you that you *must* forget, that it is your Christian or economic or intellectual duty to forget. They are doing so already. You must choose between us. For I say to you—and now I am not speaking to you alone but to Europe—that the forgetfulness of idealism or profit—and the consequences are the same—is exactly what the English-speaking peoples, through their leaders, attained in the inter-war period. Given that curious Anglo-Saxon levity and the ponderous immutability of German aims, this Second World War was always inevitable. But you, Europe, and you, France, precipitated the catastrophe by your own weaknesses and squabbles and corruptions. I believe in you enough *not* to believe that you would have yielded to all those if you had remembered clearly enough what the Germans have done, being what they have logically become. They cannot by any miracle change rapidly, even if they would.

Still less, if you have remembered the German record, would you ever have allowed yourselves to be lured into one hour of hope or trust by one German word, a million German words, of German "honour." The Germans have no honour. Hence their boundless capacity for dishonouring themselves. The Germans are nationally false. For generations they have undertaken every obligation, conducted every foreign intercourse, with intent to deceive. There is no moral health in them. Never forget therefore that no German bond or promise is of the slightest value;

it is on the contrary a trap, and may so remain for at least fifty years to come. Therefore beware of further falling, or walking, into it. Never forget the first half of this century till you have the second half well behind you.

It is therefore not in any spirit of petty vindictiveness but as a friend that I say to Europe: Do *not* forget. Remember what I have written. If the chief victims forget, how easily will oblivion overcome the lesser sufferers although, indeed because, their strength may be greater, their recuperation easier. Yet if all, or indeed any, of us do succumb to the temptations of lassitude and easy forgiveness, a crime against Man masquerading as a virtue, we must know what awaits us: the Germans again. There will be no surprises, for we shall have failed to change their minds just because we change ours too often. Forget—and forgive—when there is a different Germany, not before. And that will not be soon.

THE END

# INDEX

- Abetz, 79  
 Adriatic, 90  
 Air Force, German, 66  
 Allied Reply of June 16, 1919, to the German Delegation, 71  
 "Allies inside Germany," 60, 136  
 Alsace-Lorraine, 12  
 Ammianus, 125  
 Ammianus Marcellinus, 125  
 Anglo-French Agreement, 1904, 106, 107  
 Anschluss, 86, 88, 89  
 Anti-clericalism, 177  
 Anti-semitism, 117, 137  
 Appeasement, 24, 37, 39, 81, 139  
 Appian, 125  
 Argentina, 82, 117  
 Aristotle, 138  
 Armaments, 44  
 Army, German, 13, 58, 66  
 Atlantic Charter, 22, 82, 83, 93, 97 *et seq.*  
 Atrocities, German, 33 *et seq.*, 38, 47, 72, 80  
 Australian Catholic Bishops, 118  
 Austria, 24, 25, 28, 85 *et seq.*  
 Aviation, German, 54  
 Baden, 62, 64, 66  
 Baden, Prince Max of, 98  
 Baldwin, Lord, 129  
 Baron, Johann, 20  
 Bauer, Gerhard, 17  
 Bauer, Otto, 86  
 Bavaria, 62, 64, 66  
 Benes, Dr., 112, 113  
 Berlin, 63, 66  
 Bertram, Cardinal, 14  
 Bismarck, 70, 71, 111, 136  
 Black Fehme, 59  
 Black Record, 71, 123, 140  
 Blockade of Germany, 27  
 Blöhm & Voss, 57  
 Bodley, 104  
 Bohemians, German, 110  
 Bonnet, Mons., 111, 112  
 Bradford, Bishop of, 118, 120, 121, 123  
 Brandenburg, 66  
 Bratislava, 90  
 Braun, Otto, 65  
 Braunthal, Julius, 23, 24  
 Bremen, 62  
 Briand, Mons., 129, 130  
 Britain, 80, 82  
 British Commonwealth, 78  
 Broadcasting to Germany, Allied, 39  
 Brown, Prof. John, 25, 29  
 Brown, Prof. William, 29  
 Bruening, 14, 21  
 Brunswick, 64  
 Bulgaria, 82  
 Burgenland, 89  
 Burke, 138  
 Butler, Dr. Nicholas Murray, 63  
 Caesar, 126  
 Camelots du Roi, 103  
 Canterbury, Archbishop of, the late, 13, 123  
 Canterbury, Dean of, 118  
 Capitalism, 47  
 Carroll, Lewis, 127  
 Catholic Centre Party, 14, 59  
 C.C.M.C.O., 118  
 Centralism, 65  
 Chamberlain, Neville, 70, 112, 114, 115, 130  
 Chemical Industry, German, 54  
 Chéradame, Mons., 29  
 Chicago Tribune, 77  
 Chichester, Bishop of, 15, 115  
 Christian Science Monitor, 19, 32  
 Christians in the Class Struggle, 118  
 Churches, the German, 11 *et seq.*, 116  
 Churchill, Winston, 30, 12  
 Claudian, 125  
 Clausewitz, 96, 120  
 Clémenceau, 129, 139  
 Coal Production, German, 31  
 Cologne, Cardinal Archbishop of, the late, 15  
 Coming World War, The, 29  
 Common Ownership, 118, 122  
 Common Sense versus Lord Vansittart, 69  
 Common Wealth Party, 69  
 Communications, 66  
 Communists, French, 103  
 Communists, German, 59, 60, 92, 94  
 Concentration camps, numbers in, 32  
 Conciliation by Conference, 78  
 Confessional Church, 18  
 Cope, Rev., 118 *et seq.*  
 Corridor, Polish, 100  
 Coué, Dr., 125  
 Council of Clergy and Ministers for Common Ownership, 118  
 Cove, M. P., 41  
 Coward, Noel, 121  
 Curzon, Lord, 127  
 Czechoslovakia, 90, 110 *et seq.*  
 D'Abernon, Lord, 20  
 Daladier, Mons., 112  
 Déat, 111  
 Decentralisation, 63, 66, 67  
 Deissmann, Adolf, 136  
 Democracy in Germany, 28, 60, 61, 67  
 Denmark, 31  
 Destruction, German policy of, 36, 37  
 Deutsch, Julius, 86  
 Deutsche Pfarrerblatt, Das, 20  
 Deutsche Rio-Zeitung, 15  
 Dion Cassius, 125  
 Disarmament, 24, 48, 50, 53, 54, 55, 76, 81, 93, 101, 116, 117  
 Disarmament Conference, 1932, 84  
 Disraeli, 70  
 Don't Let's be Beastly to the Germans, 121  
 Dresden, 63  
 Dreyfus, 103  
 Duelling, 56  
 Dumbarton Oaks, 77  
 Dutch, the, 102  
 East Prussia, 66, 99, 100  
 Ebert, 65, 92  
 Economist, The, 51  
 Edward VIII, 128  
 Ehrenburg, Ilya, 72  
 Eire, 82  
 Eisenhower, General, 39  
 Eisner, Kurt, 64  
 E.L.A.S., 110  
 Ennodius, 125  
 Entente, the, 104, 105, 108  
 Ermeland, Bishop of, 15  
 Eumenius, 125  
 Evacuation of occupied territories, 49

# INDEX

- Fichte, 133  
 Financial loans to Germany, 49, 52  
 Finland, 100  
 Fisher, H. A. L., 81  
 Fiume, 90  
 Foch, Marshal, 68, 139  
 Foerster, Professor W., 72  
*Foreign Policy Reports*, 99  
 Fosdick, Dr. H. E., 70  
 Fourteen Points, 70, 98, 139  
 Fraenkel, Heinrich, 23  
 France, 31, 76, 102 *et seq.*  
*France* (Bodley), 104  
 Frank (alias Hagen), 88  
 Frankfurt, 62, 63, 66  
 Frederick the Great, 71  
 Free German Committee, 92  
 Free German Movement in London, 23  
 Freiburg, Archbishop of, 15  
 Fulham, Bishop of, 115  
 "Full Larders, empty arsenals," 43  
*Future of Faith, The*, 115  
  
 Gamelin, General, 112  
 Garrick, David, 132  
 Gaulle, General de, 109  
*Gazette de Lausanne*, 15  
 Gerard, James, 17  
 German army, 91, 92  
 German Catholic Party, 14  
 German Churches, 11, 13, 16  
 German General Staff, 52, 55, 97  
 German heavy industrialists, 50, 94  
 German Left, 42, 43, 50, 94  
 German Lutheran Day, 18  
 German national responsibility for war, 44  
 German Navy, 66  
 German political parties, 59  
 German Right, 42, 49  
 German Underground Movement, 30, 32, 33, 36  
 German women, 51, 60  
 Gestapo, 31, 58  
 Glondys, Bishop Viktor, 20  
 Godesberg crisis, 113  
 Goebbels, 60, 93  
 Goethe, 69  
 Greece, 31, 40, 110  
 Green, William, 51  
 Grévy, le père, 103  
 Groener, General, 66  
  
 Haig, Field Marshal, 139  
 Hamburg, 62  
 Hankey, Donald, 68  
 Hanover, 62, 66  
 Hansa towns, 66  
 Harding, President, 104  
 Harsch, Joseph, 32  
 Hearst Press, 77  
 Heine, 136  
 Henlein, 111  
 Hesse, 64, 66  
 Hindenburg, 98  
 Hochschule für Politik, 21  
 Home Office, 94  
 Horace, 124  
 Hossenfelder, Pastor Joachim, 17  
 House, Colonel, 139  
 Hungary, 82, 89, 90  
*Hunting of the Snark, The*, 127  
  
 Ideological war, 117  
 I.G. Farben, 54, 57  
 Imperial German Staff, Budget of, 31  
 Independent Labour Party, 69  
 Inge, Dean, 71  
 Innitzer, Cardinal, 15, 90  
*Instinct of the Herd in Peace and War*, 8  
 Intelligence Service, Allied, in Germany, 61, 87  
 Italy, 89, 90  
  
 Jessop, Professor, 14  
 Johnson, Dr., 40, 122  
 Josephus, 126  
 Julian, 126  
 Junkers, 27, 49, 94  
  
 Kaiser, the, 96  
 Kaltenbrunner, 86  
 Kerl, Reichs Church Minister, 18  
 Keynes, Lord, 57  
 Kharkoff Trial, 121  
 Kiel Canal, 66  
 Kiel dockhands, 31  
 King-Hall, Commander, 74  
 Kipling, 105  
 Kirdorf, 26  
 Koenen Wilhelm, 22, 23  
 Koenigsberg, 100  
 Kriegk, 60  
 Krupp, 57  
 Kultur, 104  
 Kurhessen Nassau, 62  
  
 La Fontaine, 78  
 League of Nations, 45  
 Lebensraum, 83  
 Lebrun, President, 103  
 Leipart, 95  
 Leipzig, 63  
 Leuna Works, 54  
 Liebknecht, 93  
 Lippmann, Walter, 69  
 Litten, Frau, 23  
 Litten, Hans, 23  
 Lloyd George, 70, 129, 139  
 London Bureau of Austrian Socialists, 86  
 Loot, restoration of, 49, 57  
 "Los von Berlin," 63  
 "Los von Deutschland," 89  
 Louis XIV, 81  
 Louis Philippe, 81  
 Löwenstein, Prince Hubertus zu, 25  
 Lübeck, 62  
 Ludendorff, 98  
 Luther, Martin, 71, 133, 136  
 Lutheran Church, 17  
 Luxemburg, 12  
 Luxemburg, Rosa, 93  
  
 McCormick, Colonel, 77  
 Macdonald, Ramsay, 129, 130  
 Machine-tool industry, 51, 54  
 Maeterlinck, 8  
 Majority Socialist Party, 98  
 Malmesbury, Bishop of, 118, 123  
 Mann, Thomas, 37  
 Mannesmann, 26  
 Maquis, the, 109  
 Marahrens, Bishop, of Hanover, 18, 19  
 Marcellinus, 125  
*Marseillaise, La*, 77  
 Marx, Karl, 47  
 Masaryk, 102  
 Maugham, Lord, 110 *et seq.*  
 Meiser, Bishop of Munich, 18  
 Melbourne, Lord, 129  
 Messer, M. P., 41  
 Military training in Germany, 49, 50  
 Millerand, 129  
 "Montagu Norman Conquest," 46  
 Moscow Conference, 50, 86, 87  
 Moscow Declaration, 76, 78, 88, 92  
 Müller, Reich-Bischof, 18  
 Munich, 63, 85, 110 *et seq.*, 139

# INDEX

- Napoleon I, 105  
 National Free German Committee, 91  
 Nationalists, German, 59  
 National Liberals, 59  
 Nazarius, 125  
 Nazis, 53  
*Need Germany Survive?* 23  
 Neutrality, 82  
 New Deal, the, 48  
*New Europe*, 32  
*New York Herald Tribune*, 15  
 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 25  
 Niederlegungskommissionen, 36  
 Niemöller, Pastor, 18  
 Nietzsche, 20, 134  
 Nitrogen fixation plant, German, 54  
 "Norddeutsche Bund," 62  
  
 Occupation, Armies of, 53  
 Occupation of Germany, 8, 48, 53, 75, 76  
 Oedenburg-Sopron, 89, 90  
 Ogler-Waterham, Rev., 118  
 Omar Khayyam, 38  
 Osnabrück, Bishop of, 15  
 Oustric, 103  
  
 Palatinate, 66  
 Panama scandal, 103  
 Pan-Germanism, 86  
 Papen, 14  
 Pastoral Letter of German Catholic Bishops, 11 *et seq.*  
 Patent laws, 54  
 Paulus, Field Marshal, 95  
 Pausanias, 125  
 Pensions, German military, 55  
 Peoples Party, 59  
 Pershing, 139  
 Petain, Philippe, 103, 128  
 Petrol, German manufacture of synthetic, 54  
 Pieck, 60  
 Pitt, 80  
 Plato, 137  
*Pleasures of Quotation*, The, 124  
*Plebs* magazine, 68, 69  
 Plutarch, 126  
 Pocket battleships, 31  
 Poincaré, 129  
 Pola, 90  
 Poland, 14, 16, 28, 31 *et seq.*, 76, 99, 100, 101, 112  
 Police forces, German, 48, 50, 65  
 Polish Committee of National Liberation, 78  
 Polish underground movement, 14, 31, 33  
 Pomerania, 16, 66  
 Pomponius Mela, 125  
 Pope, His Holiness the, 118  
 Portugal, 82  
*Pravda*, 78  
 Preuss, Hugo, 64  
 Prince Albert, 62  
*Problem of Germany*, The, 67  
 Procopius, 125  
 Propaganda, 7, 38, 56, 70, 91, 108, 109  
 Prussia, 57, 58, 62, 63  
 Quintilian, 126  
 Radek, Karl, 97  
 Rauschnig, 21  
 Rawson, General Arturo, 127, 131  
 Rearmament, German, 30  
 Re-education, German, 49, 52, 71  
 Refugees, German, 7, 21, 24, 53, 72  
 Regional agreements, 83  
 Reichsbahngesellschaft, 64  
 Reichsbank, 55  
 Renner, 86, 90  
 Reparations, 56, 116  
 "République des Camarades," 103  
 Responsibility for War, German, 47, 71  
 Retribution, 40, 79  
 Revolution in Germany, 71, 92  
 Reynaud, 111, 112  
 Rhenish Westphalia, 64, 66  
 Rhine bridgeheads, 66  
 Rhineland, 66  
 Robertson, J. M., 8  
 Rochette, 103  
 Rocket war, 74  
 Roosevelt, President, 48  
 Rosenberg, 11  
*Rote Fahne*, 93  
 Royal Institute of International Affairs, 67  
 Rozier, Pilâtre de, 135  
 Rubber, synthetic, 54  
 Ruhr, the, 66, 108, 116  
 Rumania, 20, 100  
 Runciman Mission, 111  
 Rupprecht of Bavaria, Prince, 63  
 Russia, 31, 76, 88, 91, 100, 101, 105, 113  
 Russo-German Agreement 1939, 113  
 Saar, the, 66  
 St. Gotthard, 90  
 Salvianus, 125  
 San Gimignano, 137  
 Sarolea, Prof., 68, 72  
 Saxony, 64, 66  
 Schacht, Dr., 55  
 Scheidemann, 98  
 Schiff, Viktor, 22, 23  
 Schleicher, General, 95  
 Schleswig-Holstein, 66  
 Schmidt, Guido, 86  
 Schoenerer, 86  
 Security, Zones of, 83  
 Seger, 25, 32, 36  
 Seneca, 124  
 Seyss-Inquart, 86  
 Shuster, George N., 99  
 Sicherheitsdienst, 58  
 Sidonius Apollinaris, 125  
*Silent War*, The, 25  
 Skoda Works, 112  
 Small nations, 80  
 Smuts, General, 104  
 Social Democrats, 27, 58, 92, 93  
 Socialist Party, German, 59  
 Sollmann, Wilhelm, 25  
 South Tyrol, 89, 90  
*Soviet War News*, 121  
 Spain, 82  
 S.S., 58  
 Stalin, Marshal, 95  
 Stampfer, Friedrich, 25, 31, 36  
*Stars and Stripes*, 75  
 Stavisky, 103  
 Steel Industry, German, 54  
 Stokes, M.P., 41  
 Strabo, 125  
 Strauss, David, 133  
 Stresemann, 30, 64, 95  
*Student in Arms*, A, 68  
 Stuttgart, 64  
 "Sudeten-Germany," 28  
*Sunday Express*, The, 127  
 Sweden, 82  
 Symmachus, 125  
 Szombathely, 90  
  
 Tacitus, 123, 126  
 Talleyrand, 38  
 Third Republic, 103, 104  
 Thirty Years War, 47  
 Thompson, Dorothy, 26  
 Thucydides, 29  
 Thuringia, 64  
 Thyssen, 57



# INDEX

- |   |  |                                       |
|---|--|---------------------------------------|
| <i>Times, The</i> , 112                         | Vansittart, Lord, 41, 79               | Wells, H. G., 69                      |
| Tomkinson, Rev. H., 116, 117                    | Vansittartism, 71, 72, 80, 121         | Westphalia, 66                        |
| Treviranus, 21                                  | Vatican, The, 11                       | West Wall, the, 112                   |
| Trieste, 90                                     | Velleius Paterculus, 125               | Wilson, Daniel, 103                   |
| Trotter, Wilfred, 8                             | Versailles, Treaty of, 47, 48, 70, 116 | Wilson, President, 98, 139            |
| <i>Truth</i> , 124                              | Voltaire, 74                           | Wilson, Sir Horace, 114               |
| <i>Truth about the Munich Crisis, The</i> , 110 |  | "Win the Peace" Movement, 7           |
| Tukachevsky, General, 95                        | War criminals, 48, 50                  | Wolseley, Lord, 68                    |
| Turkey, 82                                      | War materials, 55                      | Wuerttemberg, 62, 64, 66              |
|   | War memorials, 56                      | Würm, Bishop, of Wuerttemberg, 18, 19 |
|   | War potential, German, 49, 52          |                                       |
| Ulbricht, 60                                    | Washington Naval Conference, 84        | York, Archbishop of, 123              |
| Unconditional surrender, 48, 52                 | <i>Wasna Polska</i> , 77               | Yugoslavia, 12, 20, 31, 90            |
| Uniforms, German, 49                            | Watts, Mr., 102                        |                                       |
| United States, 84, 91, 101, 105, 106, 130       | Weber, August, 23                      |                                       |
| Universities, German, 56                        | Weimar Constitution, 14                | Zara, 90                              |
|   | Weimar Government, 95                  | Zeiss, 57                             |



**AIDE-de-CAMP'S LIBRARY**

Accn. No.....365.....

1. Books may be retained for a period not exceeding fifteen days.

